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Summary
The design and verification of concurrent and real-time systems are notoriously difficult problems.
Among the software validation techniques, model checking approach has been proved to be suc-
cessful as an automatic and effective solution. In this thesis, we study the verification of concurrent
and real-time systems using model checking approach.
First, we design an integrated formal language for concurrent and real-time modeling, which com-
bines high-level specification languages with mutable data variables and low-level procedural codes
for the purpose of efficient system analysis, in particular, model checking. Timing requirements are
captured using behavior patterns like deadline, time out, etc. A formal semantic model is defined
for this language.
Based on this modeling language, we investigate LTL verification problem with focus of fairness
assumptions, and refinement checking problem with following results.
1. We propose a unified on-the-fly model checking algorithm to handle a variety of fairness
assumptions, which is further tuned to support parallel verification in multi-core architecture
with shared memory. We apply the proposed algorithm on a set of self-stabilizing population
protocols, which only work under global fairness. One previously unknown bug is discovered
in a leader election protocol. Population protocols are designed for networks with large or
even unbounded number of nodes, which gives the space explosion problem. To solve this
problem, we develop a process counter abstraction technique to handle parameterized systems
under fairness. We show that model checking under fairness is feasible, even without the
knowledge of process identifiers.
2. Based on the ideas in FDR, we present an on-the-fly model checking algorithm for refinement
checking, incorporated with advanced model checking techniques. This algorithm is success-
fully applied in automatic linearizability verification and conformance checking between Web
Services.
Symbolic model checking is capable of handling large state space. We present an alternative solution
for LTL verification using bounded model checking approach. Hierarchical systems are encoded as
SAT problems. The encoding avoids exploring the full state space for complex systems so as to
avoid state space explosion.
To support verification of real-time systems, we propose an approach using a fully automated ab-
straction technique to build an abstract finite state machine from the real-time model. We show that
the abstraction has finite state and is subject to model checking. Furthermore, it weakly bi-simulates
the concrete model and we can perform LTL model checking, refinement checking and even timed
refinement checking upon the abstraction.
The results of this thesis are embodied in the design and implementation of a self-contained frame-
work: Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT), which supports composing, simulating and reasoning of con-
current and real-time systems. This framework includes all of the proposed techniques: deadlock-
freedom, reachability, LTL checking, refinement checking and etc. PAT adopts an extensible design,
which allows new languages and verification algorithms to be supported easily. Currently, three
modules have been developed in PAT. The experiment results show that PAT is capable of verifying
systems with large number of states and complements the state-of-the-art model checkers in several
aspects.
Key words: Formal Verification, Concurrent and Real-time Systems, Model Checking, PAT,
LTL Model Checking, Fairness, Partial Order Reduction, Process Counter Abstraction, Re-
finement Checking, Bounded Model Checking, Timed Zone Abstraction, Timed Refinement
Checking, Population Protocol, Linearizability, Web Service Conformance
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The design and verification of concurrent and real-time systems are notoriously difficult problems.
In particular, the interaction of concurrent processes in large systems often leads to subtle bugs
that are extremely difficult to discover using the conventional techniques of simulation and testing.
Automated verification based on model checking promises a more effective way of discovering
design errors, which has been used successfully in practice to verify complex software systems.
1.1 Motivation and Goals
With the fast development of IT industry, our reliance on the functioning of software systems is
growing rapidly. These systems are becoming more and more complicated and are massively en-
croaching on daily life, e.g., the Internet, embedded systems, mobile devices and so on. This is
especially true for concurrent and real-time systems, which have concurrent executions, shared
resources and timing factors. Failure is unacceptable for mission critical systems like electronic
commerce, telephone switching networks, air traffic control systems, medical instruments, and nu-
merous other examples. We frequently read of incidents where catastrophic failure is caused by an
error in software systems, as some examples listed below.
1
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• Pentium bug: Intel Pentium II chip, released in 1994 produced error in floating point division.
Cost: $475 million
• Ariane 5 failure: In December 1996, the Ariane 5 rocket exploded 40 seconds after takeoff,
by an overflow generated by converting a 64-bit floating-point number into a 16-bit integer.
Cost: $400 million
• Therac-25 accident: A software failure caused wrong dosages of x-rays.
Cost: Human Loss.
In a recent example, the 2010 Toyota recall that can cost excess of 2 billion USD has been quite
surprising for the people, who have been acquainted with the successful history of this company.
Much of the cost, damage to the company’s reputation, and the uncertainty regarding the nature
of the problems, could have been avoided if the correctness of the software components has been
established beyond doubt.
Clearly, the need for reliable software systems is crucial. As the involvement of such systems in
our lives increases, so too does the burden for ensuring their correctness. Therefore, it will become
more important to develop methods that increase our confidence in the correctness of such systems.
The principal validation methods for complex systems are simulation, testing, deductive verification,
and model checking. Model checking is a method of automatically verifying concurrent systems in
which a finite state model of a system is compared with a correctness requirement. The process
of model checking can be separated into system modeling, requirement specification and verifica-
tion. It has a number of advantages over other traditional approaches. This method has been used
successfully in practice to verify complex circuit design and communication protocols.
In this thesis, our research focuses on model checking of concurrent and real-time systems. In partic-
ular, we have tried to address four issues related to model checking: (i) proposing a formal language
to model concurrent and real-time systems, (ii) exploring efficient model checking algorithms and
reduction techniques, (iii) implementing a toolkit to support effective software verification, and (iv)
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applying the proposed model checking techniques in different domains. The concrete issues that
require more research efforts are elaborated below in the order of the process of model checking.
System Modeling
Formal modeling languages and notations have much to offer in the achievement of technical quality
in system development. Precise notations and languages help to make specifications unambiguous
while improving intuitiveness, increasing consistency and making it possible to detect errors auto-
matically with the support of effective tools. Over the last few decades, many formal modeling lan-
guages have been proposed [108, 222, 75, 183, 150, 120, 155, 10]. Formal modeling languages and
notations are generally logic-based formalisms, which are divided into two groups, state-oriented
formalisms, including VDM [120], Z [222], Object-Z [75], etc., and event-oriented formalisms,
including Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [108], CCS [155], Timed CSP [183], π-
calculus [155], etc. The formalisms based on the notion of state machines1 include finite state
machines, Statecharts [104], Petri-net [165], Timed Automata [10], etc.
We are particular interested in the event-based modeling languages like CSP, CCS for their rich
set of concurrent operators and compositional structure (to achieve a modular design by nature).
CSP has passed the test of time. It has been widely accepted and influenced the design of many
recent programming and specification languages. Nonetheless, modeling systems with non-trivial
data structures and functional aspects completely using languages like CSP remains difficult. In
order to solve the problem, many specification languages integrating process algebras like CSP or
CCS with state-based specification languages like the Z language or Object-Z have been proposed.
The state-based language component is typically used to specify the data states of the system and
the associated data operations in a declarative style. Examples include Circus [221] (i.e., an inte-
gration of CSP and the Z language), CSP-OZ [86] (i.e., an integration of CSP and Object-Z) and
TCOZ [152] (i.e., an integration of Timed CSP and Object-Z). However, because declarative speci-
fication languages like Z are very expressive and not executable, automated analyzing (in particular,
1State machine is a model of behavior composed of a number of states.
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model checking) of systems modeled using the integrated languages is extremely difficult.
During the last decade or so, a popular approach for specifying real-time systems is based on the
notation Timed Automata [10, 149]. Timed Automata are powerful in designing real-time models
with explicit clock variables. Real-time constraints are captured by explicitly setting/reseting clock
variables. Models based on Timed Automata often adapt a simple structure, e.g. a network of Timed
Automata with no hierarchy [135]. The benefit is that efficient model checking is made feasible.
Nonetheless, designing and verifying hierarchical real-time systems is becoming an increasingly
difficult task due to the widespread applications and increasing complexity of such systems. As a
result, users often need to manually cast high-level compositional time patterns into a set of clock
variables with carefully calculated clock constraints. The process is tedious and error-prone.
One goal of this thesis is to design an integrated modeling language for concurrent and real-time
systems, which is sufficiently expressive, but is still subject to model checking.
Requirement Specification and Verification
Critical system requirements like safety, liveness and fairness play important roles in system spec-
ification, verification and development. Safety properties ensure that something undesirable never
happens. Liveness properties state that something desirable must eventually happen. Fairness prop-
erties state that if something is enabled sufficiently often, then it must eventually happen. Often,
fairness assumptions are necessary to prove liveness properties.
Over the last decades, specification and verification of safety properties (e.g., deadlockfreeness and
reachability) have been studied extensively. The concept of liveness itself is problematic [132].
Fairness constraints have been proved to be an effective way of expressing liveness, and is also
important in system specification and verification. For instance, without fairness constraints, verify-
ing of liveness properties may often produce counterexamples which are due to un-fair executions,
e.g., a process or choice is infinitely ignored. State-based fairness constraints have been well stud-
ied in automata theory based on accepting states, e.g., in the setting of Büchi/Rabin/Streett/Muller
automata [209]. It has been observed that the notion of fairness is not easily combined with the
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bottom-up type of compositionality (of process algebra for instance [170]), which is important for
attacking the complexity of system development. Existing model checkers are ineffective with re-
spect to fairness [202]. It is desirable to develop effective fairness verification algorithm. Especially
it is proven that the correctness of recently developed population protocols requires fairness [14, 88].
In this thesis, we focus on liveness properties expressed in Linear Temporal Logics (LTL)2, which
allows potentially on-the-fly verification algorithms to be developed [61].
In order to verify hierarchical systems, more general specifications like refinement relation are
needed. In these cases, the requirement is modeled using an abstract model rather than a logic
formula, which gives more expressive power. FDR (Failures-Divergence Refinement) [175] is the
de facto refinement analyzer, which has been successfully applied in various domains. Based on the
model checking algorithm presented in [175] and later improved with other reduction techniques
presented in [179], FDR is capable of handling large systems. Nonetheless, since FDR was initially
introduced, model checking techniques have evolved much further in the last two decades. A num-
ber of effective reduction methods have been proposed which greatly enlarge the size the systems
that can be handled. Some noticeable ones include partial order reduction, symmetry reduction,
predicate abstraction, etc. It is worth revisiting this algorithm by incorporating new techniques.
For the real-time systems, previous works [135, 35, 35, 217, 207, 33] focus on the flat modeling
structure, like Timed Automata. Verification for hierarchical languages is less studied. To the
best of our knowledge, there are few verification support for Timed CSP, e.g. the theorem proving
approaches documented in [40, 101], the translation to UPPAAL models [70, 71] and the approach
based on constraint solving [72]. Regarding the timed refinement checking, tool support is also
very limited. One of the reasons is that Timed Automata, which extended Büchi Automata with
clocks [10], is designed to capture infinite languages. The refinement checking (or equivalently
the language inclusion) problem is undecidable in the setting of Timed Automata [10], because the
language of Timed Automata is not closed under complement. Effective verification algorithms and
reduction techniques are always desirable when real-time is involved.
2For model checking, there is no practical complexity advantage to restrict oneself to a particular temporal logic [80].
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Model checking approach works only with finite state space3 and suffers from the state space explo-
sion problems. We need to develop advanced techniques to cope with this limitation. First, symbolic
model checking have been proved as a successful representation for state graph, which can handle
large system state up to 1020 [44], which may be a promising approach for verifying hierarchical
systems. Second, effective reduction techniques have been developed during the last two decades,
e.g., partial order reduction [214], symmetry reduction, etc. Therefore, problem specific reduction
can be developed when we design the verification algorithms. Third, to handle infinite state spaces,
sound abstraction techniques are required, e.g. to handle infinite number of similar processes or
apply model checking in real number clocks. Fourth, additional computation resources can be used
to speed up the verification, e.g., parallel verification using multi-core CPU.
Tool Support
Effective tool development has always been the focus of model checking community. Since 1980,
there is an ample set of model checkers developed. General propose model checkers for concurrent
systems include NuSMV [53], SPIN [111], mCRL2 [102] and so on. Verification tools for real-time
systems include UPPAAL [135], KRONOS [35], RED [217], Timed COSPAN [207], Rabbit [33]
and so on. The success of these tools is shown in establishing the correctness of various systems
and finding critical bugs in published algorithm and real-world applications. With the focus on the
performance, most tools ignore the following aspects in their design, which may limit their usage.
Usability To be a useful tool, model checkers should be self-contained and offer user friendly
interfaces to support system editing, animated simulation, and parameterized verification.
Extensibility Most tools are designed for certain systems or favor for particular requirements. Ex-
tensibility of new model checking algorithm or input modeling language is rarely mentioned.
A structural design shall make the support of new algorithm or language relative easy by
reusing the existing model checking algorithms and libraries.
3Though this is generally true, a considerable amount of effort has been expended on applying model checking to
infinite state models [140, 84, 4].
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To add to our understanding of the field, we aim to develop efficient model checker with the consid-
eration of the above points.
1.2 Summary of Contributions
The main results of this thesis are embodied in the design and implementation of Process Analysis
Toolkit (PAT), a self-contained framework for the automatic analysis of concurrent and real-time
systems. The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We design an integrated formal language4 for concurrent and real-time modeling, which com-
bines high-level specification languages with mutable data variables and low-level procedural
codes for the purpose of efficient system analysis, in particular, model checking. Timing
requirements for real-time systems are captured using behavior patterns like deadline, time
out, etc. Instead of explicitly manipulating clock variables (as in Timed Automata), the time
related process constructs are designed to build on implicit clocks. Furthermore, we formally
define the semantic model for the language, which facilitates PAT to perform sound and com-
plete system verification.
• We develop a unified on-the-fly model checking algorithm which handles a variety of fair-
ness including process-level weak/strong fairness, event-level weak/strong fairness, strong
global fairness, etc. The algorithm extends previous work on model checking based on find-
ing strongly connected components (SCC). To give flexibility, we propose several fairness
annotations on individual events, which allows effective reduction techniques used together
with the proposed fairness verification. Furthermore, we present a parallel version of the
proposed algorithm in multi-core shared-memory architecture. The parallel algorithm is per-
formed on-the-fly with little overhead. Experimental results (see Section 4.7) show that our
4The proposed language borrows syntax and semantics of CSP. Though it is not compositional as original CSP, all the
verification algorithms presented in this thesis require no compositionality.
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algorithm is more effective compared to SPIN to prove or disprove fairness enhanced sys-
tems. The parallel algorithm is shown to be scalable to the number of CPU-cores, especially
when a system search space contains many SCCs. We apply the proposed fairness model
checking algorithms on a set of self-stabilizing population protocols for ring networks, which
only work under fairness. We report on our model checking results. Especially, we discover
one previously unknown bug in a leader election protocol [118].
• We develop a novel technique for model checking parameterized systems under fairness,
against Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae. We show that model checking under fairness
is feasible, even without the knowledge of process identifiers. This is done by systematically
keeping track of the local states from which actions are enabled / executed within any infinite
loop of the abstract state space. We develop necessary theorems to prove the soundness of
our technique, and also present efficient on-the-fly model checking algorithms.
• Based on the ideas in FDR [175], we present a on-the-fly model checking algorithm for re-
finement relations verification. Our algorithm is designed to incorporate advanced model
checking techniques, e.g. partial order reduction, to analyze event-based hierarchical system
models.
• We apply the refinement checking algorithm to automatically check linearizability [107]
based on refinement relations from abstract specifications to concrete implementations. Our
method avoids the often difficult task of determining linearization points in implementations,
but can also take advantage of linearization points if they are given. We have checked a va-
riety of implementations of concurrent objects, including the first algorithms for the mailbox
problem [19] and scalable NonZero indicators [78].
• We apply the refinement checking algorithm to automatically check consistency between Web
Service choreography and Web Service orchestration by showing conformance relationship
between the choreography and the orchestration. The algorithm is further extended with data
support and specialized optimizations for Web services.
• We presents a bounded model checking approach to verify LTL properties using composi-
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tional encoding of hierarchical systems as satisfiability (SAT) problems. State-of-the-art SAT
solvers are then applied for bounded model checking. The encoding avoids exploring the full
state space for complex systems so as to avoid state space explosion. The experiment re-
sults show that our approach has a competitive performance for verifying systems with large
number of states.
• We propose an approach for modeling and verifying hierarchical real-time systems, which
uses a fully automated abstraction technique to build an abstract finite state machine from the
real-time model. The idea is to dynamically create clocks to capture constraints introduced by
the timed process constructs. A clock may be shared for many constructs in order to reduce
the number of clocks. Further, the clocks are deleted as early as possible. During system
exploration, a constraint on the active clocks is maintained and solved using techniques based
on Difference Bound Matrix (DBM [68]). We show that the abstraction has finite state and is
subject to model checking. Further, it weakly bi-simulates the concrete model and, therefore,
we may perform sound and complete LTL model checking or refinement checking upon the
abstraction. To facilitate timed refinement checking, we formally define a timed trace seman-
tics and a timed trace refinement relationship. We extend the zone abstraction technique to
preserve timed event traces; hence timed refinement checking is possible. We provide the first
solution for model checking Timed CSP and timed refinement checking.
• We develop Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT), a self-contained tool to support composing, sim-
ulating and reasoning of different concurrent systems. PAT implements all proposed model
checking techniques catering for checking deadlock-freeness, reachability, LTL checking,
refinement checking and etc. To achieve good performance, advanced techniques are imple-
mented like partial order reduction, process counter abstraction, bounded model checking,
parallel model checking, etc. PAT is designed to be a generic framework, which can be easily
extended to support a system with new languages syntax and verification algorithms. The
experiment results show that PAT is capable of verifying systems with large number of states
and complements the state-of-the-art model checkers in many aspects.
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1.3 Thesis Outline and Overview
In this section, we briefly present the outline of the thesis and overview of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is devoted to an introduction of model checking techniques in the order of model checking
process. First, systems are modeled using Kripke structures. Second, specification can be written
using temporal logic, particular LTL. Last, the verification is done using dedicated algorithms with
reduction techniques like partial order reduction. The basics about real-time model checking are
explained in the end of this chapter.
Chapter 3 introduces an integrated modeling language with formally defined syntax and operational
semantics. The semantics model is interpreted using Labeled Transition System (LTS). A multi-lift
system and Fischer’s algorithm are used to illustrate the language.
In Chapter 4, we study the LTL verification problem under different fairness assumptions. A fair-
ness model checking approach based on Tarjan’s SCC detection algorithm is proposed. To give
flexibility, we propose several fairness annotations on individual events, which allow effective re-
duction techniques used together with the proposed fairness verification. Furthermore, we present a
parallel version of the proposed algorithm for multi-core shared-memory architecture.
In Chapter 5, we apply the algorithms developed in Chapter 4 to self-stabilizing population proto-
cols. One previously unknown bug is discovered in a leader election protocol [118]. Population
protocols are designed on a large or even unbounded number of similar processes, which raises the
state explosion problem. To solve this problem, we propose a process counter abstraction technique.
Chapter 6 introduces trace refinement relations and proposes a refinement checking algorithm incor-
porated with advanced reduction techniques, like partial order reduction. In Chapter 7, we apply the
proposed refinement algorithm on linearizability checking and web service conformance checking.
Chapter 8 presents a compositional encoding of hierarchical processes as satisfiability (SAT) prob-
lem and then applies state-of-the-art SAT solvers for bounded model checking. This encoding avoids
exploring the full state space for complex systems so as to deal with state space explosion.
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Chapter 9 explains our solution to verify hierarchical real-time systems. We develop an automated
abstraction technique to build an abstract finite state machine from the real-time model. We show
that the abstraction has finite state and is amenable to model checking. Further, we present al-
gorithms for LTL model checking, refinement checking and timed refinement checking upon the
abstraction.
Chapter 10 presents PAT, a general framework to support composing, simulating and reasoning
of different concurrent systems. The system architecture, workflow, functionalities and details of
existing modules are explained in this chapter.
Chapter 11 summaries the contributions of the thesis and discusses future research directions.
1.4 Publications from the Thesis
Most of the work presented in this thesis has been published or accepted in international conference
proceedings or journals.
The work in Chapter 3 was presented at The 3rd IEEE International Symposium on Theoretical
Aspects of Software Engineering TASE’09 (July 2009) [194]. The work in Section 4.5 was pre-
sented at The 10th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods ICFEM’08 (Novem-
ber 2008) [202]. The work in Section 4.6 is accepted at The 11th International Conference on
Formal Engineering Methods ICFEM’09 (December 2009) [147]. The work in Section 5.1 to Sec-
tion 5.3 was used as a basis for the paper presented at The 3rd IEEE International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Software Engineering TASE’09 (July 2009) [144]. The work in Section 5.4
to Section 5.7 is accepted at The 16th International Symposium on Formal Methods FM’09 (Novem-
ber 2009) [204]. The work in Chapter 6 was presented in an invited paper at The 3rd International
Symposium on Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation ISoLA’08
(October 2008) [193]. The work in Section 7.1 to Section 7.3 is accepted at The 16th International
Symposium on Formal Methods FM’09 (November 2009) [143]. One case study in Section 7.3
was published in The 21st International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge En-
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gineering SEKE’09 (July 2009) [225]. The work in Chapter 8 was presented in a paper at The
2nd IEEE International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Software Engineering TASE’08 (June
2008) [199], and a journal article in 2nd volume of The Frontiers of Computer Science in China
journal [200]. The work in Chapter 9 is accepted at The 11th International Conference on Formal
Engineering Methods ICFEM’09 (December 2009) [203]. The work in Chapter 10 was the basis for
the paper published in The 30th International Conference on Software Engineering ICSE’08 (May
2008) [146], and the paper published in The 21st International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification CAV’09 (June 2009) [197].
Part of Chapter 4 has been submitted for publication [195]. A paper including the web service con-
formance checking presented in Section 7.4 to Section 7.7 has been submitted for publication [198].
Part of Section 9.2.3 has been submitted for publication [201]. I also made contributions to other
publications [145, 73] which are remotely related this thesis.
For all the publications mentioned above, I have contributed substantially in both theory develop-
ment and tool implementation.
Chapter 2
Background
The principal validation methods for complex systems include testing, simulation, deductive verifi-
cation, and model checking. Simulation and testing approaches send the test signal at input-points
and check the signal at the output-points. These two methods may become very expensive for
complex, asynchronous systems. More importantly, they cover only a limited subset of possible be-
haviors. Deductive verification uses axioms and proof rules to prove the correctness of the systems,
which can handle infinite state systems. However, it is a manual approach, very time-consuming
and can only be used by experts. Model checking is an automatic approach for verifying finite state
systems. It differs from other methods in two crucial aspects: (1) it does not aim of being fully
general, and (2) it is fully algorithmic and of low computational complexity1.
After two decades’ development, model checking has covered a wide area including a number of
different approaches (e.g. explicit model checking, symbolic model checking, probabilistic model
checking, etc.) and techniques (e.g. partial order reduction, binary decision diagrams, abstraction,
symmetry reduction, etc.). In this chapter, we cover basic knowledge of model checking and con-
cepts related to this thesis. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 gives
a brief introduction to model checking. Section 2.2 explains how the systems should be modeled in
1The complexity of most model checking algorithms is proportional to the state space or the product of the state space
and property.
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model checking approaches. Section 2.3 enumerates several specifications and related algorithms
to verify them. Section 2.4 covers the background knowledge of real-time model checking.
2.1 Basics of Model Checking
Model checking [58] is a verification technique that explores all possible system states in a brute-
force manner. Therefore, model checking is not feasible for infinite state space systems, which is
caused by unbounded data size or infinite number of processes. The performance of model checking
approach is related to the size of the system state space. It is a real challenge to examine the
largest possible state space that can be handled by limited processors and memories. State-of-the-
art model checkers can handles state space of about 108 to 109 states [111] with explicit state-space
enumeration. The main challenge in model checking is dealing with the state space explosion
problem. This problem occurs in systems with many components that can interact with each other
or data structures with many different values. In such cases, the number of global states can be
enormous. The linear increment of the interaction or data values will give exponential increment of
the state space. For example, a concurrent program with k processes can have a state graph of size
exp(k). During the last ten years, considerable research works have been focusing on this problem.
The process of model checking consists of several tasks. First of all, system design is converted
into a formalism accepted by model checking tools. The requirement of the systems is abstracted
as logic specifications. One common example is temporal logic, which can assert how the behavior
of the system evolves over time. The verification of the specification against the system model is
generally conducted automatically. If the result is negative, the user is often provided with a witness
trace (or counterexample). The analyzing of the error trace may require modifications to the model
and repeat the model checking process. Each process of the model checking, namely modeling,
specification and verification, will be explained in the following sections.
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2.2 System Modeling
First of all, we convert the system, which should be examined, into a formalism accepted by a model
checking tool. Formal modeling is a difficult and critical step. Sometimes, owing to limitations on
time and memory, the modeling of a design may require the use of abstraction. It may not be
so simple to provide the model, because on the one hand relevant or important points must be
represented in the model, on the other hand unnecessary details should be eliminated. For example,
when reasoning about a communication protocol we may want to focus on the exchange of messages
and ignore the actual contents of the messages.
A state (or configuration) is a snapshot or instantaneous description2 of the system that captures
program counter and the values of the variables at a particular instant of time. The state change as
the result of some action of the system is described by transitions, which is a pair of states with an
action (or event) linking them. A computation of a system is a finite or infinite sequence of states
where each state is obtained from the previous state by some transition. We use a state transition
graph called a Kripke structure [113] to formally model a system.
Definition 1 (Kripke structure) Let AP be a non-empty set of atomic propositions. A Kripke
structure M over a set of atomic propositions AP is a four-tuple M = (S ,S0,R,L), where S
is a finite set of states; S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states; R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation;
L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions true in this
state.
A Kripke structure is a graph having the reachable states of the system as nodes and state transitions
of the system as edges. It also contains a labeling of the states of the system with properties that hold
in each state. In this thesis, we adopt an event-based formalism. Therefore we extend the transitions
in Kripke structure with events (denoted as Σ) to link the pair of states.
2The components of state are determined by the actual modeling language. See Section 3.1.2 for the state definition
of the proposed modeling language in this thesis.
2.3. SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 16
2.3 Specification and Verification
Specifications are the properties that the design must satisfy. There are different ways to express
properties. In state-based formalisms, properties are generally stated using temporal logics to spec-
ify how the system evolves over time. These properties are divided into two categories: safety prop-
erties and liveness properties. In this section, we present the common properties and algorithms
(and techniques) used to verify them.
2.3.1 Safety Property
A safety property is a property stating that “something bad never happens". Generally, safety re-
quirements include the absence of deadlocks and similar critical states that can cause the system to
crash.
Deadlock Sequential programs that are not subject to divergence (e.g., endless loops) have a ter-
minal state, which has no outgoing transitions. For concurrent systems, however, computations
typically do not terminate. In such case, terminal states are undesirable and mostly represent a de-
sign error. Apart from simple design errors where it has been forgotten to indicate certain activities,
in most cases such terminal states indicate a deadlock. A deadlock occurs if the complete system
is in a terminal state, although at least one component is in a (local) nonterminal state. A typical
deadlock scenario occurs when components mutually wait for each other to progress.
A more general form of safety property can be stated as a logic formula of the atomic propositions,
e.g., ¬(cs0 ∧ cs1) is a safety property for mutual exclusion problem meaning that process 0 and
process 1 cannot be in the critical section at the same time.
To verify safety properties, we simply need to conduct a depth first search (or breadth first search)
in the state space. During the search, if the reached state is undesirable (e.g., having no outgoing
transitions in case of deadlock checking), then we detect an evidence trace as a counterexample.
The algorithm (based on depth first search) has been implemented in PAT, which gives a linear time
complexity in the size of the state space.
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Note that, in the event-oriented world, deadlock-freedom is a liveness property rather than safety
property. In practice, safety and liveness do not apply well in a pure event-based formalism. “Some-
thing" that happens (or not) is really a configuration of the system and/or its environment, not nec-
essarily an observable event. In this thesis, we treat deadlock as a safety property.
2.3.2 Liveness Properties and Linear Temporal Logics
Different from safety properties, liveness properties mean that “something good" will eventually
happen. Safety properties are violated in finite time, liveness properties are violated in infinite time,
i.e., by infinite system runs. For example, in a mutual exclusion algorithm, typical examples of
liveness properties are including:
• (eventually) each process will eventually enter its critical section;
• (repeated eventually) each process will enter its critical section infinitely often;
• (starvation freedom) each waiting process will eventually enter its critical section.
To model liveness properties, the common practice is to use Temporal Logics, e.g. Computation Tree
Logic (CTL) [55], Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [188] and CTL* [56]. It is known that, for purposes
of model checking, there is no practical complexity advantage to restrict oneself to a particular
temporal logic [80]. In this thesis, we focus on LTL as the algorithms proposed later are consistent
with LTL model checking.
Definition 2 Let Pr be a set of propositions and Σ be a set of events. A LTL formula is,





where p ranges over Pr and a ranges over Σ. Let π = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , ei , si , · · ·〉 be an infinite
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execution. Let πi be the suffix of π starting from si .
πi  p ⇔ si  p
πi  a ⇔ ei−1 = a
πi  ¬φ ⇔ ¬(πi  φ)
πi  φ ∧ ψ ⇔ πi  φ ∧ πi  ψ
πi  Xφ ⇔ πi+1  φ
πi 
2
φ ⇔ ∀ j ≥ i • πj  φ
πi 
3
φ ⇔ ∃ j ≥ i • πj  φ
πi  φUψ ⇔ ∃ j ≥ i • πj  ψ ∧ ∀ k | i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 • πj  φ
Informally, Xφ means φ has to hold at the next state.
2
φ means φ has to hold at all states in the
execution.
3
φ means φ eventually has to hold in some state of the execution. φUψ means that φ
has to hold at least until ψ, which holds at the current or a future position.
Using LTL, safety properties can be specified as formula
2
¬p, where p is the undesired property.
Regarding the three liveness properties in the mutual exclusion example, they can be formulated as
follows, where csi means the process i is in the critical section, and waitingi means the process i












Note that because we are dealing with an event-based formalism (see Chapter 3 for the proposed
language) in this thesis, it would be meaningful if the properties may concern both states and events.
For instance, waitingi and csi in the examples above are events. The simplicity of writing formulae
concerning events as in the above examples is not purely a matter of aesthetics. It may yield gains
in time and space (refer to examples in [50]).
Explicit state model checking uses a graph to represent a Kripke structure with nodes for states and
edges for transitions. The input model is converted into a corresponding automaton M, and the
negation of the LTL specification φ is translated into a Büchi automaton B¬φ. Then, the emptiness
2.3. SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 19
of the product of M and B¬φ is checked. If the product is not empty, a counterexample is reported.
Algorithms (of model checking finite state systems) based on the explicit state enumeration could
be improved if only a fraction of the reachable states are explored. In many cases, it is possible to
avoid constructing the entire state space of the model. This is because the states of the automaton
are generated only when needed, while checking the emptiness of its intersection with the property
automaton B. This tactic is called on-the-fly model checking [61, 110]. Instead of constructing
the automata for both M and B¬φ first, we will only construct the property automaton B¬φ. We
then use it to guide the construction of the system automaton M while computing the product.
In this way, we may frequently construct only a small portion of the state space before we find a
counterexample to the property being checked.
One advantage of on-the-fly model checking is that when computing the intersection of the system
automaton M with the property automaton B, some states of M may never be generated at all.
Another advantage of the on-the-fly procedure is that a counterexample may be found before com-
pleting the construction of the intersection of the two automata. Once a counterexample has been
found and reported, there is no need to complete the construction. Interested readers can refer to
Section 4.3 for more details of this approach.
2.3.3 Partial Order Reduction
Systems that consist of a set of components that cooperatively solve a certain task are quite com-
mon in practice, e.g. hardware systems, communications protocols, distributed systems, and so on.
Typically, such systems are specified as the parallel composition of n processes. The state space of
this specification equals in worst case the product of the state spaces of the components. A major
cause of this state space explosion is the representation of parallel by means of interleaving. Inter-
leaving is based on the principle that a system run is a totally ordered sequence of actions. In order
to represent all possible runs of the systems, all possible interleaving of actions of components need
to be represented. For checking a large class of properties, however, it is sufficient to check only
some representative of all these interleavings.
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For example, if two processes both increment an integer variable in successive steps, the end result
is the same regardless of the order in which these assignments occur. The underlying idea of this
approach is to reduce the interleaving representation into a partial-order representation. System
runs are now no longer totally ordered sequences, but partially ordered sequences. The partial
order reduction technique [213, 164] aims at reducing the size of the state space that needs to be
explored by model checking algorithms. It exploits the commutativity of concurrently executed
transitions, which result in the same state when executed in different orders.
The method consists of constructing a reduced state graph. The full state graph, which may be
too big to fit in memory, is never constructed. The behaviors of the reduced graph are a subset
of the behaviors of the full state graph. The justification of the reduction method shows that the
behaviors that are not present do not add any information. More precisely, it is possible to define
an equivalence relation among behaviors such that the checked property cannot distinguish between
equivalent behaviors. If a behavior is not present in the reduced state graph, then an equivalent
behavior must be included.
2.4 Model Checking Real-time Systems
Computers are frequently used in critical applications where predictable response times are essential
for correctness. Such systems are called real-time systems. Examples of such applications include
controllers for aircraft, industrial machinery and robots. Due to the nature of such applications,
errors in real-time systems can be extremely dangerous, even fatal. Guaranteeing the correctness of
a complex real-time system is an important and nontrivial task.
There are two time semantics in the definition of real-time systems. Discrete-time semantics [11]
requires that all time readings are integers and all clocks increment their readings at the same time.
The other choice is dense-time semantics [9], which means that time readings can be rational num-
bers or real numbers and all clocks increment their readings at a uniform rate. We discuss the two
semantics in the following paragraphs.
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2.4.1 Discrete-time Systems
When time is discrete, possible clock values are nonnegative integers, and events can only occur
at integer time values. This type of model is appropriate for synchronous systems, where all of the
components are synchronized by a single global clock. The duration between successive clock ticks
is chosen as the basic unit for measuring time. This model has been successfully used for reasoning
about the correctness of synchronous hardware designs for many years.
In discrete-time models, we require that there is a single global clock. Therefore, there is a sim-
ple and obvious way [133] to support it: introduce a clock variable now , whose value represents
the current time, and model the passage of time with a Tick action that increments now . For a
continuous-time specification, Tick might increment now by any real number; for a discrete-time
specification, it increments now by 1. Timing bounds on actions are specified with one of three
kinds of timer variables: a countdown timer is decremented by the Tick action, a count-up timer is
incremented by Tick , and an expiration timer is left unchanged by Tick . A countdown or count-up
timer expires when its value reaches some value; an expiration timer expires when its value minus
now reaches some value. An upper-bound timing constraint on when an action A must occur is
expressed by an enabling condition on the Tick action that prevents an increase in time from vio-
lating the constraint; a lower-bound constraint on when A may occur is expressed by an enabling
condition on A that prevents it from being executed earlier than it should be.
Alternative approaches are using quantitative temporal analysis for discrete-time systems [81, 46].
These approaches extend CTL with bounded until operator [81] to support the specification of tim-
ing constraints between two actions. One example query can be that “it is always true that p may
be followed by q within 3 time units". Verification algorithms are then developed for this extended
modal logic in the similar way of CTL model checking. To increase the scalability, symbolic model
checking technique is integrated with this solution [46].
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2.4.2 Dense-time Systems
Compared to discrete-time, dense-time is the natural model for asynchronous systems, because the
separation of events can be arbitrarily small. This ability is desirable for representing causally
independent events in an asynchronous system. Moreover, no assumptions need to be made about
the speed of the environment when this model of time is assumed. In discrete-time modeling, it is
necessary to separate time by choosing some fixed time quantum so that the delay between any two
events will be a multiple of this time quantum. This may limit the accuracy with which systems can
be modeled. Also the choice of a sufficiently small time quantum to model an asynchronous system
accurately may blow up the state space so that verification is no longer possible.
During the last two decades, a number of specification languages are proposed for modeling dense-
time systems, e.g. Timed Automata [10, 149], Timed Process Algebra [223, 174, 182], Timed Inter-
val Calculus [85], Timed Statecharts [117] and so on. The verification approaches include model
checking, simulation, theorem proving and so on. Theorem proving [51, 52] is proved to be a
successful means to verify systems with real-valued clock variables. However, model checking
technique is difficult to apply in this case since it is designed for finite state systems. Therefore,
abstraction is needed to apply model checking. This thesis focuses on the abstraction technique of
dense-time models with rational-valued clock values.
Among the specification languages, Timed Automata has become the standard modeling technique
in designing real-time models. Timed Automata are finite state machines equipped with clocks
variables (ranging over rational numbers). The elapse of the time can be modeled as clock variables
updating, and execution of the model can be constrained by guard expressions involving clocks.
This definition provides a general way to annotate state transition graphs with timing constraints
using finitely many rational-valued clock variables. In order to obtain a finite representation for the
infinite state space of rational-valued clocks, abstraction techniques like clock regions [8] and clock
zones [68, 224] are used to verify real-time models. Based on these techniques, a number of efficient
verification tools for Timed Automata have been developed, e.g. UPPAAL [135], KRONOS [35],
RED [217], Timed COSPAN [207] and Rabbit [33].
Chapter 3
System Modeling
System modeling is very important and highly non-trivial. The choice of specification language is an
important factor in the success of the entire development. The language should cover several facets
of the requirements and the model should reflect exactly (up to abstraction of irrelevant details) an
existing system or a system to be built. The language should have a semantic model suitable to study
the behaviors of the system and to establish the validity of desired properties. A formal semantic
model is highly desirable, which can act as the basis for a variety of system development activities,
e.g., system simulation, visualization, verification or prototype synthesis.
In this chapter, we introduce an event-based modeling language for concurrent systems and real-
time systems. This language has a rich set of operators for concurrent communications and time
calculations. It is used as the modeling language in the rest of the thesis and our PAT tool.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents CSP#, the modeling
language for concurrent systems with formal syntax (in Section 3.1.1) and semantic model (in Sec-
tion 3.1.2). The discussion in Section 3.1.3 explains the semantic relationship between CSP and
CSP#. Section 3.1.4 demonstrates a CSP# model of a multi-lift system. Section 3.2 presents the
language extensions of CSP# for modeling real-time systems. Several timed process constructs are
introduced in Section 3.2.1, and their semantics is explained in Section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 demon-
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strates the real-time system modeling using Fischer’s mutual exclusion algorithm. Section 3.3 dis-
cusses related works and summarizes the chapter.
3.1 Concurrent System Modeling
Many specification languages have been proposed for the modeling of concurrent systems. High-
level languages like CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [108] and CCS (Calculus of Com-
municating Systems) [155] use mathematical objects as abstractions to represent systems or pro-
cesses. System behaviors are described as process expressions combined with a rich set of hierar-
chical operators, e.g., deterministic or nondeterministic choice, parallel composition and recursion.
The operators are associated with elegant algebraic laws for system analysis.
The original CSP derives its full name from the built-in syntactic constraint that processes belong to
the sequential subset of the language. CSP has passed the test of time. It has been widely accepted
and influenced the design of many recent programming and specification languages. Nonetheless,
modeling systems with non-trivial data structures and functional aspects completely using languages
like CSP remains difficult. A characteristic of CSP is that processes have disjoint local variables,
which was influenced by Dijkstra’s principle of loose coupling [67]. CSP supports inter-process
communication through message passing but not shared memory, i.e., shared variables. It has long
been known (see [108] and [177], for example) that one can model a variable as a process parallel
to the one that uses it. The user processes then read from, or write to, the variable by CSP commu-
nication. Though feasible, this is painful for systems with non-trivial data structures (e.g., arrays)
and operations (e.g., array sorting). Therefore, ‘syntactic sugars’ like shared variables are mostly
welcome.
In order to solve the problem, many specification languages integrating process algebras like CSP
or CCS with state-based specification languages like Z language [222], Object-Z [189], have been
proposed. The state-based language component is typically used to specify the data states of the
system and the associated data operations in a declarative style. Examples include Circus [221]
(an integration of CSP and the Z language), CSP+OZ [86, 190] (an integration of CSP and Object-
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Z), CCS+Z [205] (an integration of CCS and the Z language) and TCOZ [152] (an integration of
Timed CSP [181] and Object-Z). However, because declarative specification languages like Z are
very expressive and not executable, automated analyzing (in particular, model checking) of systems
modeled using the integrated languages is extremely difficult.
In this chapter, we propose an alternative solution, i.e., instead of specifying data states and opera-
tions in declarative languages, they are given as procedural codes. We propose a modeling language
named CSP# (short for communicating sequential programs, pronounced as ‘CSP sharp’) which
combines high-level modeling operators with low-level programs, for the purpose of concurrent
system modeling and verification. We demonstrate that data operations can be naturally modeled
as terminating sequential programs, which then can be composed using high-level concurrency op-
erators. The idea is to treat sequential terminating programs as atomic non-communicating events.
CSP# models are executable with complete operational semantics, and therefore subject to system
simulation and, more importantly, fully automated system verification techniques like model check-
ing. CSP# is supported by the CSP module in PAT (see Section 10.3.1) and has been applied to
model and verify a number of systems.
3.1.1 Syntax
Integrating a highly abstract language like CSP with programming codes leads to many compli-
cations. Our design principle is to maximally maintain CSP’s core elegance in specifying process
synchronization, while also allowing state-based behaviors.
A motivating example
We use a multi-lift system as a running example in this section. The reason for choosing the multi-
lift system is that it has complicated dynamic behaviors as well as nontrivial data states. Further-
more, the single-lift system has been modeled using many modeling languages including CSP [220].
The system contains multiple components, e.g., the users, the lifts, the floors, the internal button
panels, etc. There are non-trivial data components and data operations, e.g., the internal requests
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and external requests and the operations to add/delete requests. For simplicity, we assume there
is no central controller for assigning external requests. Instead, each lift functions on its own to
find and serve requests, in the following way. Initially, a lift resides at the ground level ready to
travel upwards. Whenever there is a request (from the internal button panel or outside button) for
the current residing floor, the lift opens the door and later closes it. Otherwise, if there are requests
for a floor on the current traveling direction (e.g., a request for floor 3 when the lift is at floor 1
traveling upwards), then the lift keeps traveling on the current direction. Otherwise, the lift changes
its direction. Other constraints on the system include that a user may only enter a lift when the door
is open, there could be an internal request if and only if there is a user inside, etc.
Sequential Programs as Events
Shared variables offer an alternative means of communication among processes (which reside at
the same computing device or are connected by wires with negligible transmission delay). They
record the global state and make the information available to all processes. In the lift example, the
internal/external requests can be naturally modeled as shared arrays. Note that the global variables in
the lift model are not the real memory used in the distributed lifts, but rather the modeling abstraction
of them. To model the real lift systems, more details (e.g. the user request and systems memory)
need to be included. In CSP#, they are declared as follows.
1. #define NoOfFloor 3;
2. #define NoOfLift 2;
3. var extUpReq [NoOfFloor ];
4. var extDownReq [NoOfFloor ];
5. var intRequests[NoOfLift ][NoOfFloor ];
6. var doorOpen[NoOfLift ];
where define and var are reserved keywords. The former defines a global constant, e.g., NoOfFloor
which denotes the number of floors and NoOfLift which denotes the number of lifts. The latter de-
fines a variable, e.g., extUpReq array and extDownReq array which store external requests of each
floor (the index of the arrays corresponds to the floor level). Two dimensional array intRequests
stores internal requests raised from the users inside the lifts, since each lift has NoOfFloor number
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intRequests[i ][level ] = 0;
if (dir > 0) {
extUpReq [level ] = 0;
} else {
extDownReq [level ] = 0;
}
Figure 3.1: CSP# codes for clearing requests
of internal request buttons. doorOpen array captures the doors’ states of all lifts. Each variables are
updated during the execution of the lift. CSP# has a weak type system (like JSP) and therefore type
information is not necessary for variable declaration. By default, all the above defined are treated
as arrays of integers. In particular, elements in extUpReq (or extDownReq) are binary: 1 at j -th
position means that there is a request for traveling upwards (or downwards) at j -th floor; 0 means
no request. Two dimensional array intRequests stores internal requests from all lifts. In particular,
the internal request for the j -th floor from the i -th lift is stored at intRequests[i ][j ] in the array.
Elements in intRequests are binary: 1 means that the floor has been requested and 0 means not
requested. Elements in array doorOpen range from −1 to NoOfFloor − 1. The i -th element of
doorOpen is −1 if and only if the door of i -th lift is closed and it is j such that j ≥ 0 if and only if
the i -th lift has opened door at j -th floor. We assume that initially all doors are closed. We remark
if the Z language is used for specification, specific types for elements in the arrays may be defined
to constrain their values.
Associated with the variables are data operations which query or modify the variables. In the lift
system, whenever a lift opens its door, the requests must be updated accordingly. For instance,
the codes shown in Figure 3.1 clear the requests when the i -th lift opens the door at level-th floor.
Let dir be the current traveling direction (1 for upwards and -1 for downwards). The first line
clears internal requests, by simply resetting the respective position in array intRequests to 0. The
rest clears external requests. Only the request along the lift’s traveling direction is cleared. A
more complicated operation is to determine whether there are requests along the current traveling
direction, so as to determine whether a lift should keep traveling in the same direction or to change
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index = level + dir ;
result [i ] = 0;
while (index ≥ 0 ∧ index < NoOfFloor ∧ result [i ] == 0) {
if (extUpReq [index ] 6= 0 ∨ extDownReq [index ] 6= 0 ∨ intRequests[i ][index ] 6= 0) {
result [i ] = 1;
} else {
index = index + dir ;
}
}
Figure 3.2: CSP# codes for searching requests
direction. This operation may be implemented by the codes in Figure 3.2, where level is a variable
recording the floor that the lift is residing at, index is a loop counter and result [i ] records the result
(0 for no such request and 1 for yes). A while-loop is used to search for a request along the current
traveling direction, e.g., if the lift is traveling upwards, we search for a request for (or from) an
upper floor. The search stops when the ground or top floor is reached.
A system may contain multiple data operations, each of which is terminating and is assumed to
be executed atomically. They can be implemented using the CSP# syntax as shown above, or they
can be implemented using existing programming languages. For instance, we offer the keyword
call in PAT to allow invocation of data operations (as atomic events) implemented externally as C#
static methods in CSP# models. Data operations may be invoked alternatively or in parallel. From
another point of view, data operations are events associated with an optional sequential terminating
program. For instance, the program in Figure 3.2 may be labeled as event checkIfToMove.i .level ,
which then can be used to constitute CSP process expressions, e.g., see Figure 3.3 and 3.5. Data
races are prevented by not allowing synchronization of events containing procedural code. In this
sense, data operations are not “events" as in CSP, but rather (atomic) computations that are inserted
in the model.
3.1. CONCURRENT SYSTEM MODELING 29
Composing Programs
The high-level compositional operators in CSP capture common system behavior patterns. They are
very useful in system modeling. Furthermore, process equivalence can be proved by appealing to
algebraic laws which are defined for the operators. In CSP#, we reuse most of the operators and
integrate them with our extensions in a rigorous way so as to maximally preserve the algebraic laws.
A CSP# specification may contain multiple process definitions. A process definition gives a pro-
cess expression a name, which can be referenced in process expressions. The following is a BNF
description1 of the process expression.
P = Stop | Skip – primitives
| e{prog} → P – event prefixing
| ch!exp → P | ch?x → P – channel communications
| P \X – hiding
| P ; Q – sequential composition
| P 2 Q | P ⊓ Q – choice operators
| if b {P} else {Q} – conditional choice
| [b]P – state guard
| P ‖ Q – parallel composition
| P ||| Q – interleave composition
| P △ Q – interrupt
| ref (Q) – process reference
where P ,Q are processes, e is a name representing an event with an optional sequential program2
prog , X is a set of event names (e.g., {e1, e2}), b is a Boolean expression, ch is a channel, exp is an
expression, and x is a variable.
Stop is the process that communicates nothing, also called deadlock. Skip = X→ Stop, where X
is the special event of termination. Event prefixing e → P performs e and afterwards behaves as
process P . If e is attached with a program (event prefixing of this type is called data operation), the
program is executed atomically together with the occurrence of the event. Hiding process P \ X
makes all occurrences of events in X not to be observed or controlled by the environment of the
1Refer to PAT’s user manual for ASCII version of the symbols.
2The grammar rules for the sequential program can be found in PAT user manual.
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process. Sequential composition, P ; Q , behaves as P until its termination and then behaves as
Q . External choice P 2 Q is solved only by the occurrence of a visible event3. On the contrast,
internal choice P ⊓ Q is solved non-deterministically. Conditional choice4 if b {P} else {Q}
behaves as P if b evaluates to true, and behaves as Q otherwise. Process [b]P waits until condition
b becomes true and then behaves as P . Note that [b]P does not block and will be dropped in
choice operators if other choices are selected. Notice that it is different from if b {P} else {Q}.
One distinguishing feature of CSP is alphabetized multi-processes parallel composition. Let P ’s
alphabet, written as αP , be the events in P excluding the special invisible event τ . Process P ‖ Q
synchronizes common events in the alphabets of P and Q excluding non-communicating events (see
Section 3.1.2 for detailed discussion). In contrast, process P ||| Q runs all processes independently
(except for communication through shared variables and synchronous channels5). Process P △ Q
behaves as P until the first occurrence of a visible event from Q . A process expression may be
given a name for referencing. Recursion is supported by process referencing.
CSP# supports global variables, including boolean/integer variables, multi-dimensional arrays and
user defined data structure6, which are globally accessible, process parameters which are accessible
in the respective process expression and local variables which are accessible in one data operation.
We restrict the use of local variables in general. In particular, local variables introduced as process
parameters or variables to store channel inputs cannot be modified by event associated programs.
They can, however, be modified indirectly. The following illustrates alternative ways of achieving
the same effect.
P(x ) = add{x = x + 1} → P(x ); – × process parameters cannot be modified.
P(x ) = add → P(x + 1); – X
var x ; P() = add{x = x + 1} → P(); – X
Process parameters cannot be modified, hence they can take their values at the point of introduction.
3In CSP, symbol τ is introduced as the internal action in the operational semantics only. In CSP#, we abuse this
notation to denote invisible events: internal actions from hiding, resolution of a choice or dereferencing of a process
variable. Any event other than τ is called visible event.
4In CSP#, we also introduce ifb for conditional choice with busy waiting on the condition.
5Note that in original CSP, P ||| Q does not allow communication through shared channels.
6In PAT, user defined data structure can be created using external C# library.
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This restriction allows us to perform efficient system verification. The reason is that, in this setting,
it is sufficient to store only the valuation of the global variables and the process expression (with
process parameters replaced with their values) when we explore the system states. Compared to
software model checking, we can safely omit the program stack (which, combined with recursions,
is very complicated to maintain) from the global state.
Besides global variables and data operations, the most noticeable extension to CSP is the use of
asynchronous channels, which again can be supported in CSP by explicitly modeling the commu-
nication buffer. Nonetheless, explicitly supporting them in CSP# is not only for users’ convenience
but also for possibly more efficient mechanical system exploration. Given a channel ch with pre-
defined buffer size, process ch!exp → P evaluates the expression exp (with the current valuation
of the variables) and puts the value into the tail of the respective buffer and behaves as P . Process
ch?x → P gets the top element in the respective buffer, assigns it to variable x and then behaves as
P . Sending/receiving multiple messages at once is supported. If a channel has buffer size 0, it is a
synchronous channel, whose input and output communications must occur synchronously.
Definition 3 (System model) A system model is a 3-tuple S = (Var , initG ,P), where Var is a set
of global variables (including channels), initG is the initial valuation of the variables and P is a
process.
Figure 3.3 presents a process Lift which concisely models the behavior of one lift. Notice that the
process has multiple parameters, namely i which is an identifier of the lift, level which denotes
the residing floor and dir which denotes the current traveling direction (1 for traveling upwards
and -1 for downwards). The condition at line 7 is used to check whether there is a request for the
current floor, with the correct traveling direction if it is external. If yes, then the door is opened,
the requests for the floor are cleared (using the code presented in Figure 3.1), and then the door
is closed. Otherwise, the lift checks whether to continue traveling on the same direction (using
the code presented in Figure 3.2). If the result is 1 (line 13), then the lift moves to the next floor.
Otherwise, the lift checks whether it need to change direction (line 21). If there is no request in
all directions, then the lift will idle at the current level. In this example, we have events which are
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7. Lift(i , level , dir) = if ((dir > 0 ∧ extUpReq [level ] == 1)
8. ∨ (dir < 0 ∧ extDownReq [level ] == 1) ∨ intRequests[i ][level ] == dir){
9. opendoor .i{doorOpen[i ] = level ; *code shown in Figure 3.1*} →
10. closedoor .i{doorOpen[i ] = −1} → Lift(i , level , dir)
11. } else {
12. checkToMoveAlong .i .level{*code shown in Figure 3.2*} →
13. if (result [i ] == 1){moving .i .dir →
14. if (level + dir == 0 ∨ level + dir == NoOfFloors − 1){
15. Lift(i , level + dir ,−1 ∗ dir)
16. } else {Lift(i , level + dir , dir)}
17. } else {
18. if ((level == NoOfFloors − 1 ∧ dir == −1)
19. ∨ (level == 0 ∧ dir == 1)) {Lift(i , level , dir)}
20. else {
21. checkDir .i .level{*code shown in Figure 3.2 with -1*dir*} →
22. if (result [i ] == 1){changedir .i .level → Lift(i , level ,−1 ∗ dir)}




Figure 3.3: CSP# model of the lift
associated with programs and simple events like moving .i .dir . The rest of the system model is
presented in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.2 Semantics
In the section, we present operational semantics of CSP# models, which translates a model into a
Labeled Transition System (LTS). The sets of behaviors can be extracted from the operational se-
mantics, thanks to congruence theorems. The complication due to conflicts between global variables
and CSP operational semantics (e.g. calculation of process alphabets) is discussed.






(V , e{prog} → P)
e
→ (upd(V , prog),P)
c is not full in V
[ out ]
(V , c!exp → P)
c!eva(V ,exp)
→ (app(V , c!exp),P)
P =̂ Q , (V ,Q)
∗




→ (V ′,Q ′)
c is not empty in V
[ in ]
(V , c?x → P)
c?top(c)
→ (pop(V , c?x),P)
V  b, (V ,P)
e




→ (V ′,P ′)
V  b, (V ,P)
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ con1 ]
(V , if b {P} else {Q})
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
V 6 b, (V ,Q)
x
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ con2 ]
(V , if b {P} else {Q})
x
→ (V ′,Q ′)
(V ,P)
x
→ (V ′,P ′), x ∈ αP , x 6∈ αQ
[ pa1 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′ ‖ Q)
(V ,Q)
x
→ (V ′,Q ′), x ∈ αQ , x 6∈ αP
[ pa2 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ‖ Q ′)
(V ,P)
x
→ (V ,P ′), (V ,Q)
x
→ (V ,Q ′), x ∈ αP ∩ αQ
[ pa3 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q)
x
→ (V ,P ′ ‖ Q ′)
where e ∈ Σ; eτ ∈ Σ ∪ {τ}; x ∈ Σ ∪ {X} and ∗ ∈ Σ ∪ {τ,X}
Figure 3.4: CSP# firing rules
Operational Semantics
In order to define the operational semantics of a system model, we first define the notion of system
configuration to capture the global system state during system executions.
Definition 4 (System configuration) A system configuration (or state) is composed of two compo-
nents (V ,P) where V is a function mapping a variable name (or a channel name) to its value (or
a sequence of items in the buffer), which we refer to as a valuation function, and P is a process
expression.
The operational semantics is presented as firing rules associated with each process construct. The
rules naturally extend the operational semantics for CSP [41] and Timed CSP [181]. Let Σ denote
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the set of all visible events and τ 7 denote the set of all invisible events8. For simplicity, we as-
sume a function upd(V , prog) which, given a sequential program prog and V , returns the modified
valuation function V ′ according to the semantics of the program. We write V  b (or V 6 b)
to denote that condition b evaluates to true (or false) given V . We write eva(V , exp) to denote
the value of the expression evaluated with variable valuations in V . To abuse notations, we write
app(V , ch!exp) to denote the function V ′ in which the respective channel buffer is appended with
eva(V , exp). We write pop(V , ch?x ) to denote the function V ′ in which the top element (written
as top(V , ch)) in the respective channel buffer is removed.
Figure 3.4 illustrates part of the firing rules. The rest can be found in the Appendix A. Rule prefix
captures how event associated with sequential programs are handled, i.e., the occurrence of the event
and program is simultaneous and appears, to the system, to be atomic. Notice that, this is the only
way global variables are modified. Rule out and in capture the semantics of channel output/input.
We remark that there are two rules (con1 and con2) associated with if b {P} else {Q}, whereas
only one rule (guard) is associated with [b]P . Therefore, if b is false given [b]P , then the process
will block until b becomes true.
The semantics of parallel composition P ‖ Q are captured using three rules. Either P or Q can
make a move if the event x is not in their common alphabets (see rule par1 and par2), otherwise P
and Q have to synchronize on x (see rule par3). Notice that the event in a data operation is called
non-communicating event, which is excluded from the alphabet in CSP#. For instance, assume x is
a global variable,
P() = a{x = x + 1} → Stop;
Q() = a{x = x + 2} → Stop;
Given the above, event a is not synchronized in the parallel composition of P() and Q(). The
intuition is that data operations are local actions, instead of communications. This prevents syn-
chronizing events associated with different data operations but with the same name (e.g., a in the
above example) and syntactically avoids potential data race.
7Since invisible events are indistinguishable, we sometimes also use τ to represent an arbitrary invisible event.
8Invisible events are internal actions from hiding, resolution of a choice or dereferencing of a process variable.
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Labeled Transition Systems
The semantics of a model S is defined using a Labeled Transition System (LTS) as follows.
Definition 5 (Labeled Transition System (LTS)) Given a model S = (Var , initG ,P), let Σ de-
note the set of all visible events in P and τ 9 denote the set of all invisible events, and Στ be Σ ∪ τ .
The labeled transition system corresponding to S is a 3-tuple LS = (S , init ,→), where S is a set
of configurations, init ∈ S is the initial configuration (initG ,P), and →⊆ S ×Στ ×S is a labeled
transition relation.
Note that the labeled transition relationship → for CSP# processes conforms to the operational
semantics presented in Figure 3.4 and the Appendix A.
For configurations s, s ′ ∈ S and e ∈ Στ , we write s
e
→ s ′ to denote (s, e, s ′) ∈→, and e is called
the engaged event of transition s e→ s ′. The set of enabled events at s is enabled(s) = {e : Στ |
∃ s ′ ∈ S , s
e
→ s ′}. We write s e1,e2,···,en→ s ′ iff there exist s1, · · · , sn+1 ∈ S such that si
ei→ si+1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n , s1 = s and sn+1 = s ′, and s
τ∗
→ s ′ iff s = s ′ or s τ,···,τ→ s ′. The set of configurations
reachable from s by performing zero or more τ transitions is τ∗(s) = {s ′ : S | s τ∗→ s ′}. Let Σ∗
be the set of finite traces. tr : Σ∗ is a sequence of visible events. s tr⇒ s ′ if and only if there exist
e1, e2, · · · , en ∈ Στ such that s
e1,e2,···,en
→ s ′. tr = 〈e1, e2, · · · , en〉 ↾ τ is the trace with invisible
events removed, and tr ↾ X removes the events in X from the sequence tr . The set of traces of L
is traces(L) = {tr : Σ∗ | ∃ s ′ ∈ S , init tr⇒ s ′}. A finite execution of L is a finite sequence of
alternating configurations/events 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , sn+1〉 where s0 = init and si
ei→ si+1 for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ n . An infinite execution is an infinite sequence 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , ei , si , · · ·〉 where
s0 = init and si
ei→ si+1 for all i ≥ 0.
We remark that the total behaviors of a LTS L can be represented by its all possible executions.
This is similar to the semantic model of TCOZ [171] consisting of events and variable values10.
9Since invisible events are indistinguishable, we sometimes also use τ to represent an arbitrary invisible event.
10TCOZ builds on the strengths of Object-Z and Timed CSP. Interested readers can refer to [171] for its semantic
model.
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The trace semantics (i.e. traces(L)) is an event-projection of the executions, which explains the
behaviors related to events only.
Given a LTS (S , init ,→), the size of S can be infinite for two reasons. First, the variables may have
infinite domains or the channels may have infinite buffer size. We require (syntactically) that the
sizes of the domains and buffers are bounded. Second, processes may allow unbounded replication
by recursion, e.g., P = (a → P ; c → Skip) 2 b → Skip, or P = a → P ||| P . In this thesis
(except Section 5.6), we consider only LTSs with a finite number of states for practical reasons. In
particular, we bound the sizes of value domains and the number of processes by constants. In our
examples, bounding the sizes of value domains also bounds the depths of recursions.
A model is deadlock-free if and only if there does not exist a finite execution 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en ,
sn+1〉 such that sn+1 is a deadlock state, i.e., no firing rules are applicable given sn+1. Given a
proposition p, a state satisfying the predicate is reachable (or equivalently p is reachable) if and
only if there exists a finite execution 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , sn+1〉 such that sn+1 = (Vn+1,Pn+1)
and Vn+1  p.
3.1.3 Discussion
The modeling power of CSP# is demonstrated via its syntax and semantics definitions. For all the
operators borrowed from CSP, the operational semantics are kept in CSP#. However, the introduc-
tion of variable and states in CSP# sacrifices some algebra properties of the original CSP, particu-
larly compositionality . Compositionality means the behaviors meaning of a complex process is
determined by the meanings of its constituent processes and the rules used to combine them. CSP
language is compositional with respect to properties expressed constraints upon possible traces
or upon combinations (called failures) of traces and sets of events that may then be refused (re-
fer to Section 6.1 for detailed definition of failures and refusal). Any universal property proven
of the traces or failures of a process remains true when that process is placed in combination with
others. Equally, a refinement of a component induces a refinement of the complete system. We
refer this property as event-based compositionality . For example, given process P1,P2 and Q , if
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traces(P1) = traces(P2) holds, then traces(P1 || Q) = traces(P2 || Q). However the following
CSP# processes do not preserve this property.
var amount = 0;
P1() = pay{amount = 5} → P1();
P2() = pay{amount = 15} → P2();
Q() = [amount > 10](accept{amount = 0} → Q());
where traces(P1) = traces(P2), but traces(P1 || Q) 6= traces(P2 || Q) because the guard
condition amount > 10 is affected by the assignments in the different pay events.
It is clear that the use of shared variables in CSP# influence process behaviors. It has long been
known that one can model a variable as a process parallel to the one that uses it [108, 177]. The user
processes then read from, or write to, the variable by CSP communication. However, introducing
variable directly in CSP abstracts out these details, which affects some language properties. This
result is not surprising, because the semantics of CSP# is explained by executions rather than purely
traces. If considering the system behavior as executions (including both event and states), CSP# may
be viewed as execution-based compositional11 . In the given example, the executions of P1 and
P2 are not equivalent, therefore it is not a counterexample of execution-based compositionality . If
focusing on the event-based compositionality , CSP# is not a direct extension of CSP. On the other
hand, the execution semantic model does not limit the usefulness of CSP#, and all the verification
algorithms presented in this thesis require no compositionality and the results do not rely on any
semantic relationship between CSP and CSP#.
CSP assumes an open environment, in which we cannot insist that some enabled events can be en-
gaged or an external choice is resolved in a particular direction. To prove any property involving
a notion of occurrence, engagement or performance (which is related to the discussion in Chap-
ter 4, 6, 8 and 9), we must assume some closure property or equivalently, that the process is place in
an environment where it provides the sole constraint upon the occurrence of the events concerned.
That is, that these events are effectively “internal”, or that we have a closed global view.
11To prove this, we need to formally present the denotational semantics of CSP#, which can be defined in a similar
way as TCOZ [171]. We leave this as one future work.
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3.1.4 Case Study: a Multi-lift System
In this section, we complete the case study of the multi-lift model. Our modeling is related to the
previous lift system model presented in [151]. In addition, we demonstrate how to write critical
system properties as assertions. In this model, we assume there is no central controller to coordinate
the lifts, hence multiple lifts may simultaneously compete to serve a single floor.
Figure 3.5 shows the rest of the model. In particular, line 27 defines the rest of the variables (which
are used in Figure 3.2). Lines 28 to 38 model users’ behavior in the lift system. At line 28, the
behavior of three users is defined as the interleaving of each user, where ||| x : {i ..j}@P(x ) =
P(i) ||| · · · ||| P(j ). Behavior of a user is specified as process aUser at line 29. Each user may
initially be at any floor. This is captured using indexed external choice. The user pushes a button
(for traveling upwards or downwards, specified as ExternalPush(pos)) and then waits for the lift
to come (specified as Waiting(pos)).
A case statement, which is a syntactic sugar for multiple if-then-else statements, is used in process
ExternalPush(pos). We remark that the conditions in the case statement are evaluated in the order
until one which evaluates to be true is found. Otherwise, the default branch is taken. In the example,
if the user is at the ground floor or the top one, only one direction to travel can be requested.
Otherwise, the user may choose either to go upwards or downwards. Lines 31 to 34 capture how the
external requests are updated.
The user then waits for the door opened at the user’s floor (captured by condition doorOpen[i ] ==
pos at line 36) and then enters the lift. We remark that this model allows users to enter the lift with
the wrong traveling direction (which may happen in real world). After making an internal request,
the user may exit when the door is opened again at his/her destination floor. The lift system is
modeled as the interleaving of users and multiple lifts at line 39. Initially, the lifts are residing at the
ground floor, ready to travel upwards. In this example, we demonstrate how variable updates and
concurrency operators may be used together seamlessly to capture system behavior.
Once we have a model, we may use PAT to simulate its behaviors. Alternatively, we may write
assertions about critical system properties and invoke the PAT model checkers to examine the model
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27. var index ; var result [NoOfLift ];
28. Users() =||| x : {0..2}@aUser();
29. aUser() =2 pos : {0..NoOfFloor − 1}@(ExternalPush(pos); Waiting(pos));
30. ExternalPush(pos) = case {
31. pos == 0 : pushup.pos{extUpReq [pos] = 1} → Skip
32. pos == NoOfFloor − 1 : pushdown.pos{extDownReq [pos ] = 1} → Skip
33. default : pushup.pos{extUpReq [pos ] = 1} → Skip 2
34. pushdown.pos{extDownReq [pos] = 1} → Skip
35. };
36.Waiting(pos) =2 i : {0..NoOfLift − 1}@([doorOpen[i ] == pos]enter .i →
37. 2 x : {0..NoOfFloor − 1}@(push.x{intRequests[i ][x ] = 1} →
38. [doorOpen[i ] == x ]exit .i .x → User()));
39. LiftSystem() = Users() ||| (||| x : {0..NoOfLift − 1}@Lift(x , 0, 1));
40. #assert LiftSystem() deadlockfree;
41. #define pr1 extUpReq [0] > 0;
42. #define pr2 extUpReq [0] == 0;







Figure 3.5: CSP# model of the lifts system
in order to find counterexamples. In particular, line 40 asserts that the lift system is deadlock-free.
Line 43 states a LTL property (refer to Section 2.3.2) asserting that (1) a request at the ground
floor (defined as the proposition at line 41) must eventually be served (defined as the proposition
at line 42), and (2) the event moving .0.1 must always eventually occur (i.e., 0-th lift must always
eventually move upwards).
3.2 Real-time System Modeling
Specification and verification of real-time systems are important research topics which have practi-
cal implications. During the last decade or so, a popular approach for specifying real-time systems
is based on the notation Timed Automata [10, 149]. Timed Automata are powerful in designing
real-time models with explicit clock variables. Real-time constraints are captured by explicitly set-
ting/resetting clock variables. A number of automatic verification support for Timed Automata have
proven to be successful [135, 35, 35, 217, 207, 33].
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Models based on Timed Automata often adapt a simple structure, e.g. a network of Timed Automata
with no hierarchy [135]. The benefit is that efficient model checking is made feasible. Nonetheless,
designing and verifying hierarchical real-time systems is becoming an increasingly difficult task due
to the widespread applications and increasing complexity of such systems. High-level requirements
for real-time systems are often stated in terms of deadline, time out, and timed interrupt [130,
74, 141]. In industrial case studies of real-time system verification, system requirements are often
structured into phases, which are then composed sequentially, in parallel, alternatively, etc [105,
134]. Unlike Statechart (with clocks) or timed process algebras, Timed Automata lack of high-level
compositional patterns for hierarchical design. As a result, users often need to manually cast those
terms into a set of clock variables with carefully calculated clock constraints. The process is tedious
and error-prone.
In remaining sections, we investigate an alternative approach for modeling hierarchical real-time
systems by extending CSP# with additional behavioral patterns which are useful in modeling and
analyzing real-time systems. Examples are deadline (which constrains a process to terminate within
some time units), timed interrupt , etc. Instead of explicitly manipulating clock variables (as in
Timed Automata), the time related process constructs are designed to build on implicit clocks.
3.2.1 Syntax
In this section, we introduce the language extensions of CSP# for modeling real-time systems.
Definition 6 (Timed process) A timed process is defined by the following grammar.
P = ∗CSP# Process Constructs∗
| Wait [d ] – delay
| P timeout [d ] Q – timeout
| P interrupt [d ] Q – timed interrupt
| P deadline[d ] – deadline
where P and Q range over processes, and d is an integer constant.
Based on CSP#, a number of timed process constructs can be used to capture common real-time
system behavior patterns. Without loss of generality, we assume d is an integer constant. Process
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Wait [d ] idles for exactly d time units. In process P timeout [d ] Q , the first observable event of P
shall occur before d time units elapse (since the process starts). Otherwise, Q takes over control
after exactly d time units elapse. Process P interrupt [d ] Q behaves exactly as P (which may
engage in multiple observable events) until d time units elapse, and then Q takes over control.
Process P deadline[d ] constrains P to terminate before d time units. In this setting, clock variables
are made implicit and hence they cannot be compared with each other directly, which potentially
allows efficient clock manipulation and hence system verification.
In this thesis, we adopt the dense-time semantic model, in which clock values are isomorphic to
a dense series of rational numbers, meaning that there is always a rational number between any
two rational numbers. This choice preserves the advantage of dense-time model over discrete-time
model (see Section 2.3.2), but still allows us to perform model checking by using some abstraction
technique (see Chapter 9). We know that a set of rational numbers can be converted an ‘equivalent’
set of integer numbers by multiplying their least common multiple. This fact allows us to only
consider integer values in the modeling language presented above12.
3.2.2 Semantics
Similar to the operational semantics of CSP#, we present the firing rules for the timed process
constructs. Recall that, a transition of the system is of the form c x→ c′ where x ∈ Σ ∪ {τ,X},
and c and c′ are the system configurations before and after the transition respectively. In real-time
modeling, we introduce the timed transition label. Let t denotes a non-negative integer number,
c
t
→ c′ denotes a transition of t time units elapsing. In the following, we present the firing rules
which are associated with the timed process constructs, adopting the approach in [181].
t ≤ d
[ de1 ]
(V ,Wait [d ])
t





The above captures behaviors of process Wait [d ]. Rule de1 states that the process may idle for any
amount of time as long as it is less than or equal to d time units; Rule de2 states that the process
12Using integer numbers is for the simplification of modeling, but not an approximation.
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terminates immediately after d becomes 0.
(V ,P)
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ to1 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ] Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
(V ,P)
τ
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ to2 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ] Q)
τ
→ (V ′,P ′ timeout [d ] Q)
(V ,P)
t
→ (V ,P ′), t ≤ d
[ to3 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ] Q)
t
→ (V ,P ′ timeout [d − t ] Q)
[ to4 ]
(V ,P timeout [0]Q)
τ
→ (V ,Q)
If an observable event x can be engaged by P , then P timeout [d ] Q becomes P ′ (rule to1). An
invisible transition does not solve the choice (rule to2). If P may idle for less than or equal to d




→ (V ′,P ′)
[ it1 ]
(V ,P interrupt [d ] Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′ interrupt [d ] Q)
(V ,P)
t
→ (V ,P ′), t ≤ d
[ it2 ]
(V ,P interrupt [d ] Q)
t
→ (V ,P ′ interrupt [d − t ] Q)
[ it3 ]
(V ,P interrupt [0] Q)
τ
→ (V ′,Q)
Rule it1 states that if P engages in event x , P interrupt [d ] Q becomes P ′ interrupt [d ] Q . Rule
it2 states that if P may idle for less than or equal to d time units, so is the composition. When d
time units elapse, Q takes over by a τ -transition.
(V ,P)
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ dl1 ]
(V ,P deadline[d ])
x
→ (V ′,P ′ deadline[d ])
(V ,P)
t
→ (V ,P ′), t ≤ d
[ dl2 ]
(V ,P deadline[d ])
t
→ (V ,P ′ deadline[d − t ])
Intuitively, P deadline[d ] behaves exactly as P except that it must terminate before d time units.
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3.2.3 Case Study: Fischer’s Algorithm
Fischer’s algorithm [87] is a timed mutual exclusion algorithm. It allows n timed processes (iden-
tical up to renaming of process identifiers) to access a shared resource in mutual exclusion. The
following models Fischer’s algorithm of three processes.
var x = −1;
var ct = 0;
Proc(i) = [x == −1]Active(i);
Active(i) = (update.i{x = i} → Skip) deadline [δ]; Wait [ǫ];
if (x == i) {




Protocol = Proc(0) ‖ Proc(1) ‖ Proc(2);
where δ and ǫ are two integer constants with δ < ǫ; x and ct are global variables. The protocol
is modeled as process Protocol , which is the parallel composition of three processes. Each of the
three processes attempts to enter the critical section when x is -1, i.e. no other process is currently
attempting. Once the process is active, it sets x to its identity i within δ time units (captured by
deadline[δ]). Then it idles for ǫ time units (captured by Wait [ǫ]) and then checks whether x is still
i . If so, it enters the critical section and leaves later. Otherwise, it restarts from the beginning.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a combination of high-level specification languages with low-level
procedural codes and time patterns for analyzing concurrent and real-time systems. A multi-lift
system and Fischer’s algorithm are used to illustrate the language. We remark that this language has
been applied to model and verify a variety of systems, ranging from recently proposed distributed
algorithms, concurrent programming algorithms to real-world systems like the pacemaker system.
Previously unknown bugs have been discovered. Furthermore, we formally defined the semantic
models, which facilitate PAT to perform sound and complete system verification.
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This chapter is related to research on integrated formal methods, in particular, works on integrating
state-based specification and event-based specification [221, 86, 152, 142, 192, 190, 205, 184, 45].
Different from previous approaches, our modeling language is designed for automated system anal-
ysis. Therefore, it is fully operational and supported by PAT. CSP+B [45, 184] (a combination
of CSP and the B language) approach is similar to ours, but our language is closer to imper-
ative programming language and accepts external (C#) programs. Two other languages are de-
signed for similar purposes, namely machine readable CSP (which we will refer to as CSPM ) sup-
ported by the refinement checker FDR [176] and Promela which is supported by the model checker
SPIN [110]. Compared to CSPM , CSP# supports additional language features like shared vari-
ables, asynchronous communication channels and event associated programs, which offers users
great flexibility in modeling. Furthermore, we give an interpretation of state/event Linear Tem-
poral Logic (see Section 2.3.2) in CSP# semantics framework, which allows temporal logic based
model checking of CSP# models. Compared to Promela, CSP# supports more process constructs
(e.g. parallel operator), i.e., Promela is based on a subset of CSP, whereas all CSP models are valid
CSP# models. In particular, CSP# inherits13 the classic trace, stable failures and failures/divergence
semantics (formally defined in Chapter 6) from CSP [108] , and therefore, allows us to perform a
variety of refinement checking.
The real-time modeling proposed in this chapter is related to hierarchical specification based on
process algebras for real-time systems, which has been studied extensively, e.g. the algebra of timed
processes ATP [187, 159], CCS + real time [223] and Timed CSP [174, 182]. A remotely related
modeling language is Statecharts with clocks [117], which too is compositional. This work follows
the approach of Timed CSP and significantly extends the notion to cover a wide range of application
domains.
13Since variables can be modeled as a process parallel to the one that uses them, then one CSP# model can be converted
to a CSP model directly. Hence the trace, stable failures and failures/divergence semantics is inherited from CSP.
Chapter 4
Model Checking Fairness Enhanced
Systems
In the area of software system verification, fairness, which is concerned with a fair resolution of
non-determinism, is often necessary and important to prove liveness properties (see Section 2.3.2).
Fairness is an abstraction of the fair scheduler in a multi-threaded programming environment or the
relative speed of the processors in distributed systems. Without fairness, verification of liveness
properties often produces unrealistic loops during which one process or event is infinitely ignored
by the scheduler or one processor is infinitely faster than others. It is important to rule out those
counterexamples and utilize the computational resource to identify the real bugs. However, system-
atically ruling out counterexamples due to lack of fairness is highly non-trivial. It requires flexible
specification of fairness as well as efficient verification under fairness.
In this chapter, we focus on formal system analysis under fairness assumptions. The objective
is to deliver a framework which model checks Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties (see Sec-
tion 2.3.2) against concurrent systems functioning under a variety of fairness assumptions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives the background infor-
mation about model checking with fairness. Section 4.2 gives the formal definitions of a family of
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fairness notions. Section 4.3 develops necessary theories for model checking. Section 4.4 presents
a sequential algorithm for verification under fairness. Section 4.5 introduces an alternative way for
specifying and verifying event-based systems with fairness. Section 4.6 proposes a parallel version
of the fairness model checking algorithm in the multi-core architecture with share-memory. Sec-
tion 4.7 gives the experiment results of the proposed algorithms. Section 4.8 discusses related works
and summarizes the chapter.
4.1 Background
Fairness and model checking with fairness have attracted much theoretical interests for decades [100,
131, 127, 202]. Their practical implications in system/software design and verification have been
discussed extensively. Recent development on distributed systems showed that there are a family
of fairness notions, including a newly formulated fairness notion named strong global fairness [88],
which are crucial for designing self-stabilizing distributed algorithms [14, 16, 88, 47]. Because
the algorithms are designed to function under fairness, model checking of (implementations of) the
algorithms thus must be carried out under the respective fairness constraints.
Existing model checkers are ineffective with respect to fairness (which is demonstrated by the exper-
iments below and in Section 4.7). One way to apply existing model checkers for verification under
fairness constraints is to re-formulate the property so that fairness constraints become premises of
the property. A liveness property φ is thus verified by showing the truth value of the following
formula.
fairness assumptions ⇒ φ – F1
This practice is, though flexible, deficient for two reasons. Firstly, model checking is PSPACE-
complete in the size of the formula. In particular, automata-based model checking relies on con-
structing a Büchi automaton from the LTL formula. The size of the Büchi automaton is exponential
to the size of the formulas. Thus, it is infeasible to handle large formulas, whereas a typical system
may have multiple fairness constraints. For example, SPIN is a popular LTL model checker [111].
The algorithm it uses for generating Büchi automata handles only a limited number of fairness
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Property n Time (Sec.) Memory #Büchi States
(
∧n
i=123pi)⇒ 23q 1 0.08 466Kb 74
same above 3 4.44 27MB 1052
same above 5 > 3600 > 1Gb −
(
∧n
i=1(23pi ⇒ 23qi))⇒ 23s 1 0.13 487Kb 134
same above 2 1.58 10Mb 1238
same above 4 4689.24 > 1Gb −
Table 4.1: Experiments on LTL to Büchi automata conversion
constraints. Table 4.1 shows experiments on the time and space needed for SPIN to generate the
automaton from the standard notions of fairness (see Section 4.2). n is the number of fairness
constraints.
The experiments are made on a 3.0GHz Pentium IV CPU and 1 GB memory executing SPIN 4.3,
where “−” means infeasible. The results show that it takes a non-trivial amount of time to han-
dle 5 fairness constraints. Secondly, partial order reduction which is one of important reduction
techniques for model checking distributed systems becomes ineffective. Partial order reduction
ignores/postpones invisible events, whereas given F1 all events/propositions presented in fairness
constraints are visible and therefore cannot be ignored or postponed.
In [161], Pang et al applied the SPIN model checker to establish the correctness of a family of
population protocols. Only protocols relying on a notion of weak fairness operating on very small
networks were verified because of the problems discussed above. Protocols relying on a notion of
stronger fairness (e.g., strong fairness or strong global fairness) are beyond the capability of SPIN
even for the smallest network1 (e.g., a network with 3 nodes). It is important to develop an effective
approach and toolkit which can handle larger networks because real counterexamples may only be
present in larger networks, as shown in Section 4.7.
An alternative method is to design specialized verification algorithms which take fairness into
1A network consists of multiple mobile nodes which interact with each other to carry out a computation. Each node
can be seen as a process. Refer to Section 5.1 for more details.
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account while performing model checking. The focus of existing model checkers has been on
process-level weak fairness, which, informally speaking, states that every process shall make infi-
nite progress if always possible (refer to detailed explanation in Section 4.2). For instance, SPIN
has implemented a model checking algorithm which handles this kind of fairness. The idea is to
copy the global reachability graph K + 2 times (for K processes) so as to give each process a fair
chance to progress. Process-level strong fairness is not supported because of its complexity. It has
been shown that process-level fairness may not be sufficient, e.g., for population protocols.
In this chapter, we present a unified on-the-fly model checking algorithm which handles a variety
of fairness including process-level weak/strong fairness, event-level weak/strong fairness, strong
global fairness, etc. The algorithm extends previous work on model checking based on finding
strongly connected components (SCC). The detailed approach is explained in the rest of the chapter.
4.2 Fairness Definitions
In this section, we present the formal definitions of a variety of fairness assumptions. The modeling
language is CSP# (see Section 3.1), which is interpreted as Labeled Transition Systems (LTS).
Recall that, given a LTS L = (S , init ,→), s e→ s ′ denotes that (s, e, s ′) is a transition in →, e
is the engaged event of transition s e→ s ′, and enabled(s) is the set of enabled events at s (refer
to Section 3.1.2). To distinguish with enabled process defined below, we introduce the equivalent
notation enabledEvt(s) for enabled(s). If the system is constituted by multiple processes running in
parallel, we write enabledPro(s) to be the set of enabled processes, which may make a move given
the system state s. Given a transition s e→ s ′, we write engagedEvt(s, e, s ′) to denote {e}, and
engagedPro(s, e, s ′) to be the set of the participating processes, which have made some progress
during the transition. engagedPro(s, e, s ′) is not empty only when the state s is an interleave or
parallel composition2 . For example, engagedPro(P1 ‖ P2 ‖ P3, e,P1 ‖ P ′2 ‖ P3) = {P2}. Notice
that if e is synchronized by multiple processes, the set contains all the participating processes.
2Process level fairness is not meaningful if the system has no currency.
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Because our targets are nonterminating concurrent systems, and fairness affects infinite not finite
system behaviors, we focus on infinite system executions in the following. Finite behaviors are ex-
tended to infinite ones by appending infinite idling events at the rear. Without fairness constraints,
a system may behave freely as long as it starts with an initial state and conforms to the transition
relation. A fairness constraint restricts the set of system behaviors to only those fair ones. Given a
LTL property φ, verification under fairness is to verify whether all fair executions of the system sat-
isfy φ. In the following, we review a variety of fairness assumptions and illustrate their differences
using examples.
Definition 7 (Event-level weak fairness) Let E = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 be an execution. E satisfies
event-level weak fairness, if and only if for every event e , if e eventually becomes enabled forever
in E , then ei = e for infinitely many i , i.e.,
32
e is enabled ⇒
23
e is engaged .
Event-level weak fairness (EWF) [131] states that if an event becomes enabled forever after some
steps, then it must be engaged infinitely often. An equivalent formulation is that every computation
should contain infinitely many positions at which event e is disabled or has just been engaged. The
latter is known as justice condition [138]. Intuitively, it means that an enabled event shall not be
ignored infinitely. Or equivalently some state must be visited infinitely often (e.g., accepting states
in Büchi automata).
Definition 8 (Process-level weak fairness) Let E = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 be an execution. E satis-
fies process-level weak fairness, if and only if for every process p, if p eventually becomes enabled
forever in E , then p ∈ engagedProc(si , ei , si+1) for infinitely many i , i.e.,
32
p is enabled ⇒
23
p is engaged .
Process-level weak fairness (PWF) states that if a process becomes enabled forever after some steps,
then it must be engaged infinitely often. From another point of view, PWF guarantees that each
process is only finitely faster than the others; otherwise there will be some always enabled process
with no progress, which violates the fairness assumption.
Weak fairness (or justice condition) has been well studied and verification under weak fairness has
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(a) (b)
a b a b
proc P proc Qproc W
Figure 4.1: Event-level weak fairness vs. process-level weak fairness
been supported to some extent, e.g., PWF is supported by the SPIN model checker [111]. Given the
LTS in Figure 4.1(a), the property
23
a is true under EWF. Event a is always enabled and, hence,
by definition it must be infinitely often engaged. The property is, however, false under no fairness or
PWF. The reason that it is false under PWF is that the process W may make progress infinitely (by
repeatedly engaging in b) without ever engaging in event a. Alternatively, if the system is modeled
using two processes as shown in Figure 4.1(b),
23
a becomes true under PWF (or EWF) because
both processes must make infinite progress and therefore both a and b must be engaged infinitely.
This example suggests that, different from PWF, EWF is not related to the system structure. In
general, process-level fairness may be viewed a special case of event-level fairness. By a simple
argument, it can be shown that PWF can be achieved by labeling all events in a process with the
same name and applying EWF.
Definition 9 (Event-level strong fairness) Let E = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 be an execution. E satisfies
event-level strong fairness if and only if, for every event e , if e is infinitely often enabled, then e = ei
for infinitely many i , i.e.,
23
e is enabled ⇒
23
e is engaged .
Event-level strong fairness (ESF) has been identified by different researchers. It is named strong
fairness in [132] (by contrast to weak fairness defined above). In [88], it is named strong local
fairness (in comparison to strong global fairness defined below). It is also known as compassion
condition [166]. ESF states that if an event is infinitely often enabled, it must be infinitely often
engaged. It is particularly useful in the analysis of systems using semaphores, synchronous com-
munication, and other special coordination primitives. Given the LTS in Figure 4.2(a), the property
23
b is false under EWF but true under ESF. The reason is that b is not always enabled (i.e., it is
disabled at the left state) and thus the system is allowed to always take the c branch under EWF. It
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Figure 4.2: Event-level strong fairness and process-level strong fairness
is infinitely often enabled, and thus, the system must engage in b infinitely under ESF.
Definition 10 (Process-level strong fairness) Let E = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 be an execution. E sat-
isfies process-level strong fairness if and only if, for every process p, if p is infinitely often enabled,
then p ∈ engagedProc(si , ei , si+1) for infinitely many i , i.e.
23
p is enabled ⇒
23
p is engaged.
The process-level correspondence is process-level strong fairness (PSF). Intuitively, PSF means
that if a process is repeatedly enabled, it must eventually make some progress. Given the LTS in
Figure 4.2(b), the property
23
c is false under PWF but true under PSF. The reason is that event c
is guarded by condition x = 1 and therefore is not repeatedly enabled.
Verification under (event-level/process-level) strong fairness (or compassion condition) has been
discussed previously, e.g., in the setting of Streett automata [99, 106], fair discrete systems [124] or
programming codes [158]. Nonetheless, there are few established tool support for formal verifica-
tion under strong fairness [100] to the best of our knowledge. The main reason is the computational
complexity. For instance, it is claimed too expensive to support in SPIN [111]. We, however, show
that reasonably efficient model checking under strong fairness can be achieved (refer to experiment
results in Section 4.7).
Definition 11 (Strong global fairness) Let E = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 be an execution. E satisfies
strong global fairness if and only if, for every s, e, s ′ such that s e→ s ′, if s = si for infinite many
i , si = s and ei = e and si+1 = s ′ for infinitely many i . i.e.
23
(s, e, s ′) is enabled ⇒
23
(s, e, s ′) is engaged.













Figure 4.3: Strong global fairness
Strong global fairness (SGF) was suggested by Fischer and Jiang in [88]. It states that if a step (from
s to s ′ by engaging in event e) is enabled infinitely often, then it must actually be taken infinitely
often3. Different from the previous notions of fairness, SGF concerns about both events and states,
instead of events only. It can be shown by a simple argument that SGF is stronger than ESF. Because
it concerns about both events and states, it is ‘event-level’ and ‘process-level’. Strong global fairness
requires that an infinitely enabled event must be taken infinitely often in all contexts, whereas ESF
only requires the enabled event to be taken in one context. Figure 4.3 illustrates the difference with
two examples. Under ESF, state 2 in Figure 4.3(a) may never be visited because all events are
engaged infinitely often if the left loop is taken infinitely. As a result, property
23
state 2 is false.
Under SGF, all states in Figure 4.3(a) must be visited infinitely often and therefore
23
state 2
is true. Figure 4.3(b) illustrates their difference when there are non-determinism. Both transitions
labeled a must be taken infinitely under SGF, which is not necessary under ESF or EWF. Thus,
property
23
b is true only under SGF. Many population protocols rely on SGF, e.g., protocols
presented in [14, 88]. As far as the authors know, there are no previous works on model checking
under SGF.
A number of other fairness notions have been discussed by various researchers, e.g., unconditional
event fairness [128] which will be discussed in Section 4.5, hyper-fairness which is of only the-
atrical interests as stated in [132] and event-level weak local/global fairness in [88]. We skip their
definitions and remark that our approach can be extended to handle other kinds of fairness.
3The definition in [88] is for unlabeled transition systems. We slightly changed it so as to suit the setting of LTS.
Nonetheless, both capture the same intuition.
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4.3 Model Checking under Fairness as Loop/SCC Searching
Given a LTSL and a LTL formula φ, model checking is about searching for an execution ofLwhich
fails φ. In automata-based model checking, the negation of φ is translated to an equivalent Büchi
automaton B¬φ, which is then composed with the LTS representing the system model. We omit the
detailed algorithms for translating LTL formula to Büchi automaton. Interested readers can refer
to [97]. To be able to explain our algorithm, first we formally define Büchi automaton as follows.
Definition 12 Büchi automaton A Büchi automaton is a tuple B = (Σ,B , ρ, b0,F ), where Σ is an
alphabet, B is a set of Büchi states, ρ : B × Σ is a nondeterministic transition function, b0 ∈ B is
an initial state, and F ⊆ B is a set of accepting states.
A run of B over an infinite word w = a1a2 . . . is an infinite sequence 〈b0, b1 . . .〉, where b0 is initial
state and bi ∈ ρ(bi−1, ai ) for all i ≥ 1. A run 〈b0, b1 . . .〉 is accepting to B if there is some accepting
state in B that repeats infinitely often.
Model checking under fairness is to search for an infinite execution which is accepting to the Büchi
automaton and at the same time satisfies the fairness constraints. In the following, we write L  φ
to mean that the LTS satisfies the property under no fairness, i.e., every execution of L satisfies φ.
We write L EWF φ (L PWF φ) to mean that L satisfies φ under event-level (process-level) weak
fairness; L ESF φ (L PSF φ) to mean that L satisfies φ under event-level (process-level) strong
fairness, and L SGF φ to mean that L satisfies φ under strong global fairness.
Without loss of generality, we assume that L contains only finite states. By a simple argument, it
can be shown that the system contains an infinite execution if and only if there exists a loop. An
execution of the product of L and B¬φ is a sequence of alternating states/events
R
j
i = 〈(s0, b0), e0, · · · , (si , bi), ei , · · · , (sj , bj ), ej , (sj+1, bj+1)〉
where si is a state of L, bi is a state of B¬φ, si = sj+1 and bi = bj+1. We skip the details
on constructing the product and refer the readers to [126]. Rji is accepting if and only if the se-
quence 〈b0, b1, · · · , bk , · · ·〉 is accepting to B¬φ, i.e., the sequence visits at least one accepting state
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of B¬φ infinitely often. Rji is fair under certain notion of fairness if and only if the sequence
〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , sk , ek , · · ·〉 is. Furthermore, we define the following sets.
alwaysEvt(Rji ) = {e | ∀ k : {i , · · · , j}, e ∈ enabled(sk )}
alwaysPro(Rji ) = {p | ∀ k : {i , · · · , j}, p ∈ enabledPro(sk )}
onceEvt(Rji ) = {e | ∃ k : {i , · · · , j}, e ∈ enabled(sk )}
oncePro(Rji ) = {p | ∃ k : {i , · · · , j}, p ∈ enabledPro(sk )}
onceStep(Rji ) = {(s, e, s
′) | ∃ k{i , · · · , j}, s = sk ∧ (s, e, s
′) ∈→)}
engagedEvt(Rji ) = {e | ∃ k : {i , · · · , j}, e = ek}
engagedPro(Rji ) = {p | ∃ k : {i , · · · , j}, p ∈ engagedPro(sk , ek , sk+1)}
engagedStep(Rji ) = {(s, e, s
′) | ∃ k{i , · · · , j − 1}, s = sk ∧ e = ek ∧ s
′ = sk+1)}
Intuitively, set alwaysEvt(Rji )/alwaysPro(R
j
i ) is the set of events/processes which are always en-




i ) is the set of events/processes/steps





is the set of events/processes/step which are engaged during the loop.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let L = (S , init ,→) be a LTS; B be a Büchi automaton equivalent to the negation
of a LTL formula φ. Let Rji be an arbitrary loop in the product of L and B.
• L EWF φ if and only if there does not existRji such that alwaysEvt(Rji ) ⊆ engagedEvt(Rji )
and Rji is accepting.
• L PWF φ if and only if there does not existRji such that alwaysPro(Rji ) ⊆ engagedPro(Rji )
and Rji is accepting.
• L ESF φ if and only if there does not exist Rji such that onceEvt(Rji ) ⊆ engagedEvt(Rji )
and Rji is accepting.
• L PSF φ if and only if there does not exist Rji such that oncePro(Rji ) ⊆ engagedPro(Rji )
and Rji is accepting.
• L SGF φ if and only if there does not exist Rji such that onceStep(Rji ) ⊆ engagedStep(Rji )
and Rji is accepting.
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The lemma can be proved straightforwardly by contradiction. By the lemma, a system fails the
property under certain fairness if and only if there exists a loop which satisfies the fairness but fails
the property. Modeling checking under fairness is hence reduced to loop searching.
In the following we introduce the basic definitions in graph theory to ease the discussion later.
Definition 13 (Directed Graph) A directed graph or digraph is a pair G = (V,E), where set V
contains the vertices and set E contains ordered pairs of vertices (i.e. directed edges).
Definition 14 (Strongly Connected Component (SCC)) A strongly connected component of a di-
rected graph G is a maximal set of vertices C ⊂ V such that for every pair of vertices u and v ,
there is a directed path from u to v and a directed path from v to u .
Note that each graph can have more than one SCCs. A SCC is terminal if and only if any transition
starting from a vertex in the SCC must end with a vertex in the SCC. If a directed graph is the
transition system of the product of L and B, the vertices are of form (s, b), where s is a state in
L and b is a state in B. We say a SCC S of such graph is accepting if and only if there exists
one vertex (s, b) in S such that b is an accepting state of B. In an abuse of notations, we refer
to S as the strongly connected subgraph in the following context. To further abuse notations, we
write alwaysEvt(S ) (alwaysPro(S ), onceEvt(S ), oncePro(S ), onceStep(Rji ), engagedEvt(S ),
engagedPro(S ) or engagedStep(Rji )) to denote the set obtained by applying the function to a loop
which traverses all states of S .
Lemma 4.3.2 Let L be a LTS; B be a Büchi automaton equivalent to the negation of a LTL formula
φ; S be a strongly connected subgraph in the product of L and B.
• L ESF φ if and only if there does not exist S such that S is accepting and onceEvt(S ) ⊆
engagedEvt(S ).
• L PSF φ if and only if there does not exist S such that S is accepting and oncePro(S ) ⊆
engagedPro(S ).
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The above lemma can be proved by a simple argument. It shows that model checking under fairness
can be reduced to strongly connected subgraph searching.
Lemma 4.3.3 Let L be a LTS; B be a Büchi automaton equivalent to the negation of a LTL formula
φ. Let S be a SCC in the product of L and B.
• L EWF φ if and only if there does not exist S such that S is accepting and alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆
engagedEvt(S ).
• L PWF φ if and only if there does not exist S such that S is accepting and alwaysPro(S ) ⊆
engagedPro(S ).
Proof. We prove the event-level weak fairness part of the lemma and remark that the other part can
be proved similarly. It can be shown that a system fails φ under event-level weak fairness if and only
if there exists one strongly connected subgraph C such that C is accepting and alwaysEvt(C ) ⊆
engagedEvt(C ). Hence, it is sufficient to show that there exists such a C if and only if there exists
a SCC S such that S is accepting and alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S ).
if: If there exists such a SCC S , then we simply let C be S .
only if: If there exists such subgraph C , the SCC S which contains C is accepting and satisfies
alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S ) since alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ alwaysEvt(C ) and engagedEvt(C ) ⊆
engagedEvt(S ). This concludes the proof. 2
The lemma shows that model checking under weak fairness can be reduced to SCC searching. The
following lemma reduces model checking under strong global fairness to searching for a terminal
SCC in L4.
Lemma 4.3.4 Let L be a LTS; B be a Büchi automaton equivalent to the negation of a LTL for-
mula φ. L SGF φ if and only if there does not exist a SCC S such that S is accepting and
onceStep(Rji ) ⊆ engagedStep(R
j
i ).
4A terminal SCC in the product of L and B may not be constituted by a terminal SCC in L.
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Proof. By lemma 4.3.1, L fails φ under strong global fairness if and only if there exists Rji in
the product of L and B such that Rji satisfies strong global fairness and R
j
i is accepting. L fails φ
under strong global fairness if and only if there exists a strongly connected subgraph C such that C
satisfies strong global fairness and C is accepting. Hence, it is sufficient to show that there exists
such a subgraph C if and only if there exists a SCC S such that S which satisfies the constraint.
if: This is proved trivially.
only if: Assume that there exists such a subgraph C . Let x (C ) = {s | ∃ b (s, b) ∈ C} be the
states of L which constitute C and t(C ) = {(s, e, s ′) | s ∈ x (C ) ∧ s ′ ∈ x (C ) ∧ ∃(s, b), (s, b ′) :
C (s, b)
e
→ (s ′, b ′)} be the transition of L which constitute the strongly connected subgraph. By
contradiction, it can be shown that x (C ) (together with the transitions in t(C )) forms one terminal
SCC in L. Let S be the SCC containing C . It can be shown that x (S ) (together with the transitions
in t(S )) forms the same terminal SCC. Therefore, S must satisfy the constraint. 2
4.4 An Algorithm for Modeling Checking under Fairness
In the area of LTL model checking, the two best known enumerative sequential algorithms based
on fair-cycle detection are the Nested Depth First Search (NDFS) algorithm [61, 109] and SCC-
based algorithms [202, 197] based on Tarjan’s algorithm for strongly connected components (SCCs)
detection [206]. NDFS has been implemented in the model checker SPIN [111]. The basic idea is to
perform one DFS first to reach a target state (i.e., an accepting state in the setting of Büchi automata)
and then perform second DFS from that state to check whether it is reachable from itself. It has been
shown the NDFS works efficiently for model checking under no fairness [111]. Nonetheless, it is
not suitable for verification under fairness [111] because whether an execution is fair depends on
the whole path instead of one state. In recent years, model checking based on SCC has been re-
investigated and it has been shown that it yields comparable performance [99]. In this chapter, we
extend the existing SCC-based model checking algorithms [99] to cope with different notions of
fairness. The algorithm is inspired by early work on emptiness check of Streett automata [106].
Figure 4.4 presents the algorithm. It is based on Tarjan’s algorithm for identifying SCCs (which is
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procedure mc(States,Transitions,Fair)
1. while there are un-visited states
2. let scc := tarjan(States,Transitions);
3. mark states in scc as visited;
4. if isFair(scc) then – *
5. generate a counterexample; – *
6. return false; – *
7. else – *
8. scc = prune(scc,Fair); – *
9. if ¬mc(scc,Transitions) then – *
10. return false; – *
11. endif – *
12. endif – *
13. endwhile
14. return true;
Figure 4.4: Algorithm for sequential model checking under fairness





Figure 4.5: Model checking example
linear time in the number of graph edges [206]). It searches for fair strongly connected subgraph
on-the-fly. The basic idea is to identify one SCC at a time and then check whether it is fair or not. If
it is, the search is over. Otherwise, the SCC is partitioned into multiple smaller strongly connected
subgraphs, which are then checked recursively one by one. Figure 4.5 presents a running example,
i.e., the product of a LTS and a Büchi automaton. Notice that state 2 is an accepting state.
Assume that States is the set of states and Transitions is the set of transitions5 . The method takes
three inputs, i.e., States , Transitions and a fairness type Fair (of value either EWF, PWF, ESF,
PSF or SGF). At the top level is a while-loop, which stops only if all states have been visited. At
5both of which may be constructed on-the-fly instead of known before-hand.
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line 2, Tarjan’s algorithm (an improved version) is used to identify a SCC [99]. If the found scc is
fair, a fair loop which traverses all states/transitions in the SCC is generated as a counterexample
(at line 5) and we conclude that the property is not true at line 6. We skip the details on generating
the loop in this thesis and remark that it could be a non-trivial task (refer to [124]). Without fairness
assumptions, a SCC is fair if and only if it is accepting to the Büchi automaton (i.e. Büchi fair).
Given the LTS presented in Figure 4.5, tarjan method identifies two SCCs, i.e., scc1 which is
composed of state 1 only and scc2 which is composed of state 0, 2 and 3. The order in which SCCs
are found is irrelevant to the correctness of the algorithm. If state 2 is explored before state 1, at line
3, scc states is the set of states in scc2.
If scc is not fair, a procedure prune (at line 8) is used to prune bad states from scc. Bad states
are the reasons why the SCC is not fair. For instance, state 0 (where the event a is enabled) is a
bad state in scc2 under event-based strong fairness because event a is never engaged in scc2 (i.e.,
a 6∈ engagedEvt(ssc2)). State 3 is a bad state under strong global fairness because the step from
state 3 to state 1 via c is not part of the SCC. The intuition behind the pruning is that there may
be a fair strongly connected subgraph in the remaining states after eliminating the bad states. By
simply modifying the prune method, the algorithm can be used to handle different fairness. Refer
to details in Section 4.4.1.
If some states have been pruned, a recursive call (line 9) is made to check whether there is a fair
strongly connected subgraph within the remaining states. The call terminates in two ways. One is
that a fair subgraph is found (at line 6) and the other is that all states in scc are pruned (at line 14).
If the recursive call returns true, there is no fair subgraph and we continue with another SCC until
all states are checked.
4.4.1 Coping with Different Notions of Fairness
In this section, we show how to customize the prune function so as to handle different fairness. Let
S be a strongly connected subgraph. The following defines the pruning methods for event-based
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weak fairness.
prune(S ,EWF ) =


S if alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S );
∅ otherwise.
If there exists an event e which is always enabled (i.e., e ∈ alwaysEvt(S )) but never engaged (i.e.,
e 6∈ engagedEvt(S )), by definition S does not satisfy event-level weak fairness. If a SCC does not
satisfy event-level weak fairness, none of its subgraphs do, because e is always enabled in any of its
subgraphs but never engaged. As a result, either all states are pruned or none of them is. Similarly,
the following defines the pruning function for process-level weak fairness.
prune(S ,PWF ) =


S if alwaysPro(S ) ⊆ engagedPro(S );
∅ otherwise.
In the case event-level (process-level) strong fairness, a state is pruned if and only if there is an
event (process) enabled at this state but never engaged in the subgraph. By pruning the state, the
event (process) may become never enabled and therefore not required to be engaged. The following
defines the pruning function for event-level and process-level strong fairness.
prune(S ,ESF ) = {s : S | enabledEvt(s) ⊆ engagedEvt(S )}
prune(S ,PSF ) = {s : S | enabledPro(s) ⊆ engagedPro(S )}
By lemma 4.3.4, a SCC may constitute a counterexample to a property under strong global fairness
if and only if the SCC satisfies strong global fairness and is accepting. Therefore, we prune all states
if it fails strong global fairness.
prune(S ,SGF ) =


S if onceStep(S ) ⊆ engagedStep(S );
∅ otherwise.
We remark that the time complexity of the prune functions are all linear in the number of edges of
the SCC.
Given the LTS in Figure 4.5, under event-level strong fairness, state 0 is pruned from scc2 be-
cause enabledEvt(state 0) = {a, c} 6⊆ engagedEvt(scc2). After that the only remaining strongly
connected subgraph contains state 2 and 3, now state 3 where c is enabled is considered as a bad
state because c is not engaged in the subgraph. State 2 is then pruned for being a trivial strongly
connected subgraph which fails event-level strong fairness.
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4.4.2 Complexity and Soundness
The time complexities for verification under no fairness, EWF or PWF or SGF are similar, i.e.,
all linear in the number of system transitions. All states in one SCC are discarded at once in all
cases and, therefore, no recursive call is necessary. Furthermore, the prune function is linear in the
number of transitions of a SCC. SPIN’s model checking algorithm under PWF increases the run-
time expense of a verification run by a factor that is linear in the number of running processes. In
comparison, our algorithm is less expensive for weak fairness. This is evidenced by the experiment
results presented in Section 4.7. Verification under ESF or PSF is in general expensive. In the
worst case (i.e., the whole system is strongly connected and only one state is pruned every time),
the tarjan method may be invoked at most #S times, where #S is the number of system states.
Thus, the time complexity is bounded by #S × #T where #T is the number of transitions. In
practice, however, if the property is false, a counterexample is usually identified quickly, because
our algorithm constructs and checks SCCs on-the-fly. Even if the property is true, our experience
suggests that the worst case scenario is rare in practice. Instead of performing detailed complexity
analysis (refer to the discussion presented in [106]), we illustrate the performance of our algorithm
using real systems in Section 4.7.
Next, we argue the total correctness of the algorithm. The algorithm is terminating because by
assumption, the number of states is finite, and the number of visited states and pruned states are
monotonically increasing.
Theorem 4.4.1 Let L be a LTS. Let φ be a property. Let F be a fairness type (i.e., EWF, PWF, ESF,
PSF or SGF). L F φ if and only if the algorithm returns true.
Proof. Case EWF: By lemma 4.3.1, L EWF φ if and only if there does not exist a SCC S such
that alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S ) and S is accepting. Given any SCC S , the algorithm returns
false if and only if it does so at line 8 because the recursive call at line 9 always returns true (by the
definition of prune(S ,T ,EWF )). Therefore, it returns false if and only if S is accepting (so that
the condition at line 5 is true) and alwaysEvt(S ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S ) (so that the condition at line 7
is true). If there does not exist such a SCC, the algorithm returns true. If the algorithm returns true,
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there must not be such a SCC. Therefore, F EWF φ if and only if the algorithm returns true.
Case PWF: Similarly as above.
Case ESF: By lemma 4.3.3, L ESF φ if and only if there does not exist a strongly connected
subgraph C such that onceEvt(C ) ⊆ engagedEvt(C ) and C is accepting. If C itself is a SCC,
it must be found (by the correctness of Tarjan’s algorithm and function prune(S ,T ,ESF )) and
the algorithm returns false if C is accepting. If it is contained in one (and only one) SCC, by the
correctness of prune(S ,T ,ESF ), its states are never pruned. As a result, it is identified when all
other states in the SCC are pruned or a fair strongly connected subgraph containing all its states is
identified. In either case, the algorithm returns false if and only if such a fair strongly connected
subgraph is found. Equivalently, it returns true if and only if there are no such subgraphs. Therefore,
F ESF φ if and only if the algorithm returns true.
Case PSF: Similarly as above.
Case SGF: By lemma 4.3.4, L SGF φ if and only if there does not exist a SCC S such that S
satisfies strong global fairness is accepting. The algorithms returns false if and only if it is at line 8
because the recursive call at line 9 always returns true (by the definition of prune(S ,T ,SGF )). By
definition of prune(S ,T ,SGF ), the control reaches line 8 if and only if the SCC is terminal and is
accepting. Thus, F SGF φ if and only if the algorithm returns true. 2
4.5 Event Annotated Fairness
In this section, we present an alternative (and more flexible) approach, which allows users to as-
sociate fairness to only part of the systems or associate different parts with different notions of
fairness. The motivation is twofold.
Firstly, previous approaches treat every event or state equally, i.e., fairness is applied to every
event/state. In practice, it may be that only certain events are meant to be fair. For instance,
when verifying open systems, fairness/liveness assumptions are often associated with environmental
events as a way to capture assumptions on the environment. In such case, if event-level or process-
level fairness is applied, it is clearly overwhelming. Our remedy is to allow users to associate
4.5. EVENT ANNOTATED FAIRNESS 63
fairness assumptions with individual events by labeling events with fairness marks6. PAT supports
a number of fairness annotations on events. We examine three of them in the following.
• Unconditional event fairness is written as f (a). An execution of the system is fair if and only
if a occurs infinitely often.
• Weak event fairness is written as wf (a). An execution of the system is fair if and only if a
occurs infinitely often if it is always enabled from some point on.
• Strong event fairness is written as sf (a). An execution of the system is fair if and only if a
occurs infinitely often if it is enabled infinitely often.
Unconditional event fairness [128] does not depend on whether the event is enabled or not, and
therefore, is stronger than weak/strong event fairness. It may be used to annotate events which are
known to be periodically engaged. For instance, the following process models a natural clock.
Clock() = tick → Clock();
By annotating tick with unconditional event fairness, we require that the clock must progress in-
finitely and the system (in which the clock and other components execute in parallel) disallows
unrealistic timelock, i.e., execution of infinite events which takes finite time. Unconditional event
fairness (like other event annotations) can be used to mechanically reduce the size of the property.




b. We may mechanically annotate a in the model
with unconditional event fairness and verify
23
b instead. The semantics of weak (strong) event
fairness is similar to event-level weak (strong) fairness defined in Section 4.2 except it is associated
with individual events (by contrast to all events)7. Event annotated fairness may be viewed as the
dual image of accepting states in automata theory, e.g., same as only selected states are marked
accepting, only selected events are annotated.
6An alternative way is to identify a set of events separately from the model itself, which is in theory equivalent, but
cumbersome in practice. It is especially true if an event may be constituted by process parameters or even global variables.
7Strong global fairness concerns with both events and states and hence no corresponding event annotation is defined.
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The other motivation of event annotated fairness is that it makes partial order reduction (see Sec-
tion 2.3.3) possible (to some extent) for model checking with strong fairness. The algorithm pre-
sented in Figure 4.4, i.e., a SCC-based explicit model checking algorithm, undoubtedly suffers from
state space explosion, especially when the whole system is strongly connected. Partial order reduc-
tion is one of the important techniques to tackle the problem, which sometimes works surprisingly
well for concurrent systems. For instance, assume that event a and b are independent and the prop-
erty to verify is deadlock-freeness, it is sufficient to explore only one of the two outgoing transitions
at state 0 in the LTS of Figure 4.3(a).
For classic model checking, a set of conditions which must be satisfied by the chosen subset of
enabled events have been proposed to guarantee sound verification against ‘X’-free LTL formulas.
Efficient heuristic algorithms which calculate over-approximations of the subset were explored [58].
One such heuristic algorithm has been implemented in PAT. However, the conditions and algorithms
may not work for verification under fairness. Following results proved in [39], it can be shown that
partial order reduction is applicable to verification under EWF or PWF. However, though every
execution which satisfies strong fairness in the full state graph has an equivalent execution (up to
re-ordering of independent events) in the reduced state graph, it may not satisfy strong fairness and
thus verification result over the reduced state graph may not be valid. Similarly, with strong global
fairness the reduced state graph may not contain a fair loop even if the full state graph does. For
instance, given the LTS in Figure 4.3(a) and assume that a and b are independent. The reduced
graph may only contain state 0 and 1, which contains no loop which satisfies strong global fairness.
In [163], it was suggested that by considering events dependent to each other if they can enable
or disable each other, partial order reduction can be applied to some extent for verification under
fairness. Nonetheless, in previous approaches, because all events must be considered, virtually all
events become inter-dependent and therefore no reduction is possible. In PAT, partial order reduction
is disabled for model checking under strong fairness or strong global fairness. Nonetheless, for
systems with event annotated fairness, it remains possible to apply partial order reduction to events
which are irrelevant to the fairness annotations.
The algorithm presented in Figure 4.4 can be applied to check systems with event annotated fairness
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with slight modification. The basic idea remains, i.e., finding a strongly connected subgraph which
satisfies the fairness constraints. Only events with fairness annotations are considered this time (by
contrast to all events). We remark that annotating all events with weak (strong) fairness is equivalent
to associate event-level weak (strong) fairness with the whole system. Method tarjan is modified
to cope with partial order reduction, following the heuristic function in [58]. In addition, we define
an event to be fairness visible if it enables or disables an event annotated with fairness and require
that if the chosen set of events is a strict subset of the enabled events, the subset must not contain
fairness visible events. The intuition is that only independent events which are irrelevant to fairness
are subject to partial order reduction. Notice that this checking has time complexity linear in the
number of enabled events. The soundness follows from the discussion in [39, 163].




∅ if there exists f (e) and e 6∈ engagedEvt(S );
∅ if alwaysEvt(S ) ∩ wf (Σ) 6⊆ engagedEvt(S );
{s : S | enabledEvt(s) ∩ sf (Σ) ⊆ engagedEvt(S )};
otherwise.
A SCC S is fair with respect to the event annotated fairness if and only if: all events which are
annotated with unconditional event fairness are contained in the set engagedEvt(S ); if an event is
annotated with weak event fairness and is enabled at every state in the SCC, then the event is con-
tained in engagedEvt(S ); and if an event is annotated with strong fairness and is enabled at some
state in the SCC, then the event is contained in engagedEvt(S ). If a SCC does not satisfy uncon-
ditional or weak event fairness, it is abandoned all together. If a state enables an event annotated
with strong fairness which is never engaged in the SCC, then it is pruned. For instance, given the
LTS in Figure 4.5, if event a is annotated with strong fairness, state 0 is a bad state in scc2. It is
not if it is annotated with no or weak fairness. By a similar argument (to that of Theorem 4.4.1), the
soundness of the algorithm can be proved.
4.6. A MULTI-CORE MODEL CHECKING ALGORITHM 66
4.6 A Multi-Core Model Checking Algorithm
Rapid development in hardware industry has brought the prevalence of multi-core systems with
shared-memory, which enabled the speedup of various tasks by using parallel algorithms. The LTL
model checking problem is one of the difficult problems to be parallelized or scaled up to multi-
core systems. In this section, we present an on-the-fly parallel model checking algorithm based
on the Tarjan’s SCC detection algorithm presented in Section 4.4. The proposed parallel algorithm
allows the verification to make full use of a multi-core CPU in the shared-memory architecture.
The approach can be applied to general LTL model checking or with different fairness assumptions.
Further, it is orthogonal to state space reduction techniques like partial order reduction.
4.6.1 Shared-Memory Platform
We work with a model based on threads that share all memory, although they have separate stacks
in their shared address space and a special thread-local storage to store thread-private data. Our
working environment is .NET framework (version 2.0) in Microsoft Windows platform, with its
implementation of threads as lightweight processes. Switching contexts among different threads
is cheaper than switching contexts among full-featured processes with separate address spaces, so
using threads in the system incurs only a minor penalty.
Critical Sections, Locking and Lock Contention In a shared-memory setting, access to memory,
that may be used for writing by more than a single thread, has to be controlled through the use of
mutual exclusion, otherwise, race conditions will occur. This is generally achieved through use
of mutex8. A thread wishing to enter a critical section has to lock9 the associated mutex, which
may block the calling thread if the mutex is locked already by some other thread. An effect called
resource or lock contention is associated with this behavior. This occurs, when two or more threads
happen to need to enter the same critical section (and therefore lock the same mutex), at the same
8A mutex is a common name for a program object that negotiates mutual exclusion among threads, also called a lock.
9In .NET framework, keyword lock is used to achieve this effect.
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time. If critical sections are long or they are entered very often, contention starts to cause observable
performance degradation, as more and more time is spent waiting for mutexes.
Memory Management and Thread Communication In our setting, we assume that all resources
are allocated from the managed heap. Objects are automatically freed when they are no longer
needed by the application. The communication between threads can be achieved simply by object
reference passing.
4.6.2 Parallel Fairness Model Checking Algorithm
The SCC-based verification algorithm presented in the previous section is highly recursive and
employs a sequential DFS search, which exhibits some challenges in parallelism.
scc1 scc2 scc4
scc3
The sequential algorithm in Figure 4.4 can be illustrated in the figure above. When a SCC is de-
tected, it will be analyzed and pruned until empty or there is a counterexample detected (scc4 in
above graph). Taking a close look at the algorithm, we observe that there are four actions applied in
each detected SCC: (1) fairness testing (line 4), (2) bad states pruning (line 8), (3) counterexample
generation (line 5), (4) recursive sub-SCC detection (line 9). The first three actions are local to the
detected SCC. Although the recursive sub-SCC detection is complicated, we can create a local copy
of the Tarjan algorithm to search for “SCC” in the pruned states. In this way, each SCC can be pro-
cessed independent. Therefore, we can put the workload of SCC analysis into separate threads to
achieve concurrency. Inspired by these observations, we present a SCC-based parallel model check-
ing algorithm with four parts: Tarjan thread , SCC worker thread , SCC worker thread pool and
parallel model checker . The detailed algorithms are illustrated as follows.
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stopped = false;
procedure run(threadPool ,States,Transitions)
1. visited = ∅;
2. while there are states in States but not in visited
3. if stopped then {return; }
4. let scc = tarjan(States,Transitions);
5. visited = visited ∪ scc;
6. if forking conditions then
7. threadPool .forkWorkerThread(scc,Transitions);
8. else




Figure 4.6: Tarjan thread implementation
Tarjan thread Figure 4.6 presents the implementation of Tarjan thread , which identifies all
SCCs using Tarjan’s algorithm. Tarjan thread has one public variable stopped and the thread starting
procedure run . stopped is a control variable to stop this thread (line 3) as soon as a worker thread
reports a counterexample. When Tarjan thread starts, the run procedure will perform a DFS
to detect all SCCs in the search space using Tarjan’s algorithm. This process is similar to mc
procedure in Figure 4.4. When a SCC scc is detected at line 4, if the forking conditions at line 6
are satisfied, then a new SCC worker thread will be forked and added in to the worker thread pool
(line 7). Otherwise scc will processed locally in the Tarjan thread (line 9). This local process
is the same as the SCC worker thread (which will be explained later), which stops this thread if
there is a counterexample is found. Forking conditions can be that the size of scc is bigger than
some threshold or the thread pool is full. We add this checking to achieve better efficiency and
workload balance. If the size of scc is small (e.g., only few nodes), the overhead of creating a thread
is much bigger than processing it locally. If the thread pool is full, processing the found scc locally
is probably more efficient than creating a long waiting queue in the thread pool.
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3. let wt = new workerThread(States,Transitions);






9. if thread produces counterexample ∧ ¬jobFinished then
10. terminate all other threads
11. terminate tarjan thread





16. while(has running threads)
17. busy wait
18. endwhile
Figure 4.7: Thread pool implementation
SCC worker thread SCC worker thread works on a detected SCC to report whether the SCC
contains a counterexample or not within the given SCC states and transitions. It basically resembles
the code from line 4 to 12 (highlighted using *) in Figure 4.4. If the detected SCC is not fair, it will
prune the states according to the given fairness type. Otherwise it will terminate and return false. If
the pruned scc has fewer states, a local copy of the Tarjan’s algorithm will continue the searching.
Upon the termination of SCC worker thread , a notification will send to the thread pool to notify
the result.
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SCC worker thread pool The implementation of the SCC worker thread pool is presented
in Figure 4.7. The thread pool has a working queue threadQueue10 to store all active worker
threads. Private variable jobFinished indicates whether a counterexample has been found or not.
Procedure forkWorkerThread creates a new worker thread (line 3) and puts it into the working
queue (line 5), if the counterexample is not found (line 2). A lock is used on threadQueue (at
line 1 and 7) to prevent Tarjan thread working too fast to add two or more threads at same time.
This is possible because during the process of forking the first thread, Tarjan thread may find
another SCC and want to fork a new thread. At line 4, we register the termination event of the
worker thread to procedure threadTermination , which means upon the termination of the worker
thread, the thread pool will be notified and procedure threadTermination will be triggered. When
procedure threadTermination is triggered, if the termination thread has located a counterexample
and no one does it before (line 9), thread pool will terminate11 all other active threads (line 10) and
Tarjan thread (by setting stopped flag to true) (line 11). Flag jobFinished is set to true at line
12, hence new threads shall not be forked anymore. !jobFinished checking in line 9 is necessary
to prevent terminating same threads twice. In the end, the termination thread is removed from
thread pool in line 12. During this process threadQueue is locked to prevent data race. Procedure
allThreadsJoin does busy-waiting until all threads terminate.
Parallel model checker Lastly, parallel model checker is shown in Figure 4.8. It conducts the
verification by creating the Tarjan thread and thread pool. Once Tarjan thread starts, it will wait
for Tarjan thread to join (i.e., successfully terminate) (line 3). The termination can be that all states
are explored, or a counterexample is found locally, or stopped flag is set to false. Afterwards, it will
wait for thread pool to terminate (line 4). The procedure will return false if any counterexample is
found in tarjan thread or any worker thread.
10In our implementation, threadQueue is realized by System.Threading.ThreadPool object in .NET Framework. The
thread scheduling is managed by the thread pool automatically.
11Thread termination can be achieved by thread killing or asking the thread to voluntarily give up. The second way is
safer and adopted in our approach. One example is the stopped flag in Tarjan thread .
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procedure pmc(States,Transitions)
1. initialize worker thread pool threadPool
2. let tarjan = tarjanThread .run(threadPool ,States ,Transitions);
3. tarjan.join();
4. threadPool .allThreadsJoin();
5. if counterexample is found then
6. return false;
7. return true;
Figure 4.8: Parallel model checker implementation
4.6.3 Complexity and Soundness
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the parallel model checking algorithm and prove its
soundness.
For the parallel version of the algorithm, the time and space complexity is exactly same as the
sequential version as discussed in Section 4.4.2. This is not surprising because the parallel algorithm
simply splits SCC analysis into worker threads. The parallel algorithm is designed for a shared
memory framework, the SCCs and their transitions are shared between Tarjan thread and worker
threads. There is no communication overhead. If to migrate this approach into distributed systems,
we may consider to pass SCC only and let the worker threads to build the transitions locally to
avoid the communication overhead. This is because the number of transitions of a SCC is often
much larger than the number of vertices.
If the verification result is true, the number of states and transitions visited in the parallel and se-
quential version are same. If there is a counterexample, the parallel version may visit more states
depending on when the counterexample is identified. If a counterexample is present in the first few
SCCs encountered during the search, then the sequential version may find one quickly, while the
parallel version may have forked multiple threads to search in more SCCs. Hence parallel version
visits more states and transitions. On the other hand, if a counterexample is present only in the last
few SCCs, the parallel version can be faster than the sequential version if the counterexample is
identified quickly in one worker thread, which then terminates all other SCC checking. This is ev-
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idenced by the experiment results presented in Section 4.7.2. Notice that when there are more than
one counterexamples in the system, it is possible that the parallel verification may produce different
counterexample at different runs.
Regarding the soundness, the following theorem states the correctness of the parallel algorithm pmc.
We argue the total correctness of the parallel algorithm by showing it is terminating and equivalent
to the sequential mc algorithm.
Theorem 4.6.1 Let L be a LTS. Let φ be a property. Let F be a fairness type (i.e., EWF, PWF, ESF,
PSF or SGF). L F φ if and only if the algorithm pmc returns true.
Proof. Firstly, we show that the pmc algorithm is terminating. By the assumption, we know that the
number of states is finite, so is the number of the SCCs. In Tarjan thread , the number of visited
states and the pruned states are monotonically increasing, hence the Tarjan thread is terminating.
Worker threads are terminating since they are working on the detected SCC and the number of
pruned states are monotonically increasing. Since the number of SCC is finite, worker thread pool
is terminating. Therefore pmc is terminating.
Secondly, we show that pmc returns the same result as mc. The key of this proof is to prove that
each SCC analysis is independent of each other. If this true, then checking the SCCs in parallel
is same as checking them sequentially. We have listed the four actions performed in the SCCs in
Section 4.6.2, which can be applied independently.
Lastly, the correctness of data sharing and race condition prevention by using locks have been
discussed in Section 4.6.1. We skip it here. 2
Following the above theorem, we conclude that the sequential algorithm and the parallel algorithm
are equivalent in terms of correctness. Therefore as long as the reduction is compatible with sequen-
tial algorithm, then it is compatible with the parallel algorithm. For example, Section 4.5 shows
that partial order reduction is possible12 by employing fairness annotations on individual events,
12In general, fairness verification conflicts with partial order reduction.
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which means this technique can also be used with our parallel algorithm. We remark that pmc is
orthogonal to state reduction techniques like partial order reduction, symmetry reduction or data
abstraction. Intuitively, the parallel algorithm would perform better since it may utilize more CPU
power. Nonetheless, thread forking/terminating or communication between threads can be costly.
We present detailed analysis using real-world examples as well as hand crafted examples in the next
section.
4.7 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the sequential version and parallel version of
fairness model checking algorithms using experiments on both benchmark systems as well as re-
cently developed population protocols, which require fairness for correctness.
4.7.1 Experiments for Sequential Fairness Verification
Table 4.2 summarizes the verification statistics on recently developed population protocols. The
unit of time measurement is second. Notice that “−” means either out of memory or more than
4 hours. The protocols include leader election for complete networks (LE C ) [88], for rooted
trees (LE T ) [47], for odd sized rings (LE OR) [118], for network rings (LE R) [88] and token
circulation for network rings (TC R) [14]. The property is that eventually always there is one and
only one leader in the network, i.e.,
32
oneLeader . Correctness of all these algorithms relies on
different notions of fairness. For simplicity, fairness is applied to the whole system. As a result,
partial order reduction is only applied for verification under no or weak fairness, but not strong
fairness or strong global fairness.
We remark that event-level fairness or strong global fairness is required for these examples. As
discussed in Section 4.2, PWF is different from EWF. In order to compare PAT with SPIN for
verification with EWF, we twist the models so that each event in population protocols is modeled as
a process. By a simple argument, it can be shown that for such models, EWF is equivalent to PWF.
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Model Size EWF ESF SGF
Result PAT SPIN Result PAT Result PAT
LE C 6 Yes 26.7 229 Yes 26.7 Yes 23.5
LE C 7 Yes 152.2 1190 Yes 152.4 Yes 137.9
LE C 8 Yes 726.6 5720 Yes 739.0 Yes 673.1
LE T 9 Yes 10.2 62.3 Yes 10.2 Yes 9.6
LE T 11 Yes 68.1 440 Yes 68.7 Yes 65.1
LE T 13 Yes 548.6 3200 Yes 573.6 Yes 529.6
LE OR 3 No 0.2 0.3 No 0.2 Yes 11.8
LE OR 5 No 1.3 8.7 No 1.8 − −
LE OR 7 No 15.9 95 No 21.3 − −
LE R 4 No 0.3 < 0.1 No 0.7 Yes 19.5
LE R 6 No 1.8 0.2 No 4.6 − −
LE R 8 No 11.7 1.7 No 28.3 − −
TC R 5 No < 0.1 < 0.1 No < 0.1 Yes 0.6
TC R 7 No 0.2 0.1 No 0.2 Yes 13.7
TC R 9 No 0.4 0.2 No 0.4 Yes 640.2
Table 4.2: Population protocols experiments: with Core 2 CPU 6600 at 2.40GHz and 2GB RAM
Nonetheless, model checking under PWF in SPIN increases the verification time by a factor that is
linear in the number of processes. By modeling each event as a process, we increase the number of
processes and therefore un-avoidably increase the SPIN verification time by a factor that is constant
(in the number of events per process for network rings) or linear (in the number of network nodes
for complete network). SPIN has no support for ESF, PSF or SGF. Thus, the only way to model
check under strong fairness or strong global fairness in SPIN is to encode the fairness constraints as
part of the property. However, even for the smallest network (with 3 nodes), SPIN needs significant
amount of time to construct (very large) Büchi automata from the property. Therefore, we conclude
that it is infeasible to use SPIN for such a purpose and omit the experiment results from the table.
We remark that in theory, strong fairness can be transformed to weak fairness by paying the price of
one Boolean variable [124]. Nonetheless, the property again needs to be augmented with additional
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clauses after the translation, which is again infeasible.
All of the algorithms fail to satisfy the property without fairness. The algorithm for complete net-
works (LE C ) or trees (LE T ) requires at least EWF, whereas the rest of the algorithms require
SGF. It is thus important to be able to verify systems under strong fairness or strong global fairness.
Notice that the token circulation algorithm for network rings (TC R) functions correctly for a net-
work of size 3 under EWF. Nonetheless, EWF is not sufficient for a network with more nodes, as
shown in the table. The reason is that a particular sequence of message exchange which satisfies
EWF only needs the participation of at least 4 network nodes. This suggests that our improvement
in terms of the performance and ability to handle different forms of fairness has its practical value.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the results in the table. Firstly, in the presence of counterex-
amples, PAT usually finds one quickly (e.g., on LE R and TC R under EWF or strong fairness).
It takes longer to find a counterexample for LE OR mainly because there are too many possible
initial configurations of the system (exactly 25∗N where N is network size) and a counterexample
is only present for particular initial configurations. Secondly, verification under ESF is more ex-
pensive than verification with no fair, EWF or SGF. This conforms to theoretical time complexity
analysis. The worst case scenario is absent from these examples (e.g., there are easily millions
of transitions/states in many of the experiments). Lastly, PAT outperforms the current practice of
verification under fairness. PAT offers comparably better performance on verification under weak
fairness (e.g., on LE C and LE T ) and makes it feasible to verify under strong fairness or strong
global fairness. This allows us to discover bugs in systems functioning with strong fairness. Exper-
iments on LE C and LE T (for which the property is only false under no fairness) show minor
computational overhead for handling a stronger fairness.
Table 4.3 shows verification statistics of benchmark systems to show other aspects of our algorithm.
Because of the deadlock state, the dining philosophers model (DP(N ) for N philosophers and
forks) does not guarantee that a philosopher always eventually eats (
23
eat0) whether with no
fairness or strong global fairness. This experiment shows PAT takes little extra time for handling
the fairness assumption. We remark that PAT may spend more time than SPIN on identifying a
counterexample in some cases. This is both due to the particular order of exploration and the
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Model Property Result Fairness PAT(sec) SPIN(sec)
DP(10)
23
eat0 No no 0.8 < 0.1
DP(13)
23
eat0 No no 9.8 < 0.1
DP(15)
23
eat0 No no 56.1 < 0.1
DP(10)
23
eat0 No strong global fairness 0.8 −
DP(13)
23
eat0 No strong global fairness 9.8 −
DP(15)
23
eat0 No strong global fairness 56.0 −
MS(10)
23
work0 Yes event-level strong fairness 9.3 −
MS(12)
23
work0 Yes event-level strong fairness 105.5 −
MS(100)
23
work0 Yes event annotated strong fairness 3.1 −
MS(200)
23
work0 Yes event annotated strong fairness 15.5 −
PETERSON(3) bounded bypass Yes process-level weak fairness 0.1 1.25
PETERSON(4) bounded bypass Yes process-level weak fairness 1.7 > 671
PETERSON(5) bounded bypass Yes process-level weak fairness 58.9 −
Table 4.3: Experiment results on benchmark systems
difference between model checking based on nested DFS and model checking based on identifying
SCCs. PAT’s algorithm relies on SCCs. If a large portion of the system is strongly connected, it
takes more time to construct the SCC before testing whether it is fair or not. In this example, the
whole system contains one large SCC and a few trivial ones including the deadlock state. If PAT
happens to start with the large one, the verification may take considerably more time.
Milner’s cyclic scheduler algorithm (MS (N ) for N processes) is a showcase for the effectiveness of
partial order reduction. We apply fairness in two different ways, i.e., one applying ESF to the whole
system and the other applying only to inter-process communications13 . In the latter case, partial
order reduction allows us to prove the property over a much larger number of processes (e.g., 200 vs
12). Peterson’s mutual exclusive algorithm (PETERSON (N )) requires at least PWF to guarantee
bounded by-pass [6], i.e., if a process requests to enter the critical section, it eventually will. The
13A general guideline for annotating event fairness is that, communication events are more unlikely to be annotated as
local events are under the control of the local scheduler.
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property is verified under PWF in both PAT and SPIN. PAT outperforms SPIN in this setting as well.
4.7.2 Experiments for Multi-core Fairness Verification
In this section, we present the experiments results on parallel fairness model checking algorithm.
Table 4.4 summarizes the verification statistics on dinning philosophers problem (DP ), and recently
developed population protocols (LE C [88], LE R [88] and TC R [14]). We modify the DP
model so that it is deadlock-free (i.e., by letting one of the philosophers to pick up the forks in a
different order). The property is that a philosopher never starves indefinitely, i.e.,
23
eat .0, where
eat .0 is the event of 0-th philosopher eating. The property for the leader election protocols is that
eventually always there is one and only one leader in the network, i.e.,
32
oneLeader . Correctness
of all these algorithms relies on different notions of fairness.
In our experiments below, Size denotes the number processes in the models. Besides the execution
time of the sequential algorithm (mc) and parallel algorithm (pmc), we present additional mea-
surements which reflect the how much workload pmc can put in parallel if the verification result is
true14. One is the average size of nontrivial SCCs (denoted as Avg SCC Size) and the number of
SCC (denoted as #SCC ). A SCC is trivial if and only if it has only one state. Intuitively, the par-
allel algorithm gains more saving with larger and more SCCs. The other is the ratio of the number
of states of all (non-trivial) SCCs and the whole state space (denoted as SCC Ratio). Intuitively, a
higher SCC Ratio shall lead to more saving. The forking condition is that the SCC must have at
least 100 states. ‘-’ means out of memory. The unit of time measurement is second.
Regarding the threads scheduling, there are two approaches. The first approach is to manually assign
a newly created thread to a free CPU-core. If all CPU-cores are used, the new thread is pushed
into the working queue and wait.The second approach is to make each thread as operating system
thread15, and let the OS CPU scheduler to do the scheduling. We compared the two approaches,
14When the property is false, SCC Ratio can be different for different runs.
15In our implementation, we use System.Threading.ThreadPool object in .NET framework 2.0 to create system threads
in Microsoft Windows system.
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Model Size Avg SCC SCC EWF ESF SGF
/#SCC Ratio Res. mc pmc Res. mc pmc Res. mc pmc
DP 5 67/13 0.36 No 0.08 0.08 Yes 0.22 0.20 Yes 0.19 0.19
DP 6 178/21 0.38 No 0.13 0.13 Yes 0.97 0.84 Yes 0.86 0.78
DP 7 486/31 0.4 No 0.38 0.37 Yes 4.62 3.39 Yes 4.42 3.38
DP 8 1368/43 0.41 No 1.41 1.33 Yes 29.3 19.5 Yes 32.9 22.1
LE C 5 34/43 0.58 Yes 4.04 3.66 Yes 4.03 3.65 Yes 3.66 3.49
LE C 6 48/103 0.64 Yes 23.1 21.3 Yes 23.1 21.5 Yes 21.9 20.1
LE C 7 66/227 0.68 Yes 128 124 Yes 129 124 Yes 134 127
LE C 8 86/479 0.71 Yes 604 600 Yes 615 607 Yes 721 684
LE R 3 9/268 0.36 No 0.11 0.11 No 0.12 0.12 Yes 1.40 1.27
LE R 4 9/2652 0.4 No 0.11 0.28 No 0.59 0.60 Yes 21.7 15.7
LE R 5 9/25274 0.42 No 0.71 0.72 No 2.22 2.19 Yes 587 456
TC R 6 84/2 0.01 No 0.11 0.11 No 0.11 0.11 Yes 2.20 2.38
TC R 7 210/2 0.01 No 0.14 0.14 No 0.15 0.16 Yes 11.3 12.3
TC R 8 330/3 0.01 No 0.19 0.20 No 0.25 0.23 Yes 69.6 72.9
TC R 9 756/3 0.01 No 0.27 0.31 No 0.36 0.37 Yes 494 573
Table 4.4: Experiment results on a PC running Windows XP with 2.83 GHz quad-core Intel Q9550
CPU and 2 GB memory
it shows that when the size of the SCCs is big, the two approaches have same results. When the
number of SCCs is big, the second approach is more efficient. We applied second approach in our
experiments.
In Table 4.4, we can see that when the verification result is false, either pmc or mc can be faster,
which is expected. When the verification result is true, pmc is faster in most of the cases, except
in the case of model checking the TC R example under strong global fairness. In this particular
example, SCC ratio is very low (0.01), which means that there are many trivial SCCs. Furthermore,
there are only few non-trivial SCCs. As a result, there is little work that can be separated out for
the worker threads to speed up the model checking, and the communication overhead makes pmc
slower. On the other hand, the pmc slowdown in this case is only several percents of mc, which
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Model Size Avg SCC/ SCC EWF ESF SGF
#SCC Ratio Res. mc pmc Res. mc pmc Res. mc pmc
PAR1 5 10001/5 0.2 No 1.75 2.11 Yes 22.5 12.0 Yes 11.3 6.97
PAR1 6 10001/6 0.2 No 1.74 2.07 Yes 27.1 14.8 Yes 13.6 8.13
PAR1 7 10001/7 0.2 No 1.71 2.29 Yes 31.2 16.7 Yes 15.9 9.14
PAR1 8 10001/8 0.2 No 1.71 2.16 Yes 36.1 18.0 Yes 18.1 10.6
PAR1 9 10001/9 0.2 No 1.71 2.15 Yes 40.6 20.9 Yes 20.4 11.9
PAR1 10 10001/10 0.2 No 1.73 2.15 Yes 45.3 22.6 Yes 22.81 13.07
PAR2 4 20000/5 0.5 No 5.46 7.12 NA - - Yes 8.87 5.52
PAR2 5 20000/6 0.5 No 6.05 9.53 NA - - Yes 18.3 8.64
PAR2 6 20000/7 0.5 No 6.39 10.5 NA - - Yes 21.4 9.32
PAR2 7 20000/8 0.5 No 6.90 11.4 NA - - Yes 24.5 9.69
PAR2 8 20000/9 0.5 No 7.77 11.7 NA - - Yes 27.9 11.82
PAR2 9 20000/10 0.5 No 8.06 12.8 NA - - Yes 30.9 13.68
PAR3 7 2000/8 1 No 0.29 0.20 Yes 412 118 Yes 0.41 0.28
PAR3 8 2000/9 1 No 0.21 0.24 Yes 463 136 Yes 0.45 0.29
PAR3 9 2000/10 1 No 0.25 0.23 Yes 516 156 Yes 0.49 0.31
Table 4.5: Experiment results on a PC running Windows XP with 2.83 GHz quad-core Intel Q9550
CPU and 2 GB memory
shows that the communication overhead in pmc is low.
Table 4.5 summarizes the verification statistics on some hand craft examples to show the potential
effectiveness of the parallel algorithm. We create three models (PAR1, PAR2 and PAR3) such
that their state spaces contain several SCCs, each of which has a big number of states. As a result,
worker threads can be dispatched with substantial workload. Correctness of all these algorithms
requires ESF and SGF.
In Table 4.5, we can see that pmc is working well in PAR1 example, where the average SCC size
is big and the SCC ratio is not very low. The performance is even better (60% speedup) when the
SCC ratio increases to 0.5 in PAR2 example. The PAR3 example almost produces the ideal case
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(a) Results on Intel Core2 6600 CPU (b) Results on Intel Q9550 CPU
Figure 4.9: Experimental results for scalability testing
further speedup could be achieved if there were more cores. ESF case in PAR2 gives a worst
case mentioned in Section 4.3 for strong fairness checking, hence it ends up with out of memory
exception.
The experiment results in Table 4.4 and 4.5 confirm that the speedup of parallel verification relies
on the size and the number of non-trivial SCCs. Each SCC has four analysis actions as described
in Section 4.6.2. If the size of SCCs is big and/or the number of SCCs is more than the number of
cores, each worker thread will make full use of the available CPU-cores. Overall, pmc performs
better than mc for big average SCC size and high SCC ratio.
To study the scalability of our approach with different number of CPU cores, we conduct the same
experiments (model checking examples in Table 1 and PARA1 example under strong global fair-
ness)16 on a dual-core CPU (Figure 4.9 (a)) and a quad-core CPU17 (Figure 4.9 (b)). The coordinate
of each point (x , y) in the graphs represents mc execution time and pmc execution time of a model
correspondingly. From the figures we can see that, points in Figure 4.9 (a) are scattered between line
16PARA2 and PARA3 have high average SCC size and SCC ratio which is rare in real systems, so we exclude them
in the salability testing.
17Since we calculate the speedup of pmc compared to mc, the absolute speed of the two CPUs is not important.
4.8. SUMMARY 81
y = x and y = 2x , while points in Figure 4.9 (b) are scattered between line y = 2x and y = 3x .
The average speedup of the parallel algorithm is 22.9% for quad-core CPU and 11.2% for dual-core
CPU. This suggests that our approach is scalable for more CPU cores in general.
Besides PAT, there are a number of model checkers which are designed for similar application do-
mains. It is, however, not easy to compare PAT with them. For instance, the refinement checker
FDR does not support shared variables/arrays, and therefore, FDR’s model is significantly different
from PAT’s. Further, FDR has no support for multi-core. The model checker SPIN supports verifi-
cation of LTL properties. The multi-core parallel algorithm in SPIN is designed for model checking
based on nested depth-first search. Nested depth-first-search works well for verification under no
fairness. It can be twisted to perform model checking under fairness in the price of significant
computational overhead, which has been shown in [197]. As a result, it makes little sense here to
compare performance of our parallel algorithm with SPIN’s.
4.8 Summary
In summary, we developed a model checking approach to verify fairness enhanced systems based
on Tarjan’s SCC detection algorithm. Our approach is holistic, which does not only take care of
LTL verification but also checks the fairness constraints satisfaction in one goal. Furthermore, we
presented a parallel version of the proposed algorithm for in multi-core shared-memory architec-
ture. We showed that our sequential algorithm is effective to prove or disprove both benchmark
systems and newly proposed distributed algorithms. The experimental results on real world systems
suggested our parallel algorithm is efficient and scalable to multi-cores.
The research on categorizing fairness/liveness, motivated by system analyzing of distributed or con-
current systems, has a long history [131, 138, 18, 96]. A rich set of fairness notions have been
identified during the last decades, e.g., weak or strong fairness in [131], justice or compassion con-
ditions in [138], hyperfairness in [21, 132], strong global or local fairness recently in [88], etc. This
chapter summarizes a number of fairness notions which are closely related to distributed system
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verification and provides a framework to model check under different fairness constraints. Other
works on categorizing fairness/liveness have been evidenced in [173, 128, 166, 216].
This chapter is related to research on system verification under fairness [100, 131, 88]. Our model
checking algorithm is related to previous works on emptiness checking for Büchi automata [126,
111, 99] and Streett automata [124, 99, 137, 106]. In this chapter, we apply the idea to the automata-
based model checking framework and generalize it to handle different fairness assumptions. In
a way, our algorithm integrates the two algorithms presented in [99, 106] and extends them in
a number of aspects to suit our purpose. Furthermore, model checking algorithms under strong
fairness have been proposed in [99] and [137]. In both works, a similar pruning process is involved.
Regarding LTL parallel verification, there are various approaches in the literature. Holzmann pro-
posed a parallel extension of the SPIN model checker in [112]. In this SPIN extension, the algorithm
for checking safety properties scales well to N-core systems. However, the algorithm for liveness
checking, which is based on the original SPIN’s nested DFS algorithm, can only be applied in dual-
core systems. Whereas, our approach is scalable to N-core system and can also handle different
forms of fairness, while SPIN handles only process level weak fairness. Lafuente [129] presented
a cycle localization algorithm based on nested DFS, which is very similar to our ideas. In their
approach, the main thread performs the first DFS to identify an accepting state, and the worker
threads perform the second DFS to detect the fair cycle starting from the accepting state. Com-
pared to this solution, our approach has the advantage that each SCC will be checked by one and
only one worker thread. A different approach to shared-memory model checking is presented in
[114], based on CTL* translation to Hesitant Alternating Automata. The proposed algorithm uses
so-called non-emptiness game for deciding validity of the original formula and is therefore largely
unrelated to the algorithms based on fair-cycle detection. Barnat, Chaloupka and Pol gave a com-
prehensive survey [24] in the distributed SCC decomposition algorithms [37, 38, 89, 49, 36, 23, 25].
However, these algorithms are designed for distributed systems and have quadratical or cubic order
of complexity.
Chapter 5
Applications of Fairness Model
Checking
Recently, the population protocol model [20] has emerged as an elegant computation paradigm for
describing mobile ad hoc networks. One essential property of population protocols is that with
respect to all possible initial configurations all nodes must eventually converge to the correct output
values (or configurations), which is a typical liveness property. To guarantee that such kind of
properties can be achieved, fairness assumption is required. A number of population protocols
have been proposed and studied [14, 16, 88, 118, 15]. Most of them only work if global fairness
(see Section 5.1) is imposed. Furthermore, it was shown that without global fairness uniform self-
stabilizing leader election in rings is impossible [88].
In this chapter, we apply the fairness model checking algorithms developed in Chapter 4 on a set
of self-stabilizing population protocols for ring networks to show the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithms. The choice of ring topology reduces the interactions of nodes and also makes our
models scale up easily. We select protocols for two-hop coloring and orienting nodes and protocols
for leader election and token passing. All these protocols only work under global fairness. We
report on our model checking results. Especially, we present one previously unknown bug in a
leader election protocol [118], which can only be identified using PAT (as far as we know).
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We notice that population protocols are designed on a large or even unbounded number of behav-
iorally similar processes, which raises the state explosion problem of the model checking approach.
To solve this problem, we propose a fair model checking algorithm with process counter abstraction.
Our on-the-fly checking algorithm enforces fairness by keeping track of the local states from where
actions are enabled / executed within an execution trace without maintaining the process identifiers.
We show the usability of this technique via the automated verification of several real-life protocols.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we introduce the population
protocol model. Section 5.2 presents the population protocols studied in this chapter. The model
checking results are summarized in Section 5.3. The process counter abstraction starts from Sec-
tion 5.4 with the system model definitions and process counter representation. Section 5.5 presents
how to perform model checking under fairness without the knowledge of process identifiers. Sec-
tion 5.6 discusses how to handle infinitely many processes. Section 5.7 discusses experimental
results of the counter abstraction. Section 5.8 concludes this chapter.
5.1 The Population Protocol Model
The population protocol model [20] is proposed recently as a computation paradigm for describing
mobile ad hoc networks, consisting of multiple mobile nodes which interact with each other to
carry out a computation. Application domains of the protocols include wireless sensor networks
and biological computers. In this section, we briefly introduce the population protocol model. More
details are available in [14, 88].
In the population protocol model, the underlying network can be described as a directed graph
G = (V ,E ) without multi-edges and self-loops. Each vertex represents a simple finite-state sens-
ing device, and each edge (u, v) means that u as an initiator could possibly interact with v as a
responder.
Definition 15 (Population Protocol Model) A population protocol model is specified as a six-tuple
P = (Q , C,X ,Y ,O , δ), which contains
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• a finite set Q of states,
• a set C of configurations,
• a finite set X of input symbols,
• a finite set Y of output symbols,
• an output function O : Q → Y , and
• a transition function δ : (Q ×X )× (Q × X )→ 2Q×Q .
If (p′, q ′) ∈ δ((p, x ), (q , y)), then we write ((p, x ), (q , y)) → (p′, q ′) and call it a transition.
When δ always maps to a set that only contains a single pair of states, then we call the protocol
deterministic.
A configuration C is a mapping C : V → Q assigning to each node its internal state, and an
input assignment α : V → X specifies the input for each node. Let C and C ′ be configura-
tions, α be an input assignment, and u, v be different nodes. If there is a pair (C ′(u),C ′(v)) ∈
δ((C (u), α(u)), (C (v), α(v))), we say that C goes to C ′ via edge e = (u, v) by transition
((C (u), α(u)), (C (v), α(v))) → (C ′(u),C ′(v)), abbreviated to (C , α) e−→ C ′. A pair of a
transition r and an edge e constitutes an action σ = (r , e). If C goes to C ′ via some edge, then C
can go to C ′ in one step, written as (C , α)→ C ′.
An execution is an infinite sequence of configurations and assignments (C0, α0), (C1, α1), . . . ,
(Ci , αi ), . . ., such that C0 ∈ C and for each i , (Ci , αi ) → Ci+1. Different fairness assump-
tions on population protocol models can be defined on the system executions in the same way as in
Section 4.2. The fairness constraint is imposed on the scheduler to ensure that the protocol makes
progress. In population protocols, the required fairness condition will make the system behave
nicely eventually, although it can behave arbitrarily for an arbitrarily long period [20]. That is why
most of population protocols [14, 16, 88, 118, 15] only work if global fairness is assumed. For
instance, Fischer and Jiang [88] have proved that without global fairness uniform self-stabilizing
leader election in rings is impossible. Several protocols are presented in the next section to further
explain the ideas.
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5.2 Population Ring Protocol Examples
In this section, we take a set of self-stabilizing population protocols for ring networks. A distributed
system or a population protocol is said to be self-stabilizing [66] if it satisfies the following two
properties:
• convergence: starting from an arbitrary configuration, the system is guaranteed to reach a
correct configuration;
• closure: once the system reaches a correct configuration, it cannot become incorrect any more.
This means that in our modeling of these protocols, we have to take all possible initial configurations
into account, and the checked properties have the form of
32
property . The choice of ring topology
makes it less demanding when we model the interactions of nodes and it also makes our models
easily scale up to larger instances. We have selected protocols for two-hop coloring and orienting
nodes and protocols for leader election and token passing. Note that all these protocols only work
under global fairness.
In the population protocol model, one protocol consists of N nodes, numbered from 0 to N − 1.1 A
protocol is usually described by a set of interaction rules between an initiator u and a responder v .
Such rules have conditions on the state and the input of the initiator and the responder, and specify
the state of the initiator and the responder if a transition can be taken.
5.2.1 Two hop coloring
A protocol to make nodes to recognize their neighbors in a ring is presented in [15]. In fact, it is
a general algorithm that enables each node in a degree-bounded graph to distinguish between its
neighbors. The graph is colored such that any two nodes adjacent to the same node have different
colors. More precisely, for each node v , if u and w are distinct neighbors of v , then u and w must
1In the following discussion, we set N as three for simplicity.
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have different colors. (u,w) is called a two-hop pair. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to rings,
and three colors suffice the purpose (see [15]).
Each node u in a ring has two state components, color [u] encodes the color of node u and F [u] is
a bit array, indexed by colors. Initially, color [u] and F [u] can have arbitrary values. The following
description defines the interaction between an initiator u and a responder v .
if F [u][color [v ]] 6= F [v ][color [u]] then
color [u]← color ′[u]; F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]];
else
F [u][color [v ]] = ¬F [u][color [v ]]; F [v ][color [u]] = ¬F [v ][color [u]];
endif
One edge (or interaction) (u, v) is synchronized if F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]], then these
two nodes do not change their color but flip their bits (F [u][color [v ]] and F [v ][color [u]]). On the
other hand, node u is nondeterministically recolored, and it copies F [v ][color [u]] of node v as its
bit F [u][color [v ]]. The statement color [u] ← color ′[u] means one of the three possible colors is
nondeterministically assigned as the new color of u . The CSP# model of this protocol is shown in
detailed in example 5.2.1. In [15], a deterministic version of two-hop coloring is given as well (see
below). Instead of nondeterministically assigning all possible colors to the initiator u , its color is
updated as color [u]← (color [u] + r [u]) mod C . The additional state component r [u] is a local bit
for node u that flits whenever u acts as the initiator of an interaction. We also model and analyze
this protocol in CSP#.
if F [u][color [v ]] 6= F [v ][color [u]] then
color [u]← (color [u] + r [u]) mod C ; F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]];
else
F [u][color [v ]] = ¬F [u][color [v ]]; F [v ][color [u]] = ¬F [v ][color [u]];
endif
r [u]← ¬r [u];
Example 5.2.1 (Two-hop Coloring Protocol) A self-stabilizing population protocol for two-hop
coloring is proposed [15]. This algorithm can guarantee that the neighbors of a node in a ring have
different colors. Figure 5.1 presents (part of) its model in CSP#. Line 1 defines two global constants
(N and C of value 3) and global variables. N models the network size, i.e., number of nodes and
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1. #define N 3; #define C 3; var color [N ]; var F [N ][C ];
2. Inter(u, v) =
3. if (F [u][color [v ]] 6= F [v ][color [u]]){
4. act1.u.v{F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]]; color [u] = 0; } → Inter(u, v)
5. 2 act2.u.v{F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]]; color [u] = 1; } → Inter(u, v)
6. 2 act3.u.v{F [u][color [v ]] = F [v ][color [u]]; color [u] = 2; } → Inter(u, v)
7. } else {
8. act4.u.v{F [u][color [v ]] = 1− F [u][color [v ]];
9. F [v ][color [u]] = 1− F [v ][color [u]]; } → Inter(u, v)
10. };
11. Init() = ...
12. Protocol() = Init(); ||| x : {0..N − 1}@(Inter(x , (x + 1)%N ) ||| Inter((x + 1)%N , x ));
13. #define thcolor (color [0] 6= color [2] ∧ color [1] 6= color [2] ∧ color [0] 6= color [1]);
14. #assert Protocol() 
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thcolor ;
Figure 5.1: CSP# Model for two hop coloring protocol
models the number of colors. Array color models the color of each node. F is a bit array for each
node, indexed by colors. Next, line 2 to 10 defines how an initiator u interacts with a responder
v , which captures the essence of the protocol. Every time there is an interaction in the network,
the initiator and responder must update themselves according to a set of pre-defined rules. A rule
is applicable only if the guarding condition (e.g., F [u][color [v ]] 6= F [v ][color [u]]) is satisfied.
An action (e.g., act1.u.v ) may be attached with variables updating (e.g., color [u] = 0). Line 12
models the two-hop coloring protocol as process Protocol , which starts with process Init (which
initializes the system in every possible configuration and is omitted here). After initialization, the
system is the interleaving (modeled by the operator |||) of nodes’ interactions in the network. Which
nodes can interact reflects the topology of the network. The LTL property is
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thcolor (defined




are modal operators which read as eventually and always
respectively (refer to Section 2.3.2 for details). thcolor (defined at line 13) is a proposition which
states that the neighbors of a node in a ring have different colors (for rings of size three). end
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5.2.2 Orienting undirected rings
Given a ring colored by protocols in Section 5.2.1, it is possible to have a protocol that gives a sense
of orientation to each node on an undirected ring [15]. After the orienting, (1) each node has exactly
one predecessor and one successor, the predecessor and successor of a node are different; (2) for
any two nodes u and v , u is the predecessor of v if and only if v is the successor of u , for any edge
(u, v), either u is the predecessor of v or v is the predecessor of u .
Each node u in a ring has three state components: color [u] encodes the color of node u , precolor [u]
the color of its predecessor, and succolor [u] the color of its successor. Initially, all nodes are two-
hop colored (array color satisfies the two-hop coloring property), precolor [u] and succolor [u] can
have arbitrary values. The following description defines the interaction between an initiator u and a
responder v . The CSP# model of this protocol is shown in Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
if color [v ] == precolor [u] ∧ color [v ] 6= succolor [u] then
succolor [v ]← color [u];
elseif color [v ] == succolor [u] ∧ color [v ] 6= precolor [u] then
precolor [v ] ← color [u];
else
precolor [u] ← color [v ]; succolor [v ]← color [u];
endif
5.2.3 Leader election
In this section, we study a leader election protocol in oriented odd rings. The following description
is partially taken from [118, 15]. Supposing each node has a label bit, a maximal sequence of
alternating labels is called a segment. According to the orientation of the ring, the head and tail of a
segment can be defined in a natural way. One edge of the form (0, 0) or (1, 1) connecting the tail of
one segment to the head of another segment is called a barrier edge. For a node u in a ring, it has
four state components: leader [u] states whether the node is a leader, label [u] is its label, probe[u]
is 1 if u holds a probe token, and phase[u] alternates between 0 and 1 to make each barrier alternate
between firing a probe and moving forward. The protocol consists of several parts. In the basic part,
the barriers move clockwise around the ring. Each barrier advances by flipping the label bit of the
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second node on the barrier (the head of the next segment). When two barriers collide, they cancel
out each other. Because the ring size is odd, there is always at least one barrier. In the rest of the
protocol, the leader bullet and probe marks are manipulated. Probes are sent out by the barrier in
a clockwise direction and absorbed by any leader they run into. If a probe meets the barrier on its
way back, it is converted to leader. Leaders fire bullets counter-clockwise around the ring. Bullets
are absorbed by the barrier, but they kill any leaders they encounter along the way. The description
of an interaction between an initiator u and a responder v in the protocol (taken from [118], p.66)
is as follows. The CSP# model of this protocol is shown in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.
if label [u] == label [v ] then
if probe[u] == 1 then leader [u]← 1; probe[u]← 0 endif
bullet [v ]← 0
if phase[u] == 0 then phase[u]← 1; probe[v ]← 1;
elseif probe[v ] == 0 then
label [v ] = ¬label [v ]; phase[v ]← 0
endif
elseif leader [v ] == 1 then
if bullet [v ] == 1 then leader [v ]← 0 else bullet [u]← 1 endif
else
if bullet [v ] == 1 then bullet [v ]← 0; bullet [u]← 1 endif
if probe[u] == 1 then probe[u]← 0; probe[v ]← 1 endif
endif
Counterexample. We have analyzed this protocol in PAT, and found one counterexample. We
consider a ring of size three, nodes are numbered as 0, 1 and 2. The counterexample found by
PAT can be described as follows: it is an infinite execution containing a loop, u is the node for the
initiator and v for the responder of one interaction according to the protocol description. The exe-
cution can start with a configuration bullet = [1, 1, 1], label = [1, 1, 1], leader = [1, 1, 0], phase =
[1, 1, 1], probe = [1, 1, 0].
1. Since label [2] == label [0], probe[2] == 0, phase[2] == 1 and probe[0] == 1, we have
bullet [0]← 0. (u = 2 and v = 0)
2. Then since label [0] == label [1], probe[0] == 1, phase[0] == 1 and probe[1] == 1, we
have leader [0] ← 1, probe[0] ← 0, and bullet [1]← 0. (u = 0 and v = 1)
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3. Then since label [2] == label [0], probe[2] == 0, phase[2] == 1 and probe[0] == 0, we
have bullet [0]← 0, label [0] ← 1− label [0], and phase[0] ← 0. (u = 2 and v = 0)
4. Then since label [1] == label [2], probe[1] == 1, phase[1] == 1 and probe[2] == 0, we
have leader [1] ← 1, probe[1]← 0, bullet [2]← 0, label [2] ← 1− label [2] and phase[2]← 0.
(u = 1 and v = 2)
5. Then since label [2] == label [0], probe[2] == 0 and phase[2] == 0, we have bullet [0]← 0,
phase[2] ← 1 and probe[0] ← 1. (u = 2 and v = 0)
Now, we have reached a configuration with bullet = [0, 0, 0], label = [0, 1, 0], leader = [1, 1, 0],
phase = [0, 1, 1], probe = [1, 0, 0].2 From here, we have a loop. Within this loop, all actions
enabled at reachable configurations of the loop are executed. But these configurations contain more
than two leaders. Hence, this infinite execution is global fair but not self-stabilizing for leader
election. The loop is given below.
1. Since label [2] == label [0], probe[2] == 0, phase[2] == 1 and probe[0] == 1, we have
bullet [0]← 0. (u = 2 and v = 0)
2. Then since label [0] 6= label [1], leader [1] == 1 and bullet [1] == 0, we have bullet [0] ← 1.
(u = 0 and v = 1)
3. Then since label [0] 6= label [1], leader [1] == 1 and bullet [1] == 0, we have bullet [0] ← 1.
(u = 0 and v = 1)
4. Then since label [2] == label [0], probe[2] == 0, phase[2] == 1 and probe[0] == 1, we
have bullet [0]← 0. (u = 2 and v = 0)
The last step in the loop leads us back to the starting configuration of the loop. We have com-
municated this counterexample to the author of [118], it is confirmed as a valid counterexample
2 As the protocol is self-stabilizing, the counterexample can start directly from here. We keep the first part just to
faithfully represent the infinite trace found by PAT.
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which has escaped simulations of the protocol [119]. The reason to the counterexample is the fol-
lowing [119]. In the explanation of the protocol, it says that “probes are sent out by the barrier in
a clockwise direction and absorbed by any leader they run into". The second half of the sentence
is missing from the pseudo code description. The protocol also requires consistent ordering of the
position of tokens within each node (in the order of leader, bullet, and probe clockwise). A barrier
edge should only generate a probe at the responder if the responder is not a leader. Otherwise, the
probe would be able to pass the leader token. In the description, this property is not preserved either.
Modifications of the description have been made in [15]. We also modeled the revised version of the
protocol, and found no counterexample. By this case study, we emphasize that without the newly
developed model checking algorithm in Chapter 4 for efficient verification under (global) fairness, it
is impossible to find such an error in a pseudo code description of a population protocol, especially
when a protocol tends to be intuitively more complicated.
5.2.4 Token circulation
The token circulation protocol in directed rings depicted below is proposed in [14, 15]. The desired
behavior of this protocol can be described as follows: (1) there is only one node who holds the
token; (2) a node does not obtain again until every other node has obtained a token once; (3) each
node can have the token infinitely often.
Rule 1. ((∗ b, N ), (∗ b, L)) → ((− b), (+ b¯))
Rule 2. ((∗ b, ∗), (∗ b¯, N )) → ((− b), (+ b))
It is assumed that every node passes the token to next one right after getting it. Furthermore, the
protocol also requires the existence of a leader. Informally, there is a static node with the leader
mark L, and all other nodes have the non-leader mark N in every configuration. The state of each
node is represented by a pair in {−,+} × {0, 1}. + means that the node is holding a token and
− means the opposite. The second part of a state of a node is called the label. The ∗ here denotes
an always-matched symbol. On the left hand side, the symbol b matches either 0 or 1 and b¯ is its
complement. It should be noticed that different occurrences of b in a same rule refer to the same
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value. The input for each node informs them who is leader, which is unique in the network. When
two nodes interact, if the responder is the leader, it sets its label to the complement of the initiator’s
label; otherwise the responder copies the label from the initiator. If an interaction triggers a label
change, a token is passed from the initiator to the responder. If a token is not present at the initiator,
a new token is generated.
The CSP# model of this protocol is shown in Figure B.3 in the Appendix B. We only give the
assertion for the first property. The other two can be defined in a similar way. The states of the
whole system are represented by three arrays of bits (leader [N ], token[N ] and label [N ]). Without
loss of generality, we assume that node 0 is always the leader. Therefore, we could simply set
each node a fixed input (leader [i ]) for leader election without considering complicated details of a
dynamic leader election process, which we have analyzed in Section 5.2.3.
5.3 Experiments of Population Protocols
In this section, we present the experimental results on the set of ring protocols presented in previous
sections. Table 5.1 collects the experimental results. For the two-hop coloring protocol, there
are two version: 1 for nondeterministic and 2 for deterministic. For the orienting undirected ring
protocol, both properties in Figure B.1 are checked. Leader election protocol is only checked for
odd rings as required. The experiment testbed is a PC running Windows XP SP3 with 2.83GHz
Intel Q9550 CPU and 4 GB memory. In the table, “−” means out of memory.
From the table, firstly it shows that the number of states, transitions and running time increase
rapidly (exponentially) with the number of nodes in rings, especially for two-hop coloring and
leader election protocols. The reason is that these protocols use more state components than the
others, e.g., the arrays. This conforms to the theoretical results. Secondly, we show that PAT is
effective, it can handle millions states in hundreds of seconds (which is compatible to SPIN). Notice
that SPIN is infeasible for verifying the protocols because it does not support the fairness notions3.
3SPIN supports only process-level weak fairness.
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Model Property Ring Size Result #States #Transitions Time (Sec)
two-hop coloring1
32
thcolor 3 Yes 122856 1972174 43.3
two-hop coloring1
32
thcolor 4 NA − − −
two-hop coloring2
32
thcolor 3 Yes 983016 9473998 627
two-hop coloring2
32
thcolor 4 NA − − −
orienting rings
32
property1 3 Yes 3200 28540 0.61
orienting rings
32
property2 3 Yes 3221 28163 0.64
orienting rings
32
property1 4 Yes 69766 883592 18.1
orienting rings
32
property2 4 Yes 66863 794662 17.5
orienting rings
32
property1 5 Yes 1100756 18216804 601
orienting rings
32
property2 5 Yes 1021851 15486265 536
orienting rings
32
property1 6 NA − − −
leader election
32
oneleader 3 Yes 55100 216699 10.6
leader election
32
oneleader 5 NA − − −
token circulation
32
onetoken 6 Yes 21559 105577 2.86
token circulation
32
onetoken 7 Yes 91954 514703 14.9
token circulation
32
onetoken 8 Yes 388076 2446736 88.6
Table 5.1: Experiment results of population protocols
Although we are bound to check relatively small instances of the protocols, the newly developed
verification techniques in Chapter 4, does complement existing model checkers with the improve-
ment in terms of performance and ability to handle different forms of fairness. It enables us to
establish the correctness of these protocols under global fairness or, in the case of the leader elec-
tion protocol, to identify bugs. Readers can compare the result presented in Section 4.7 on a similar
verification practice using SPIN. The argument for using model checking techniques in general, is
that, if there is a bug in the protocol design, probably it is present in a small network. On the other
hand, to apply model checking on large number of nodes, we need to apply advanced reduction or
abstraction techniques in the verification to conquer the state explosion problem. This motivates
the algorithm of fairness model checking with process counter abstraction, which is presented in
following sections.
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5.4 Process Counter Abstraction
All the protocols in the previous sections are designed on a large (or even unbounded) number
of behaviorally similar processes of the same type. Such systems, refereed as parameterized sys-
tems, frequently arise in distributed algorithms and protocols (e.g., cache coherence protocols, con-
trol software in automotive / avionics), where the number of behaviorally similar processes is un-
bounded during system design, but is fixed later during system deployment. Thus, the deployed
system contains fixed, finite number of behaviorally similar processes. However during system
modeling/verification it is convenient to not fix the number of processes in the system for the sake
for achieving more general verification results. A parameterized system represents an infinite fam-
ily of instances, each instance being finite-state. Property verification of a parameterized system
involves verifying that every finite state instance of the system satisfies the property in question.
A common practice for analyzing parameterized systems can be to fix the number of processes to
a constant (as we did in the verification of population protocols). To avoid state space explosion,
the constant is often small (smaller than 10 in our population protocols experiments), compared
to the size of real applications. Model checking is then performed in the hope of finding a bug
which is exhibited by a fixed (and small) number of processes. This practice can be incorrect
because the real size of the systems is often unknown during system design (but fixed later during
system deployment). It is also difficult to fix the number of processes to a “large enough" constant
such that the restricted system with fixed number of processes is observationally equivalent to the
parameterized system with unboundedly many processes. Computing such a large enough constant
is undecidable after all, since the parameterized verification problem is undecidable [17]. It is
difficult to apply model checking to the problem directly.
Since parameterized systems contain a large number of behaviorally similar processes, a natural
state space abstraction is to group the processes based on which state of the local transition systems
they reside in [167, 63, 168]. Thus, instead of saying “process 1 and 3 are in state s, and process
2 is in state t", we simply say “2 processes are in state s and 1 is in state t". Such an abstraction
reduces the state space by exploiting a powerful state space symmetry, as often evidenced in real-life
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concurrent systems such as a caches, mutual exclusion protocols and network protocols. Verification
by traversing the abstract state space here produces a sound and complete verification procedure.
However, if the total number of processes is unbounded, the aforementioned counter abstraction
still does not produce a finite state abstract system. The count of processes in a local state can still
be ω (unbounded number), if the total number of processes is ω. We can adopt a cutoff number, so
that any count greater than the cutoff number is abstracted to ω. This yields a finite state abstract
system, which allows sound but incomplete verification procedure, e.g., any LTL property verified
in the abstract system holds for all concrete finite-state instances of the system, but not vice-versa.
In this chapter, we develop a novel technique for model checking parameterized systems under
fairness, against LTL formulae. We show that model checking under fairness is feasible, even
without the knowledge of process identifiers. This is done by systematically keeping track of the
local states from which actions are enabled / executed within any infinite loop of the abstract state
space. We develop necessary theorems to prove the soundness of our technique, and also present
efficient on-the-fly model checking algorithms.
5.4.1 System Models
We begin with formally defining our system model, which is a specialized one (compared to Defi-
nition 3 in Section 3.1.1) that the system process is a parallel composition of identity processes.
Definition 16 (System Model) A system model is a structure S = (VarG , initG ,Proc) where
VarG is a finite set of global variables, initG is their initial valuation and Proc is a parallel com-
position of multiple processes Proc = P1 ‖ P2 ‖ · · · such that each process Pi = (Si , initi ,→i) is
a labeled transition system.
We assume that all global variables have finite domains and each Pi has finitely many local states.
A local state represents a program text together with its local context (e.g. valuation of the local
variables). Two local states are equivalent if and only if they represent the same program text and
the same local context. Let State be the set of all local states. We assume that State has finitely
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global variables: int counter = 0; bool writing = false; 
[!writing]
Figure 5.2: Readers/writers model
many elements. This disallows unbounded non-tail recursion which results in infinite different local
states. Proc may be composed of infinitely many processes. Each process has a unique identifier.
In an abuse of notation, we use Pi to represent the identifier of process Pi when the context is clear.
Notice that two local states from different processes are equivalent only if the process identifiers
are irrelevant to the program texts they represent. Processes may communicate through global
variables, (multi-party) barrier synchronization or synchronous/asynchronous message passing. It
can be shown that parallel composition ‖ is symmetric and associative.
Example 5.4.1 Figure 5.2 shows a model of the readers/writers problem, which is a simple protocol
for the coordination of readers and writers accessing a shared resource. The protocol, referred as
RW , is designed for arbitrary number of readers and writers. Several readers can read concurrently,
whereas writers require exclusive access. Global variable counter records the number of readers
which are currently accessing the resource; writing is true if and only if a writer is updating the
resource. A transition is of the form [guard ]name{assignments}, where guard is a guard condition
which must be true for the transition to be taken and assignments is a simple sequential program
which updates global variables. The following are properties which are to be verified.
2
!(counter > 0 ∧ writing) – Prop1
23
counter > 0 – Prop2
Property Prop1 is a safety property which states that writing and reading cannot occur simultane-
ously. Property Prop2 is a liveness property which states that always eventually the resource can be
accessed by some reader. end
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In order to define the operational semantics of this specialized system model, we re-define the notion
of system configuration defined in Definition 4 in Section 3.1.2, which is referred to as concrete
configurations. This terminology distinguishes the notion from the state space abstraction and the
abstract configurations which will be introduced later.
Definition 17 (Concrete Configuration) Let S be a system model. A concrete configuration of S
is a pair (v , 〈s1, s2, · · ·〉) where v is the valuation of the global variables (channel buffers may be
viewed as global variables), and si ∈ Si is the local state in which process Pi is residing.
A system transition is of the form (v , 〈s1, s2, · · ·〉) →Ag (v ′, 〈s ′1, s ′2, · · ·〉) where the system con-
figuration after the transition is (v ′, 〈s ′1, s ′2, · · ·〉) and Ag is a set of participating processes. For
simplicity, set Ag (short for agent) is often omitted if irreverent. A system transition could be one
of the following forms:
(i) a local transition of Pi which updates its local state (from si to s ′i ) and possibly updating global
variables (from v to v ′). An example is the transition from R0 to R1 of a reader. In such a case, Pi
is the participating process, i.e., Ag = {Pi}.
(ii) a multi-party synchronous transition among processes Pi , · · · ,Pj . Examples are message send-
ing/receiving through channels with buffer size 0 (e.g., as in Promela [111]) and alphabetized barrier
synchronization in the classic CSP. In such a case, local states of the participating processes are up-
dated simultaneously. The participating processes are Pi , · · · ,Pj .
(iii) process creation of Pm by Pi . In such a case, an additional local state is appended to the
sequence 〈s1, s2, · · ·〉, and the state of Pi is changed at the same time. Assume for now that the
sequence 〈s1, s2, · · ·〉 is always finite before process creation. It becomes clear in Section 5.6 that
this assumption is not necessary. In such a case, the participating processes are Pi and Pm .
(iv) process deletion of Pi . In such case, the local state of Pi is removed from the sequence
(〈s1, s2, · · ·〉). The participating process is Pi .
Definition 18 (Concrete Transition System) Let S = (VarG , initG ,Proc) be a system model,
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where Proc = P1 ‖ P2 ‖ · · · such that each process Pi = (Si , initi ,→i) is a local transi-
tion system. The concrete transition system corresponding to S is a 3-tuple TS = (C , init , →֒)
where C is the set of all reachable system configurations, init is the initial concrete configuration
(initG , 〈init1, init2, · · ·〉) and →֒ is the global transition relation obtained by composing the local
transition relations →i in parallel.
An execution of S is an infinite sequence of configurations E = 〈c0, c1, · · · , ci , · · ·〉where c0 = init
and ci →֒ ci+1 for all i ≥ 0. Given an execution in the setting of parameterized system, we can de-
fine process-level weak fairness (see Definition 8), process-level strong fairness (see Definition 10)
and strong global fairness (see Definition 11) in a similar way as in Section 4.2.
Given the RW model presented in Figure 5.2, it can be shown that RW  Prop1. It is, however, not
easy to prove it using standard model checking techniques. The challenge is that many or unbounded
number of readers and writers cause state space explosion. Also, RW fails Prop2 without fairness
constraint. For instance, a counterexample is 〈startwrite, stopwrite〉∞ , i.e., a writer keeps updating
the resource without any reader ever accessing it. This is unreasonable if the system scheduler is
well-designed or the processors that the readers/writers execute on have comparable speed. To avoid
such counterexamples, we need to perform model checking under fairness.
5.4.2 Process Counter Representation
Parameterized systems contain behaviorally similar or even identical processes. Given a configura-
tion (v , 〈· · · , si , · · · , sj , · · ·〉), multiple local states4 may be equivalent. A natural “abstraction” is to
record only how many copies of a local state are there.
Let S be a system model. An alternative representation of a concrete configuration is a pair (v , f )
where v is the valuation of the global variables and f is a total function from a local state to the
set of processes residing at the state. For instance, given that R0 is a local state in Figure 5.2,
f (R0) = {Pi ,Pj ,Pk} if and only if reader processes Pi , Pj and Pk are residing at state R0. This
4The processes residing at the local states may or may not have the same process type.
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representation is sound and complete because processes at equivalent local states are behavioral
equivalent and ‖ composition is symmetric and associative (so that processes ordering is irrelevant).
Furthermore, given a local state s and processes residing at s, we may consider the processes indis-
tinguishable (as the process identifiers must be irrelevant given the local states are equivalent) and
abstract the process identifiers. That is, instead of associating a set of process identifiers with a local
state, we only count the number of processes. Instead of setting f (R0) = {Pi ,Pj ,Pk}, we now set
f (R0) = 3. In this and the next section, we assume that the total number of processes is bounded.
Definition 19 (Abstract Configuration) Let S be a system model. An abstract configuration of S
is a pair (v , f ) where v is a valuation of the global variables and f : State → N is a total function5
such that f (s) = n if and only if n processes are residing at s.
Given a concrete configuration cc = (v , 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉), let F(〈s0, s1, · · ·〉) returns the function f
(refer to Definition 19) — that is, f (s) = n if and only if there are n states in 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉 which are
equivalent to s. Further, we write F(cc) to denote (v ,F(〈s0, s1, · · ·〉)). Given a concrete transition
c →Ag c
′
, the corresponding abstraction transition is written as a →֒Ls a ′ where a = F(c) and
a ′ = F(c′) and Ls (short for local-states) is the local states at which processes in Ag are. That is,
Ls is the set of local states from which there is a process leaving during the transition. We remark
that Ls is obtained similarly as Ag is.
Given a state s and an abstract configuration a, enabled(s, a) to be true if and only if ∃ a ′, a →֒Ls
a ′ ∧ s ∈ Ls , i.e., a process is enabled to leave s in a. For instance, given the transition system in
Figure 5.3, Ls = {R0} for the transition from A0 to A1 and enabled(R0,A1) is true.
Definition 20 (Abstract Transition System) Let S = (VarG , initG ,Proc) be a system model,
where Proc = P1 ‖ P2 ‖ · · · such that each process Pi = (Si , initi ,→i ) is a local transition
system. An abstract transition system of S is a 3-tuple AS = (C , init , →֒) where C is the set of all
reachable abstract system configurations, init ∈ C is (initG ,F(initG , 〈init1, init2, · · ·〉)) and →֒
is the abstract global transition relation.
5In PAT, the mapping from a local state to 0 is always omitted for memory saving.








Figure 5.3: Readers/writers model
We remark that the abstract transition relation can be constructed without constructing the concrete
transition relation, which is essential to avoid state space explosion. Given the model in Figure 5.2,
if there are 2 readers and 2 writers, then the abstract transition system is shown in Figure 5.3.
A concrete execution of TS can be uniquely mapped to an execution of AS by applying F to every
configuration in the sequence. For instance, let X = 〈c0, c1, · · · , ci , · · ·〉 be an execution of TS (i.e.,
a concrete execution), the mapped execution of AS is L = 〈F(c0),F(c1), · · · ,F(ci ), · · ·〉 (i.e., the
abstract execution). In an abuse of notation, we write F(X ) to denote L. Notice that the valuation
of the global variables are preserved. Essentially, no information is lost during the abstraction. It
can be shown that AS  φ if and only if TS  φ.
5.5 Fair Model Checking Algorithm with Counter Abstraction
Process counter abstraction may significantly reduce the number of states. It is useful for verifying
safety properties. However, it conflicts with the notion of fairness. A counterexample to a liveness
property under fairness must be a fair execution of the system. By Definition 8 and 10, the knowl-
edge of which processes are enabled or engaged is necessary in order to check whether an execution
is fair or not. In this section, we develop the necessary theorems and algorithms to show that model
checking under fairness constraints is feasible even without the knowledge of process identifiers.
By assumption the total number of processes is finite, the abstract transition system AS has finitely
many states. An infinite execution of AS must form a loop (with a finite prefix). Assume that the
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loop starts with index i and ends with k , written as Lki = 〈c0, · · · , ci , ci+1, · · · , ci+k , ci+k+1〉where
ci+k+1 = ci . We define the following functions to collect loop properties and use them to define
fairness later.
always(Lki ) = {s : State | ∀ j : {i , · · · , i + k}, enabled(s, cj )}
once(Lki ) = {s : State | ∃ j : {i , · · · , i + k}, enabled(s, cj )}
leave(Lki ) = {s : State | ∃ j : {i , · · · , i + k}, cj →֒Ls cj+1 ∧ s ∈ Ls}
Intuitively, always(Lki ) is the set of local states from where there are processes, which are ready to
make some progress, throughout the execution of the loop; once(Lki ) is the set of local states where
there is a process which is ready to make some progress, at least once during the execution of the
loop; leave(Lki ) is the set of local states from which processes leave during the loop. For instance,
given the abstract transition system in Figure 5.3, X = 〈A0,A1,A2〉∞ is a loop starting with index
0 and ending with index 2. always(X ) = ∅; once(X ) = {R0,R1,W 0}; leave(X ) = {R0,R1}.
The following lemma checks whether an execution is fair by only looking at the abstract execution.
Lemma 5.5.1 Let S be a system model; X be an execution of TS ; Lki = F(X ) be the respective
abstract execution of AS . (1). always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) if X is weakly fair; (2). once(Lki ) ⊆
leave(Lki ) if X is strongly fair.
Proof: (1). Assume X is weakly fair. By definition, if state s is in always(Lki ), there must be
a process residing at s which is enabled to leave during every step of the loop. If it is the same
process P , P is always enabled during the loop and therefore, by Definition 8, P must participate
in a transition infinitely often because X is weakly fair. Therefore, P must leave s during the loop.
By definition, s must be in leave(Lki ). If there are different processes enabled at s during the loop,
there must be a process leaving s, so that s ∈ leave(Lki ). Thus, always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ).
(2). Assume X is strongly fair. By definition, if state s is in once(Lki ), there must be a process
residing at s which is enabled to leave during one step of the loop. Let P be the process. Because P
is infinitely often enabled, by Definition 8, P must participate in a transition infinitely often because
X is strongly fair. Therefore, P must leave s during the loop. By definition, s must be in leave(Lki ).
2
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The following lemma generates a concrete fair execution if an abstract fair execution is identified.
Lemma 5.5.2 Let S be a model; Lki be an execution ofAS . (1). There exists a weakly fair execution
X of TS such that F(X ) = Lki if always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ); (2). If once(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ), there
exists a strongly fair execution X of TS such that F(X ) = Lki .
Proof: (1). By a simple argument, there must exist an execution X of TS such that F(X ) = Lki .
Next, we show that we can unfold the loop (of the abstract fair execution) as many times as necessary
to let all processes make some progress, so as to generate a weakly fair concrete execution. Assume
P is the set of processes residing at a state s during the loop. Because always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ),
if s ∈ always(Lki ), there must be a transition during which a process leaves s. We repeat the loop
multiple times and choose a different process from P to leave each time. The generated execution
must be weakly fair.
(2). Similarly as above. 2
The following theorem shows that we can perform model checking under fairness by examining the
abstract transition system only.
Theorem 5.5.3 Let S be a system model. Let φ be a LTL property. (1). S wf φ if and only if for
all executions Lki of AS we have always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) ⇒ Lki  φ; (2). S sf φ if and only if
for all execution Lki of AS we have once(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki )⇒ Lki  φ.
Proof: (1). if part: Assume that for all Lki of AS we have Lki  φ if always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ), and
S 6wf φ. By definition, there exists a weakly fair execution X of TS such that X 6 φ. Let Lki
be F(X ). By lemma 5.5.1, always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) and hence Lki  φ. Because our abstraction
preserves valuation of global variables, Lki 6 φ as X 6 φ. We reach a contradiction.
only if part: Assume that S wf φ and there exists Lki ofAS such that always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ), and
Lki 6wf φ. By lemma 5.5.2, there must exist X of TS such that X is weakly fair. Because process
counter abstraction preserves valuations of global variables, X 6 φ. Hence, we reach contradiction.
(2). Similarly as above. 2
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Thus, in order to prove that S satisfies φ under fairness, we need to show that there is no execution
Lki of AS such that Lki 6 φ and the execution satisfies an additional constraint for fairness, i.e.,
always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(L
k
i ) for weak fairness or once(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) for strong fairness. Or, if
S 6wf φ, then there must be an execution Lki of AS such that Lki satisfies the fairness condition and
Lki 6 φ. In such a case, we can generate a concrete execution.
Following the above discussion, fair model checking parameterized systems is reduced to searching
for particular loops in AS . We amend those SCC based algorithms presented in Chapter 4 to cope
with weak or strong fairness and process counter abstraction. Given AS and a property φ, model
checking involves searching for an execution of AS which fails φ. In automata-based model check-
ing, the negation of φ is translated to an equivalent Büchi automaton B¬φ, which is then composed
with AS . Notice that a state in the produce of AS and B¬φ is a pair (a, b) where a is an abstract
configuration of AS and b is a state of B¬φ.
Given a transition system, a strongly connected subgraph is a subgraph such that there is a path
connecting any two states in the subgraph. An MSCC is a maximal strongly connected subgraph.
Given the product of AS and B¬φ, let scg be a set of states which, together with the transitions
among them, forms a strongly connected subgraph. We say scg is accepting if and only if there
exists one state (a, b) in scg such that b is an accepting state of B¬φ. In an abuse of notation, we
refer to scg as the strongly connected subgraph in the following. The following lifts the previously
defined functions on loops to strongly connected subgraphs.
always(scg) = {y : State | ∀ x : scg , enabled(y , x )}
once(scg) = {y : State | ∃ x : scg , enabled(y , x )}
leave(scg) = {z : State | ∃ x , y : scg , z ∈ leave(x , y)}
always(scg) is the set of local states such that for any local state in always(scg), there is a process
ready to leave the local state for every state in scg ; once(scg) is the set of local states such that
for some local state in once(scg), there is a process ready to leave the local state for some state
in scg ; and leave(scg) is the set of local states such that there is a transition in scg during which
there is a process leaving the local state. Given the abstract transition system in Figure 5.3, scg =
{A0,A1,A2,A3} constitutes a strongly connected subgraph. always(scg) = nil; once(scg) =
{R0,R1,W 0,W 1}; leave(scg) = {R0,R1,W 0,W 1}.
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procedure checkingUnderWeakFairness(AS ,B¬φ)
1. while there are un-visited states in AS ⊗B¬φ
2. use the improved Tarjan’s algorithm to identify one SCC, say scg ;
3. if scg is accepting to B¬φ and always(scg) ⊆ leave(scg)




Figure 5.4: Model checking algorithm under weak fairness
Lemma 5.5.4 Let S be a system model. There exists an execution Lki ofAS such that always(Lki ) ⊆
leave(Lki ) if and only if there exists an MSCC scc of AS such that always(scc) ⊆ leave(scc).
Proof: The if part is trivially true. The only if part is proved as follows. Assume there exists
execution Lki of AS such that always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ), there must exist a strongly connected
subgraph scg which satisfies always(scg) ⊆ leave(scg). Let scc be the MSCC which contains
scg . We have always(scc) ⊆ always(scg), therefore, the MSCC scc satisfies always(scc) ⊆
always(scg) ⊆ leave(scg) ⊆ leave(scc). 2
The above lemma allows us to use MSCC detection algorithms for model checking under weak
fairness. Figure 5.4 presents an on-the-fly model checking algorithm based on Tarjan’s algorithm
for identifying MSCCs. The idea is to search for an MSCC scg such that always(scg) ⊆ leave(scg)
and scg is accepting. The algorithm terminates in two ways, either one such MSCC is found or all
MSCCs have been examined (and it returns true). In the former case, an abstract counterexample is
generated. In the latter case, we successfully prove the property. Given the system presented in Fig-
ure 5.3, {A0,A1,A2,A3} constitutes the only MSCC, which satisfies always(scg) ⊆ leave(scg).
The complexity of the algorithm is linear in the number of transitions of AS .
Lemma 5.5.5 Let S be a system model. There exists an execution Lki of AS such that once(Lki ) ⊆
leave(Lki ) if and only if there exists a strongly connected subgraph scg of AS such that once(scg) ⊆
leave(scg).
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procedure checkingUnderStrongFairness(AS ,B¬φ, states)
1. while there are un-visited states in states
2. use Tarjan’s algorithm to identify a subset of states which forms a SCC, say scg ;
3. if scg is accepting to B¬φ
4. if once(scg) ⊆ leave(scg)
5. generate a counterexample and return false;






Figure 5.5: Model checking algorithm under strong fairness
We skip the proof of the lemma as it is straightforward. The lemma allows us to extend the algorithm
proposed in [202] for model checking under strong fairness. Figure 5.5 presents the modified algo-
rithm. The idea is to search for a strongly connected subgraph scg such that once(scg) ⊆ leave(scg)
and scg is accepting. Notice that a strongly connected subgraph must be contained in one and only
one MSCC. The algorithm searches for MSCCs using Tarjan’s algorithm. Once an MSCC scg is
found (at line 2), if scg is accepting and satisfies once(scg) ⊆ leave(scg), then we generate an
abstract counterexample. If scg is accepting but fails once(scg) ⊆ leave(scg), instead of throwing
away the MSCC, we prune a set of bad states from the SCC and then examinate the remaining states
(at line 6) for strongly connected subgraphs. Intuitively, bad states are the reasons why the SCC
fails the condition once(scg) ⊆ leave(scg). Formally,
bad(scg) = {x : scg | ∃ y , y 6∈ leave(scg) ∧ y ∈ enabled(y , x )}
That is, a state s is bad if and only if there exists a local state y such that a process may leave
y at state s and yet there is no process leaving y given all transitions in scg . By pruning all bad
states, there may be a strongly connected subgraph in the remaining states satisfying the fairness
constraint.
The algorithm is partly inspired by the one presented in [106] for checking emptiness of Streett
automata. Soundness of the algorithm follows the discussion in [202, 106]. It can be shown that any
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state of a strongly connected subgraph which satisfies the constraints is never pruned. As a result, if
there exists such a strongly connected subgraph scg , a strongly connected subgraph which contains
scg or scg itself must be found eventually. Termination of the algorithm is guaranteed because the
number of visited states and pruned states are monotonically increasing. The complexity of the
algorithm is linear in #states ×#trans where #states and #trans are the number of states and
transitions of AS respectively. A tighter bound on the complexity can be found in [106].
5.6 Counter Abstraction for Infinitely Many Processes
In the previous sections, we assume that the number of processes (and hence the size of the abstract
transition system) is finite and bounded. If the number of processes is unbounded, there might
be unbounded number of processes residing at a local state, e.g., the number of reader processes
residing at R0 in Figure 5.2 might be infinite. In such a case, we choose a cutoff number and then
apply further abstraction. In the following, we modify the definition of abstract configurations and
abstract transition systems to handle unbounded number of processes.
Definition 21 Let S be a system model with unboundedly many processes. Let K be a positive
natural number (i.e., the cutoff number). An abstract configuration of S is a pair (v , g) where v
is the valuation of the global variables and g : State → N ∪ {ω} is a total function such that
g(s) = n if and only if n(≤ K ) processes are residing at s and g(s) = ω if and only if more than
K processes are at s.
Given a configuration (v , 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉), we define a function G similar to function F , i.e., G(〈s0, s1,
· · ·〉)) returns function g (refer to Definition 21) such that given any state s, g(s) = n if and only if
there are n states in 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉 which are equivalent to s and g(s) = ω if and only if there are more
than K states in 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉 which are equivalent to s. Furthermore, G(c) = (v ,G(〈s0, s1, · · ·〉)).
The abstract transition relation of S (as per the above abstraction) can be constructed without con-
structing the concrete transition relation. We illustrate how to generate an abstract transition in the
following. Given an abstract configuration (v , g), if g(s) > 0, a local transition from state s to state












Figure 5.6: Abstract readers/writers model
s ′, creating a process with initial state init may result in different abstract configurations (v , g ′)
depending on g . In particular, g ′ equals g except that g ′(s) = g(s) − 1 and g ′(s ′) = g(s ′) + 1 and
g ′(init) = g(init)+1 assuming ω+1 = ω, K +1 = ω and ω−1 is either ω or K . We remark that
by assumption State is a finite set and therefore the domain of g is always finite. This allows us to
drop the assumption that the number of processes must be finite before process creation. Similarly,
we abstract synchronous transitions and process termination.
The abstract transition system for a system model S with unboundedly many processes, written as
RS (to distinguish from AS ), is now obtained by applying the aforementioned abstract transition
relation from the initial abstract configuration.
Example 5.6.1 Assume that the cutoff number is 1 and there are infinitely many readers and writers
in the readers/writers model. Because counter is potentially unbounded and, we mark counter as
a special process counter variable which dynamically counts the number of processes which are
reading (at state R1). If the number of reading processes is larger than the cutoff number, counter
is set to ω too. The abstract transition system ARW is shown in Figure 5.6. The abstract transition
system may contain spurious traces. For instance, the trace 〈start , (stopread)∞〉 is spurious. It is
straightforward to prove that ARW  Prop1 based on the abstract transition system. end
The abstract transition system now has only finitely many states even if there are unbounded number
of processes and, therefore, is subject to model checking. As illustrated in the preceding example,
the abstraction is sound but incomplete in the presence of unboundedly many processes. Given an
execution X of TS , let G(X ) be the corresponding execution of the abstract transition system. An
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execution L of RS is spurious if and only if there does not exist an execution X of TS such that
G(X ) = L. Because the abstraction only introduces execution traces (but does not remove any),
we can formally establish a simulation relation (but not a bisimulation) between the abstract and
concrete transition systems, that is, RS simulates TS . Thus, while verifying a LTL property φ we
can conclude TS  φ if we can show that RS  φ. Of course, RS  φ will be accomplished by
model checking under fairness.
The following re-establishes Lemma 5.5.1 and (part of) Theorem 5.5.3 in the setting of RS . We skip
the proof as they are similar to that of Lemma 5.5.1 and Theorem 5.5.3 respectively.
Lemma 5.6.2 Let S be a system model, X be an execution of TS and Lki = G(X ) be the corre-
sponding execution of RS . We have (1). always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) ifX is weakly fair; (2).once(Lki )
⊆ leave(Lki ) if X is strongly fair.
Theorem 5.6.3 Let S be a system model and φ be a LTL property. (1). S wf φ if for all execution
traces Lki of RS we have always(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki ) ⇒ Lki  φ; (2). S sf φ if for all execution
traces Lki of RS we have once(Lki ) ⊆ leave(Lki )⇒ Lki  φ;
The reverse of Theorem 5.6.3 is not true because of spurious traces. We remark that the model
checking algorithms presented in Section 5.5 are applicable to RS (as the abstraction function is
irrelevant to the algorithm). By Theorem 5.6.3, if model checking of RS (using the algorithms
presented in Section 5.5 under weak/fairness constraint) returns true, we conclude that the system
satisfies the property (under the respective fairness).
5.7 Experiments of Process Counter Abstraction
In this section, we conduct experiments on real-life systems to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
process counter abstraction technique. The experimental results are summarized in the Table 5.2,
where NA means not applicable (hence not tried, due to limit of the tool); NF means not feasible
(out of 2GB memory or running for more than 4 hours). The data is obtained with Intel 9550 CPU at
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Model #Proc Property No Fairness Weak Fairness Strong Fairness
Result PAT SPIN Result PAT SPIN Result PAT SPIN
LE 10
32
one leader false 0.04 0.02 true 0.06 320 true 0.06 NA
LE 100
32
one leader false 0.04 0.02 true 0.27 NF true 0.28 NA
LE 1000
32
one leader false 0.04 NA true 2.26 NA true 2.75 NA
LE 10000
32
one leader false 0.04 NA true 23.9 NA true 68.8 NA
LE ∞
32
one leader false 0.06 NA true 265 NA true 464 NA
KV 2 PropKvalue false 0.05 0 true 0.6 1.14 true 0.6 NA
KV 3 PropKvalue false 0.05 0 true 4.56 61.2 true 4.59 NA
KV 4 PropKvalue false 0.05 0.02 true 29.2 NF true 30.2 NA
KV 5 PropKvalue false 0.06 0.02 true 175 NF true 187 NA
KV ∞ PropKvalue false 0.12 NA ? NF NA ? NF NA
Stack 5 Propstack false 0.06 0.02 false 0.78 NF false 0.74 NA
Stack 7 Propstack false 0.06 0.02 false 11.3 NF false 12.1 NA
Stack 9 Propstack false 0.06 0.02 false 159 NF false 192 NA
Stack 10 Propstack false 0.05 0.02 false 596 NF false 780 NA
ML 10
23
access true 0.11 21.5 true 0.11 107 true 0.11 NA
ML 100
23
access true 1.04 NF true 1.04 NF true 1.04 NA
ML 1000
23
access true 11.0 NA true 11.1 NA true 11.1 NA
ML ∞
23
access true 13.8 NA true 13.8 NA true 13.8 NA
Table 5.2: Experimental results of process counter abstraction
2.83GHz and 2GB RAM. We compared PAT with SPIN [111] on model checking under no fairness
or weak fairness. Notice that SPIN does not support strong fairness and is limited to 255 processes.
The first model (LE ) is a self-stabilizing leader election protocol for complete networks (i.e., any
pair of nodes are connected) [88]. The property is that eventually always there is one and only one
leader in the network, i.e.,
32
one leader . PAT successfully proved the property under weak or
strong fairness for many or unbounded number of network nodes (with cutoff number 2). SPIN
took much more time to prove the property under weak fairness. The reason is that the fair model
checking algorithm in SPIN copies the global state machine n + 2 times (for n processes) so as to
give each process a fair chance to progress, which increases the verification time by a factor that is
linear in the number of network nodes.
5.7. EXPERIMENTS OF PROCESS COUNTER ABSTRACTION 111
The second model (KV ) is a K-valued register [22]. A shared K-valued multi-reader single-writer
register R can be simulated by an array of K binary registers. The complete model can be found in
Example 7.2.1 in Section 7.2.1. A progress property we tested is that PropKvalue = 2(read inv →
3
read res), i.e., a reading operation (read inv ) eventually returns some valid value (read res).
With no fairness, both PAT and SPIN identified a counterexample quickly. Because the model con-
tains many local states, the size of AS increases rapidly. PAT proved the property under weak/strong
fairness for 5 processes, whereas SPIN was limited to 3 processes with weak fairness.
The third model (Stack ) is a lock-free stack [210]. In concurrent systems, in order to improve the
performance, stacks can be implemented by a linked list shared by arbitrary number of processes.
Each push or pop operation keeps trying to update the stack until no other process interrupts. The
property of interest is that a process must eventually be able to update the stack, which can be




push res) where event push inv (push res)
marks the starting (ending) of push operation. The property is false even under strong fairness.
The fourth model (ML) is the Java meta-lock algorithm [5]. In Java language, any object can be
synchronized by different threads via synchronized methods or statements. The Java meta-locking
algorithm is designed to ensure the mutually exclusive access to an object. A synchronized method
first acquires a lock on the object, executes the method and then releases the lock. The property is
that always eventually some thread is accessing the object, i.e.,
23
access, which is true without
fairness. This example shows that the computational overhead due to fairness is negligible in PAT.
In another experiment, we use a model in which processes all behave differently (so that counter
abstraction results in no reduction) and each process has many local states. We then compare the
verification results with or without process counter abstraction. The result shows the computational
and memory overhead for applying the abstraction is negligible. In summary, the enhanced PAT
model checker complements existing model checkers in terms of not only performance but also the
ability to perform model checking under weak or strong fairness with process counter abstraction.
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5.8 Summary
In the literature, a number of population protocols have been proposed to solve problems in wireless
sensor networks. The correctness of these protocols relies on global fairness, which makes their
automatic verification using existing model checkers expensive or even infeasible. In this chapter,
we have applied proposed fairness model checking algorithms, designed to handle verification under
fairness more efficiently, to a set of self-stabilizing population ring protocols. We have shown
that the model checking algorithm allows us to successfully verify instances of these protocols.
Moreover, it has helped us to identify one previously unknown bug in a leader election protocol.
During the analysis, we have faced the infamous state explosion problem (see Table 5.1). To solve
this problem, we studied model checking under fairness with process counter abstraction. We pre-
sented a fully automatic method for property checking under fairness with process counter abstrac-
tion. We showed that fairness can be achieved without the knowledge of process identifiers. We
have shown the effectiveness of our approach by conducting experiments on real-world systems.
Pang et al [161] applied the SPIN model checker to establish the correctness of a family of popu-
lation protocols. Only small networks (i.e., with few nodes) were verified under weak fairness in
SPIN. Theorem proving is used in verifying population protocols with arbitrary size [64]. However,
translating protocols into theorem prover accepted formalism and manual proof make this approach
difficult to apply. PAT can handle global fairness required for the correctness of most population
protocols, which makes PAT an ideal candidate for automatically verifying population protocols.
The works closest to counter abstraction approach are the methods presented in [63, 168, 167]. In
particular, verification of liveness properties under fairness is addressed in [167]. In [167], the fair-
ness constraints for the abstract system are generated manually (or via heuristics) from the fairness
constraints for the concrete system. Different from the above works, our method handles one (pos-
sibly large) instance of parameterized systems at a time and uses counter abstraction to improve
verification effectiveness. In addition, fairness conditions are integrated into the on-the-fly model
checking algorithm which proceeds on the abstract state representation - making our method fully
automated. Our method is also related to work on symmetry reduction [82, 57].
Chapter 6
Refinement Checking
The previous chapters have been focused on temporal logic model checking. An alternative ap-
proach is refinement checking, which has been successfully demonstrated by FDR [175]. In this
chapter, we enrich PAT with this capability.
Hoare’s classic Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP [108]) has been a rather successful
event-based modeling language for decades. Theoretical development on CSP has advanced for-
mal methods in many ways. Its distinguishable features like alphabetized parallel composition have
proven to be useful in modeling a wide range of systems.
FDR (Failures-Divergence Refinement) is the de facto analyzer for CSP, which has been success-
fully applied in various domains. Based on the model checking algorithm presented in [175] and
later improved with other reduction techniques presented in [179], FDR is capable of handling large
systems. Nonetheless, since FDR was initially introduced, model checking techniques have evolved
much further in the last two decades. Quite a number of effective reduction methods have been pro-
posed which greatly enlarge the size the systems that can be handled. Some noticeable ones include
partial order reduction, symmetry reduction, predicate abstraction, etc. In this chapter, we present
a on-the-fly refinement checking algorithm designed to incorporate advanced model checking tech-
niques to analyze event-based hierarchical systems.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We briefly introduce FDR and its refinement
checking in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 proposes a refinement checking algorithm integrated with
partial order reduction. Section 6.3 presents the experimental results of the proposed algorithm,
compared with FDR model checker. Section 6.4 concludes this chapter.
6.1 FDR and Refinement Checking
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR [175]) is a well-established model checker for CSP. Different
from temporal logic based model checking, using FDR, safety, liveness and combination properties
can be verified by showing a refinement relation from the CSP model of the system to a CSP process
capturing the properties. In addition, FDR verifies whether a process is deadlock-free or not. In the
following, we review the notions of different refinement/equivalence relationship in terms of labeled
transition systems (see Section 3.1.2).
Given a model S = (Var , initG ,P), let L = (S , init ,→) be the LTS of S . Let s, s ′ be members
of S , Σ denote the set of all visible events in P , τ denote the set of all invisible events, and Στ be
Σ ∪ τ . We define the following notions.
• enabled(s) = {e : Στ | ∃ s
′ • s
e
→ s ′}. A state s is stable if and only if τ 6∈ enabled(s).
• mrefusal(s) = Σ \ enabled(s) is the maximum refusal set, i.e., the maximum set of events
which can be refused.
• A state is a divergence state div(s) if and only if s can be extended with infinite τ transitions.
• The set of divergence traces of L, written as divergence(L), is {tr : Σ∗ | ∃ tr ′, tr ′ is a prefix
of tr ∧ ∃ s : S , init tr
′
→ s ∧ div(s)}. Note that if some prefix of a given trace is a divergence
trace, the given trace is too.
• The set of failures of L, written as failures(L), is {(tr ,X ) : Σ∗ × 2Σ | ∃ s : S , init tr→ s ∧
X ⊆ Σ \ enabled(s)} ∪ {(tr ,Σ) : Σ∗ × 2Σ | tr ∈ divergence(L)}. Note that the system
state reached by a divergence state may refuse all events.
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The following defines refinement and equivalence.
Definition 22 (Refinement and Equivalence) Let Lim = (Sim , initim ,→im) be a LTS represent-
ing an implementation. Let Lsp = (Ssp , initsp , →sp) be a LTS representing a specification.
Lim refines Lsp in the trace semantics, written as Lim ⊒T Lsp , if and only if traces(Lim ) ⊆
traces(Lsp). Lim refines Lsp in the stable failures semantics, written as Lim ⊒F Lsp , if and
only if failures(Lim ) ⊆ failures(Lsp). Lim refines Lsp in the failures/divergence semantics,
written as Lim ⊒D Lsp , if and only if failures(Lim ) ⊆ failures(Lsp) and divergence(Lim) ⊆
divergence(Lsp). Lim equals Lsp in the trace (stable failures/failures divergence) semantics if and
only if they refine each other in the respective semantics.
Different refinement relationship can be used to establish different properties. Safety can be verified
by showing a trace refinement relationship. Combination of safety and liveness is verified by show-
ing a stable failures refinement relationship if the system is divergence-free or otherwise by showing
a failures/divergences refinement relationship. The reader should refer to [178] for a discussion on
the expressiveness of CSP refinement. In the following, we write Im ⊒ Sp to mean LIm ⊒ LSp
whenever it will not cause confusion. Internally, equivalence relationships may be used to simplify
process expressions, e.g., P 2 P is replaced by P for simplicity.
Example 6.1.1 The following models the classic dining philosophers [108],
Phil(i) = get .i .(i + 1)%N → get .i .i → eat .i →
→ put .i .(i + 1)%N → put .i .i → think .i → Phil(i)
Fork(i) = get .i .i → put .i .i → Fork(i) 2
get .(i − 1)%N .i → put .(i − 1)%N .i → Fork(i)






i=0 {get .i .(i + 1)%N , put .i .(i + 1)%N }
where N is a global constant (i.e., the number of philosophers), get .i .j (put .i .j ) is the action of
the i -th philosopher picking up (putting down) the j -th fork and fc is a global variable recording
the amount of food that has been consumed. The system is composed of N philosopher-fork-pairs
running in parallel. Figure 6.1 is the transition system of College with N = 2. All events except
the bolded ones are invisible.













Figure 6.1: LTS for 2 dining philosophers
Assume that the following process is used to capture the property for the dining philosophers:
Prop =̂‖N−1i=0 Eat(i) where Eat(i) = eat .i → Eat(i). It can be shown that College trace-refines
Prop (given a particular N ). Informally speaking, that means it is possible for each philosopher to
eat, i.e., {eat .0, · · · , eat .(N − 1)}∗ are traces of College . In order to show that it is always possible
for him/her to eat, we need to establish College ⊒F Prop, which is not true, i.e., assume N = 2,
(〈get .0.1, get .1.0〉, {eat .0, eat .1}) is in failures(College) but not failures(Prop). end
In order to check refinement, every reachable state of the implementation reachable from the initial
state via some trace must be compared with every state of the specification reachable via the same
trace. There may be many such states in the specification due to nondeterminism. In FDR, the
specification is firstly normalized so that there is exactly one state corresponding to each possible
trace. A state in the normalized LTS is a set of states which can be reached by the same trace
from the initial state. For instance, Figure 6.2 shows the normalized LTS of the one presented in
Example 6.1.1.
Definition 23 (Normalized LTS) Let (S , init ,→) be a LTS. The normalized LTS is (NS ,Ninit ,
NT ) where NS is the set of subsets of S , Ninit = τ∗(init), and NT = {(P , e,Q) | P ∈ NS ∧
Q = {s : S | ∃ v1 : P , ∃ v2 : S , (v1, e, v2) ∈→∧ s ∈ τ
∗(v2)}}.




• mrefusal(s) is {mrefusal(x ) | x ∈ s}, which is a set of maximum refusal sets,
• div(s) is true if and only if there exists x ∈ s such that div(x ) is true.





Figure 6.2: Normalized LTS for 2 dining philosophers
Given a LTS constructed from a process, the normalized LTS corresponds the normalized process.
A state in the normalized LTS groups a set of states in the original LTS which are all connected by
τ -transitions. Given a trace, exactly one state in the normalized LTS is reached. FDR then traverses
through every reachable states of the implementation and compares them with the corresponding
normalized states in the specification (refer to the algorithm presented in [175]).
6.2 An Algorithm for Refinement Checking
This section is devoted to algorithms for refinement checking. We start with reviewing a slightly
modified on-the-fly checking algorithm based on the one implemented in FDR and then improve it
with partial order reduction.
6.2.1 On-the-fly Refinement Checking Algorithm
Let Spec = (Ssp , initsp ,→sp) be a specification and Impl = (Sim , initim ,→im) be an imple-
mentation. Refinement checking is reduced to reachability analysis of the product of Impl and
normalized Spec. It has been shown that such an approach works well for certain models [179].
Nonetheless, because normalization in general is computationally expensive, it may not be always
desirable. Thus, we adopted an alternative approach. Figure 6.3 presents the on-the-fly refinement
checking algorithm. The algorithm similarly performs a reachability analysis in the product of the
implementation and the normalized specification. The difference is that normalization is brought
on-the-fly as well.
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procedure refines(Impl ,Spec)
0. checked := ∅;
1. pending .push((initim , τ
∗(initsp)));
2. while pending 6= ∅
3. (Im,NSp) := pending .pop();
4. checked := checked ∪ {(Im,NSp)};
5. if ¬(enabled(Im) \ {τ} ⊆ enabled(NSp)) – C1
6. ∨ (τ 6∈ Im ∧ ¬ existSuperSet(mrefusal(Im),mrefusal(NSp))) – C2
7. ∨ (¬ div(NSp) ∧ div(Im)) – C3
8. return false;
9. else
10. foreach (Im ′,NSp′) ∈ next(Im,NSp)
11. if (Im ′,NSp′) 6∈ checked






Figure 6.3: Algorithm: refines(Impl ,Spec)
Details of the following procedures are skipped for brevity. Procedure tau(S ) explores all outgoing
transition of S and returns the set of states reachable from S via a τ -transition. We remark that
this procedure will be refined later. Procedure τ∗(S ) is implemented using a depth-first-search
procedure. The set of states reachable from S via only τ transitions is returned. For instance,
given the LTS in Example 6.1.1, τ∗(0) returns {0, 1, 2, 6, 7, 11}. The procedure tau(S ) is applied
repeatedly until all τ -reachable states are identified. Procedure existSuperSet(x ,Y ) where x is a
set and Y is a set of sets returns true if and only if there exists y in Y such that x ⊆ y .
Depending on the type of refinement relationship, the algorithm performs a depth-first search for
a pair (Im,NSp) where Im is a state of the implementation and NSp is a state of the normalized
specification such that, the enabled events of Im is not a subset of those of NSp (C1), or Im is
stable and there does not exist a state in NSp which refuse all events which are refused by Im
(C2), or Im diverges but not NSp (C3). The algorithm returns true if no such pair is found. Note
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procedure next(Im,NSp)
0. toReturn := ∅
1. foreach e ∈ enabled(Im)
2. if e == τ
3. foreach Im ′ ∈ tau(Im)
4. toReturn := toReturn ∪ {(Im ′,NSp)};
5. endfor
6. else
7. NSp′ := {s | ∃ x : NSp, x
e
→ x ′ ∧ s ∈ τ∗(x ′)};
8. foreach Im ′ such that Im e→ Im ′





Figure 6.4: Algorithm: next(Im,NSp)
that if C1 is satisfied, a counterexample is found for any refinement checking; if C2 is satisfied,
a counterexample is found for stable failures refinement checking or failure/divergence refinement
checking; if C3 is satisfied, a counterexample is found for fairlure/divergence refinement checking
only. The procedure for producing a counterexample is skipped for simplicity. Producing the short-
est counterexample requires a breath-first-search after identifying the faulty state. Line 10 to 14 of
algorithm refines explores new states of the product and pushes them into the stack pending . The
procedure next is presented in Figure 6.4. Given a pair (Im,NSp), it returns a set of pairs of the
form (Im ′,NSp′) for each enabled event in Im. If the event is visible, NSp′ is a successor of NSp
via the event and Im ′ is the successor of Im via the same event. Otherwise, Im ′ is a successor of
Im via a τ -transition and NSp′ is Sp. Because normalization is brought on-the-fly, it is sometimes
possible to find a counterexample before the specification is completely normalized. The soundness
of the algorithm follows the soundness discussion in [175].
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6.2.2 Partial Order Reduction
As any model checking algorithm, refinement checking suffers from state space explosion. A num-
ber of attempts have been applied to reduce the search space [179]. This section describes the one
implemented in PAT based on partial order reduction. Our reduction realizes and extends the early
works on partial order reduction for process algebras and refinement checking presented in [214]
and [219]. The inspiration of the reduction is that events may be independent, e.g., think .i is mu-
tually independent of each other. Given P = P1 ‖ · · · ‖ Pn and two enabled events e1 and e2, e1 is
dependent of e2, written as dep(e1, e2), and vice versa only if one of the following is true,
• e1 and e2 are from the same process Pi .
• e1 = e2 so that they may be synchronized, e.g., get .i .i of process Phil(i) and get .i .i of
process Fork(i).
• e1 updates a variable which e2 depends on or vice versa, e.g., because eat .i updates a global
variable, all eat .i are inter-dependent.
Two events are independent if they are not dependent. Because the ordering of independent events
may be irrelevant to a given property, we may deliberately ignore some of the ordering so as to
reduce the search space. Partial order reduction may be applied to a number of places in algorithm
refines , namely, the procedure tau(S ) (and therefore tauclosure) and next . Since indexed parallel
composition (and indexed interleaving) is the main source of state space explosion, we assume that
Im is of the form (V , (P1 ‖ P2 ‖ · · · ‖ Pn) \ X ) in the following and show how it is possible to
only explore a subset of the enabled transitions and yet preserve the soundness.
We start with applying partial order reduction to the procedure tau . Note that tau is applied to the
specification or implementation independently. Thus, as long as we guarantee that the reduced state
space (of either Impl or Spec) is failures/divergence equivalent to the full state space, we prove that
there is a refinement relationship in the reduced state space if and only if there is one in the full state
space. Figure 6.5 show our algorithm for selecting a subset of the τ -transitions. In the algorithm
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procedure tau ′(Im)
0. nextmoves := stubborn tau(Im);
1. if (nextmoves 6= ∅) then return nextmoves; else return tau(Im);
procedure stubborn tau(Im)
0. foreach Pi
1. por := enabledPi (Im) ⊆ {τ} ∪ X ∧ enabledPi (Im) = current(Pi)
2. foreach e ∈ enabledPi (Im)
3. por := por ∧ ¬ loop(e) ∧ ∀ e ′ : Σj , j 6= i ⇒ ¬ dep(e, e ′)
4. endfor
5. if por then
6 return {(((· · · ‖ P ′i ‖ · · ·) \X ),V ,C ′) | (Pi ,V ,C )
e





Figure 6.5: Algorithm: tau ′(Im) and stubborn tau(Im)
tau ′, we try to identify one set of τ -transitions which are independent of the rest. If such a subset
is found (i.e., the algorithm stubborn tau returns a non-empty set of successors), only the subset is
explored further. Otherwise (i.e., stubborn tau returns an empty set), all possible τ -transitions are
explored. In stubborn tau , the idea is to identify one process Pi such that all τ -transitions from
Pi are independent of those from other processes. Note that this approach is most effective with
τ -transition generated from one process only. It is possible to handle τ -transition generated from
multiple processes with a slightly more complicated procedure (which we skip for brevity). The
details of the following simple procedures have been skipped. Given Im = (V ,P), enabledPi (Im)
is the set of enabled event from component Pi , i.e., enabled(Im) ∩ enabled((V ,Pi )). For in-
stance, given College with N = 2, enabled(Pair(0)) is {get .0.1}. current(Pi) is the set of
events that could be enabled in process Pi given the most cooperative environment. For instance,
current(Phil(i)) = {get .i .(i +1)%N } despite whether the fork is available or not. loop(e) is true
if and only if performing this event results in a state on the search stack, i.e., forming a cycle.
A process Pi is considered a candidate only if all enabled events from Pi result in τ -transitions
(i.e., enabledPi (Im) ⊆ {τ}∪X ) and no other transition could be possibly enabled given a different
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environment (i.e., enabledPi (Im) = current(Pi)). The former is required because we are only
interested in τ -transitions. The latter (partly) ensures that no disabled event from Pi is enabled
before executing an event from Pi . Furthermore, all enabled events from Pi must not form a cycle
(so that an enabled event is not skipped for ever) or dependent on an enabled event from some other
component. For detailed discussion on the intuition behind these conditions, refer to [58].
Example 6.2.1 Assume that N = 2 and the following is the current process expression,
((think .0→ Phil(0) ‖ put .1.0→ Fork(0)) \ {get .0.0, put .0.0, think .0}) ‖
(((get1.1→ eat .1→ put .1.0→ put .1.1→ think .1→ Phil(1)) ‖ Fork(1))
\{get .1.1, put .1.1, think .1}) \ {get .0.1, get .1.0, put .0.1, put .1.0}
where the first philosopher has just put down both forks while the second one has just picked up
his first fork. Two τ -transitions are enabled, i.e., one due to think .0 and the other due to get .1.1.
The algorithm tau ′ would return only the successor state after performing get .1.1 (assuming it is
not on the stack). This is the only event enabled for the second component of the outer parallel
composition is the τ transition due to get .1.1 (and thus the condition at line 1 of stubborn tau is
satisfied). Because get .1.1 is local to the component, por is true after the loop from line 2 to line 4.
end
The above algorithms apply partial order reduction to τ -transitions only. tauclosure is refined as
well since it is based on tau ′. Unlike FDR, PAT is capable of applying partial order reduction to
visible events. Because both Impl and Spec must make corresponding transitions for a visible event,
reduction for visible events is complicated. A conservative approach has been implemented in PAT.
Figure 6.6 present the algorithm, i.e., the refined next . If Im is not stable, we apply the algorithm
stubborn tau to identify a subset of τ -transitions (line 1). If no such subset exists, the pair (Im,Sp)
is fully expanded (line 11). An algorithm stubborn visible similar to stubborn tau is used to check
if a given visible event e is a candidate for partial order reduction. Function processes(e) returns all
process components (of the parallel composition) whose alphabet contains e . Firstly, we choose a
possible candidate from Im using the algorithm stubborn visible . Event e is chosen if and only if,
for each process in processes(e), e is the only event from the process which can be enabled and all
6.2. AN ALGORITHM FOR REFINEMENT CHECKING 123
procedure next ′(Im,Sp)
0. if τ ∈ enabled(Im)
1. nextmoves := stubborn tau(Im);
2. if (nextmoves 6= ∅) then return nextmoves;
3. else
4. foreach e ∈ enabled(Im)
5. por := stubborn visible(Im, e);
6. foreach S ∈ Sp
7. por := por ∧ stubborn visible(S , e);
8. endeach
9. if por then return {(Im ′, tauclosure(Sp′)) | Im e→ Im ′ ∧ Sp e→ Sp′}
10. endeach
11. return next(Im,Sp);
procedure stubborn visible(Im, e)
0. por := ¬ loop(e) ∧ ∀ e ′ : Σj • e ′ 6= e ⇒ ¬ dep(e, e ′);
1. foreach Pi ∈ processes(e)
2. por := por ∧ enabledPi (Im) = current(Pi ) = {e};
3. return por ;
Figure 6.6: Algorithm: next ′(Im,Sp) and stubborn visible(Im, e)
other enabled events are independent of e and performing e does not result in a state on the stack.
Next, we check if e satisfies the same set of conditions for each state in the normalized state of the
specification. If it does, e is used to expand the search tree at line 9 (and all other enabled events are
ignored). In order to find such e efficiently, the candidate events are selected in a pre-defined order,
i.e., events which have the least number of associated processes are chosen first. The soundness of
the partial order reduction algorithms is proved as follows.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. Firstly, because the algorithm tau ′ applies to one model
only (whereas next ′ must coordinate both the implementation and the specification), it is sufficient
to show that the reduction regarding τ -transitions (i.e., the algorithm stubborn tau) preserves fail-
ures/divergence equivalence. Secondly, we show that the reduction regarding visible events (i.e., the
algorithm next ′) is sound.
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Given a LTS (S , init ,→), let Σ be the set of events, ΣI be the set of invisible events and ΣV be the
set of visible events. A stubborn set generator is a function Ä: S → 2Σ such that for every s ′0, s ′n ,
and s0, s1, . . . ∈ S , e ∈ Ä(s0), and e1, e2, . . . ∈ Σ− Ä(s0). The set Ä(s) is called a stubborn set.
In [214], the following sufficient conditions has been proved to preserve CSP failures divergence
equivalence.
Ä0 If enabled(s0) 6= ∅ then Ä(s0) ∩ enabled(s0) 6= ∅
Ä1 If there are a trace 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , sn , 〉 and (sn , e, s ′n), then there are s ′0, . . . , s ′n−1 ∈ S
such that 〈s ′0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , s ′n , 〉 and (s0, e, s ′0).
Ä2 If there are a trace 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , sn , 〉 and (s0, e, s ′0), then there are s ′1, . . . , s ′n ∈ S such
that 〈s ′0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , en , s ′n , 〉 and (sn , e, s ′n ).
Ä3 If there are a trace 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, · · ·〉 and (s0, e, s ′0), then there are s ′1, s ′2, . . . ,∈ S such that
〈s ′0, e0, s
′
1, e1, · · · , 〉.
Ä4 For every s ∈ ¨S, either ΣV∩ Ä(s) ∩enabled(s) = ∅ or ΣV ⊆ Ä(s) (or both).
Ä5 ∀ s ∈ ¨S: ∀ e ∈ enabled(s) : ∃ s ′ ∈ ¨S: s e1,e2,···,en→ s ′ ∧ e ∈Ä(s).
Ä6 For every s ∈ ¨S, if ΣI ∩ enabled(s) 6= ∅, then Ä(s) ∩ ΣI ∩ enabled(s) 6= ∅.
It is thus sufficient to prove that the reduction regarding τ -transitions satisfies the sufficient condi-
tions. In the following, let E be the reduced set of successors (i.e., the stubborn set Ä(s)) and F be
the full set. Notice that the result returned by algorithm stubborn tau is returned by algorithm tau ′
or next ′ if and only if it is not empty (line 1 of tau ′ and line 2 of next ′). Thus, as long as F is not
empty, E is not empty. By line 3 of algorithm stubborn tau , transitions other than those selected in
E are all independent of those in E . By line 1 of stubborn tau , because the set of possibly enabled
events must be the same of the set enabled event from the component, a transition from the com-
ponent must remain disabled unless a transition from the components has been taken. By theorem
3.2 of [214], Ä0, Ä1, Ä2, Ä3 hold. Because only τ -transitions are reduced in tau ′, condition Ä4 is
trivial. By the condition ¬ loop(e) at line 3 of stubborn tau , no action will be ignored forever, and
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thus Ä5 holds. Ä6 is trivial for the same reason as for Ä4. By theorem 4.2 and 5.3 in [214], the
reduction regarding τ -transitions preserves trace/failures/divergence equivalence and thus is sound.
In order to prove that algorithm next ′ is sound, we need to prove (in addition to the above) that the
reduction regarding visible events are sound as well. We reuse the results which have been proved
in [219] and show that the sufficient conditions proposed in [219] have been full-filled. Firstly, C1
and C3 in [219] are trivial true. Because of line 0 and 2 of stubborn visible , an action dependent
(say e) on an action selected can only be executed after some action selected has been executed.
There are two cases in which this might be violated. In both of these cases, some transition (say a)
independent of e are executed, eventually enabled a transition that is dependent on e . In the first
case, if a belongs to some other components. A necessary condition for this to happen is that a is
dependent on e . This is prevented by line 1. In the other case, a belongs to the same component of
e , which is not possible because we require that current(Pi ) = {e}. The same argument applies
to line 6 to 8 which guarantees that no action dependent on e is executed before e is executed (and
there C1in [219] is proved). C2 in [219] is guaranteed by the condition ¬ loop(e). Therefore, we
conclude the reduction is sound. 2
Example 6.2.2 Let P(i) = a.i → b.i → P(i). Assume the specification and implementation is
defined as: Spec =‖2i=0 P(i) and Impl =‖
1
i=0 P(i). Assume we need to show that Impl trace-
refines Spec. Initially, two events are enabled in Impl , i.e., a.0 and a.1. Assume that a.0 is selected
first, because loop(a.0) is false and a.0 is independent of all other enabled events (i.e., a.1), the
condition at line 0 of algorithm stubborn visible is satisfied. Because a.0 is the only event that
would possibly be enabled from P(0), the condition at line 2 is satisfied too. Thus, a.0 is a possible
candidate for partial order reduction for Impl . Similarly, it is also a candidate for Spec (which is
the only state in the normalized initial state). Therefore, we only need to explore a.0 initially. end
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6.3 Experiments
We compare PAT with FDR using benchmark models for refinement checking. For the sake of a
fair comparison, all models use only standard CSP features which are supported by both. Table 6.1
shows the experiment results for three models, obtained on a 2.0 GHz Intel Core Duo CPU and 1
GB memory. In the table, “−” means out of memory. Since FDR has no direct support for variables,
the experiments use three examples with process definitions only.
The first example is the classic dining philosopher problem, where N is the number of philosophers
and forks. Because of the modeling, partial order reduction is not effective for this example. As a
result, PAT handles about 107 states (about 11 philosophers and forks) in a reasonable amount of
time. FDR performs extremely well for this example because of the strategy discussed in [179].
Namely, it builds up a system gradually, at each stage compressing the subsystems to find an equiv-
alent process with (for this particular example) many less states. Notice that with manual hiding (to
localize some events), PAT performs much better. The second example is the classic readers/writers
problem, in which the readers and writers coordinate to ensure correct read/write ordering. N is
the number of readers/writers. Reduction in PAT is very effective for this example. As a result,
PAT handles a few hundreds of readers/writers efficiently, whereas FDR suffers from state space
explosion quickly (for N = 18). The third example is the Milner’s cyclic scheduling algorithm,
in which multiple processes are scheduled in a cyclic fashion. Partial order reduction is extremely
effective for this model. As a result, PAT handles hundreds of processes, whereas FDR handles less
than 14 processes. The experiment results show our best effort so far on automated model check-
ing of an extended version of CSP. It by no means suggests the limit of our tool. We believe that
by incorporating more reduction techniques (e.g., symmetry reduction) as well as fine-tuning the
implementation, the performance of PAT can be improved significantly.
We remark that we are using the intuitive modeling in these examples. FDR compression techniques
are not fully explored.
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Model N Property Result PAT (sec.) FDR (sec.)
Dining Philosophers 5 P [T= S true 0.28125 0.067
Dining Philosophers 6 P [T= S true 0.8593 0.069
Dining Philosophers 8 P [T= S true 13.78 0.076
Dining Philosophers 10 P [T= S true 430.28 0.107
Dining Philosophers 12 P [T= S true - 0.319
Reader/Writers 12 P [T= S true < 1 0.812
Reader/Writers 14 P [T= S true < 1 6.906
Reader/Writers 16 P [T= S true < 1 81.247
Reader/Writers 18 P [T= S true < 1 -
Reader/Writers 50 P [T= S true 1.097 -
Reader/Writers 100 P [T= S true 9 -
Reader/Writers 200 P [T= S true 77.515 -
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 11 P [T= S true < 1 19.011
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 12 P [T= S true < 1 89.421
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 13 P [T= S true < 1 419.021
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 14 P [T= S true < 1 -
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 50 P [T= S true 2.406 -
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 100 P [T= S true 9.765 -
Milner’s Cyclic Scheduler 200 P [T= S true 60.453 -
Table 6.1: Experiment results for refinement checking
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we studied refinement checking problem. We started with the definitions of trace
refinement and equivalence. Based on the FDR approach, we proposed an on-the-fly refinement
checking algorithm, incorporated with partial order reduction. Experiments suggest that our ap-
proach is effective compared to FDR. Though we have shown cases where PAT outperforms FDR,
we believe that a full comparison is yet to be carried out with more experiments.
Refinement checking of CSP programs is an area that has been widely explored. There has been
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research on techniques that require human assistance. This work ranges from completely manual
proof techniques, such as Josephs’ work on relational approaches to CSP refinement checking [122],
to semi-automated techniques where humans must provide hints to guide a theorem prover in check-
ing refinements [76, 208, 116, 190]. Second, there has been work on fully automated techniques to
CSP refinement checking [175], the state of the art being embodied in the FDR tool [175]. Leuschel
and Butler [139] proposed a refinement checking approach for B language based on the searching
and tabling techniques of logic programming. However their approach is not on-the-fly. Kundu,
Lerner and Gupta [125] developed an automatic solution for refinement checking of infinite data
size. Their approach uses theorem proving to handle infinite state space, which can also be combined
with our solution. Regarding partial order reductions, a number of algorithms have been previously
proposed for partial order reduction which is trace/failures/divergence preserving, e.g. [214, 219].
The algorithms presented in the chapter may be considered as lightweight realization and extension
of those presented in [214, 219].
Chapter 7
Applications of Refinement Checking
Refinement checking is a useful verification technique, which has many applications. As one exam-
ple, Allen and Garlen have shown how CSP programs can be used as types to describe the interfaces
of software components [7]. The refinement relation becomes a sub-typing relation, and refinement
checking can then be used to determine if two components, whose interfaces are specified using
CSP programs, are compatible. In this chapter, we demonstrate the usefulness of refinement check-
ing using two examples, namely, linearizability verification for concurrent objects and Web Service
conformance checking.
Linearizability is an important correctness criterion for implementations of concurrent objects. Au-
tomatic checking of linearizability is challenging because it requires checking that 1) all executions
of concurrent operations be serializable, and 2) the serialized executions be correct with respect to
the sequential semantics. In the first half of this chapter, we describe a new method to automat-
ically check linearizability based on refinement relations from abstract specifications to concrete
implementations. Our method avoids the often difficult task of determining linearization points
in implementations, but can also take advantage of linearization points if they are given. The re-
finement verification algorithm developed in the previous chapter is used to automatically check
a variety of implementations of concurrent objects, including the first algorithms for the mailbox
problem [19] and Scalable NonZero Indicators [78]. Our system is able to prove or find all known
129
7.1. LINEARIZABILITY 130
and injected bugs in these implementations.
In recent years, many Web Service composition languages have been proposed. Web Service chore-
ography describes collaboration protocols of cooperating Web Service participants from a global
view. Web Service orchestration describes collaboration of the Web Services in predefined patterns
based on local decision about their interactions with one another at the message/execution level.
In the second part of this chapter, we present a model-based method to close the gap between the
two views. Building on the strength of advanced model checking techniques, Web Service chore-
ography and orchestration are verified against against each other (to show that they are consistent).
Specialized optimization techniques are developed to handle large Web Service models.
The rest of the chapter is structured in two parts. The first part talks about linearizability checking.
Section 7.1 gives the definition of linearizability. Section 7.2 shows how to express linearizability
using refinement relations in general. Section 7.3 presents experimental results of linearizability
checking. The second part talks about Web Service conformance checking. Section 7.4 introduces
the background about Web Service and conformance checking. Section 7.5 introduces the modeling
languages to capture Web Service compositions. Section 7.6 discusses how to verify Web Services.
Section 7.7 presents experimental results to show its scalability. Section 7.8 concludes this chapter.
7.1 Linearizability
Linearizability [107] is an important correctness criterion for implementations of objects shared by
concurrent processes, where each process performs a sequence of operations on the shared objects.
Informally, a shared object is linearizable if each operation on the object can be understood as
occurring instantaneously at some point, called the linearization point, between its invocation and
its response, and its behavior at that point is consistent with the specification for the corresponding
sequential execution of the operation.
One common strategy for proving linearizability of an implementation (used in manual proofs or
automatic verification) is to determine linearization points in the implementation of all operations
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and then show that these operations are executed atomically at the linearization points [78, 13, 215].
However, for many concurrent algorithms, it is difficult or even impossible to statically determine
all linearization points. For example, in the K-valued register algorithm (Section 10.2.1 of [22]),
linearization points differ depending on the execution history. Furthermore, the linearization points
determined might be incorrect, which can give wrong results of linearizability. Therefore, it is
desirable to have automatic solutions to verifying these algorithms without knowing linearization
points. However, existing methods for automatic verification without using linearization points
either apply to limited kinds of concurrent algorithms [218] or are inefficient [215].
In this chapter, we describe a new method for automatically checking linearizability based on re-
finement relations from abstract specifications to concrete implementations. Our method does not
rely on knowing linearization points, but can take advantage of them if given. The method exploits
model checking of finite state systems specified as concurrent processes with shared variables, and
is not limited to any particular kinds of concurrent algorithms. We exploit powerful optimizations
to improve the efficiency and scalability of our checking method.
Refinement requires that the set of execution traces of a concrete implementation be a subset of
that of an abstract specification. Thus, we express linearizability as trace refinement of operation
invocations and responses from the abstract specification to the concrete implementation, where the
abstract specification is correct with respect to sequential semantics. The idea of refinement has been
explored before: Alur et al. [12] showed that linearizability can be cast as containment of two regular
languages on a semi-commutative alphabet, and Derrick et al. [65] expressed linearizability as non-
atomic refinement of Object-Z and CSP models. Some similar approaches [59, 69, 148] prove
linearizability using trace simulation. In this following, we give a general and rigorous definition of
linearizability, regardless of the modeling language used, using refinement.
7.1.1 Formal Definition
Linearizability [107] is a safety property of concurrent systems, over sequences of events corre-
sponding to the invocations and responses of the operations on shared objects.
7.1. LINEARIZABILITY 132
In a shared memory model M, O = {o1, . . . , ok} denotes a set of k shared objects, P = {p1, . . . ,
pn} denotes a set of n processes accessing the objects. Shared objects support a set of operations,
which are pairs of invocations and matching responses. Every shared object has a set of states that
it could be in. A sequential specification of a (deterministic) shared object1 is a function that maps
every pair of invocation and object state to a pair of response and a new object state.
The behavior of M is defined as H , the set of all possible sequences of invocations and responses
together with the initial states of the objects. A history σ ∈ H induces an irreflexive partial order
<σ on operations such that op1 <σ op2 if the response of operation op1 occurs in σ before the invo-
cation of operation op2. Operations in σ that are not related by <σ are concurrent. σ is sequential iff
<σ is a strict total order. Let σ|i be the projection of σ on process pi , which is the subsequence of σ
consisting of all invocations and responses that are performed by pi . Let σ|oi be the projection of σ
on object oi , which is the subsequence of σ consisting of all invocations and responses of operations
that are performed on object oi .
A sequential history σ is legal if it respects the sequential specifications of the objects. More specifi-
cally, for each object oi , if sj is the state of oi before the invocation of the j -th operation opj in σ|oi ,
then response of opj and the resulting new state sj+1 of oi follow the sequential specification of oi .
For example, a sequence of read and write operations of an object is legal if each read returns the
value of the preceding write if there is one, and otherwise it returns the initial value. Every history
σ of a shared memory model M must satisfy the following basic properties:
Correct interaction For each process pi , σ|i consists of alternating invocations and matching re-
sponses, starting with an invocation. This property prevents pipelining operations.
Closeness Every invocation has a matching response. This property prevents pending operations.
In addition to these two, liveness property is also important here to guarantee the progress of the
systems. Even if the model satisfies linearizability, it may not progress as desired. For instance,
1More rigorously, the sequential specification is for a type of shared objects. For simplicity, however, we refer to both
actual shared objects and their types interchangeably in this chapter.
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even under a fair scheduler push/pop in Treiber’s stack algorithm [210] might never terminate if
there is always another concurrent push/pop. According to Section 2.3.2, liveness properties can
be formulated as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae and checked using standard LTL model
checkers (with or without the assumption of a fair scheduler).
Given a history σ, a sequential permutation π of σ is a sequential history in which the set of op-
erations as well as the initial states of the objects are the same as in σ. The formal definition of
linearizability is given as follows.
Linearizability There exists a sequential permutation π of σ such that
1. for each object oi , π |oi is a legal sequential history (i.e. π respects the sequential
specification of the objects), and
2. if op1 <σ op2, then op1 <pi op2 (i.e., π respects the run-time ordering of operations).
Linearizability can be equivalently defined as follows: In every history σ, if we assign increasing
time values to all invocations and responses, then every operation can be shrunk to a single time
point between its invocation time and response time such that the operation appears to be completed
instantaneously at this time point [148, 22]. This time point for each operation is called its lineariza-
tion point. Linearizability is a safety property [148], so its violation can be detected in a finite prefix
of the execution history.
Linearizability is defined in terms of the interface (invocations and responses) of high-level oper-
ations. In a real concurrent program, the high-level operations are implemented by algorithms on
concrete shared data structures, e.g., using a linked list to implement a shared stack object. There-
fore, the execution of high-level operations may have complicated interleaving of low-level actions.
Linearizability of a concrete concurrent algorithm requires that, despite complicated low-level inter-
leaving, the history of high-level invocation and response events still has a sequential permutation
that respects both the run-time ordering among operations and the sequential specification of the
objects. This idea is formally presented in the next section using refinement relations in a process
algebra extended with shared variables.
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7.2 Linearizability as Refinement Relations
In this section, we show how to create high-level linearizable specifications and how to use a refine-
ment relation from an implementation model to a specification model to define linearizability.
7.2.1 Model Construction
To create a high-level linearizable specification for a shared object, we rely on the idea that in any
linearizable history, any operation can be thought of as occurring at some linearization point. We
define the specification LTS Lsp = (Ssp , initsp ,→sp) for a shared object o as follows. Every ex-
ecution of an operation op of o on a process pi includes three atomic steps: the invocation action
inv(op)i , the linearization action lin(op)i , and the response action res(op, resp)i . The lineariza-
tion action lin(op)i performs the computation based on the sequential specification of the object. In
particular, it maps the invocation and the object state before the operation to a new object state and
a response, changes the object to the new state, and buffers the response resp locally. The response
action res(op, resp)i generates the actual response resp using the buffered result from the lineariza-
tion action. Each of the three actions is executed atomically without being interfered by any other
action, but the three actions of one operation may interleave with the actions of other operations. In
Lsp , all inv(op)i and res(op, resp)i are visible events, while lin(op)i are invisible events.
In a LTS Lsp = (Ssp , initsp ,→sp), each process pi has (a) an idle state spi ,0, (b) a state s(op)pi ,1
for every operation op of object o, representing the state after the invocation of op but before
the linearization action of op, and (c) s(op, resp)pi ,2 for every operation op and every possible
response resp of this operation, representing the state after the linearization action of op but before
the response of op. Then Ssp is the cross product of all object values and all process states. initsp
is the combination of the initial value of object o and spi ,0’s for all processes pi . For s ∈ Ssp , let
svo be the value of object o encoded in s, spi be the state of pi in s, and s−pi and s−pi ,−vo be the
state s excluding spi and excluding spi and svo , respectively. The labeled transition relation →sp is
such that for (s, e, s ′) ∈→, (a) if e = inv(op)i , then s−pi = s ′−pi , spi = spi ,0, and s ′pi = s(op)pi ,1;
(b) if e = lin(op)i , then s−pi ,−vo = s ′−pi ,−vo , spi = s(op)pi ,1, and s ′pi = s(op, resp)pi ,2, such
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that s ′vo and resp are the new object value and the response, respectively, based on the sequential
specification of object o as well as the old object state svo and the state spi = s(op)pi ,1 of process
pi ; (c) if e = res(op, resp)i , then s−pi = s ′−pi , spi = s(op, resp)pi ,2, and s ′pi = spi ,0.
Example 7.2.1 (K-valued register) We use a shared K-valued single-reader single-writer register
algorithm (Section 10.2.1 of [22]) to demonstrate the ideas above. The linearizable abstract model
is defined as follows, where R is the shared register with initial value K , and M is a local variable
to store the value read from R.
ReaderA() = read inv → read{M = R} → read res.M → ReaderA();
WriteA(v) = write inv .v → write{R = v} → write res → Skip;
WriterA() = (WriteA(0) 2WriteA(1) 2 . . . 2WriteA(K − 1)); WriterA();
RegisterA() = (ReaderA() |||WriterA())\{read ,write};
The ReaderA process repeatedly reads the value of register R and stores the value in local variable
M . Event read res.M returns the value in M . WriteA(v) writes the given value v into R. Event
write inv .v stores the value v to be written into the register. The WriterA process repeatedly
writes a value in the range of 0 to K − 1. External choices are used here to enumerate all possible
values. RegisterA interleaves the reader and writer processes and hides the read and write events
(linearization actions). The only visible events are the invocation and response of the read and write
operations. This model generates all the possible linearizable traces.
Given a LTS Lim = (Sim , initim ,→im) that supposedly implements object o, the visible events of
Lim are those inv(op)i ’s and res(op, resp)i ’s. For example, the following models an implementa-
tion of a K -valued register using an array B of K binary registers (storing only 0 and 1).
Reader() = read inv → UpScan(0);
UpScan(i) = if(B [i ] == 1){DownScan(i − 1, i)}else{UpScan(i + 1)};
DownScan(i , v) = if(i < 0){read res.v → Reader()}
else{if(B [i ] == 1){DownScan(i − 1, i)}else{DownScan(i − 1, v)}};
Write(v) = write inv .v → τ{B [v ] = 1; } →WriterScan(v − 1);
WriterScan(i) = if(i < 0){write res → Skip}
else{τ{B [i ] = 0; } →WriterScan(i − 1)};
Writer() = (Write(0) 2Write(1) 2 . . . 2Write(K )); Writer();
Register() = Reader() |||Writer();
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The Reader process first does a upward scan from element 0 to the first non-zero element i , and
then does a downward scan from element i − 1 to element 0 and returns the index of last element
whose value is 1. Event read res.v returns this index as the return value of the read operation. The
Write(v) process first sets the v -th element of B to 1, and then does a downward scan to set all
elements before i to 0. Note that in this implementation, the linearization point for Reader is the
last point where the parameter v in DownScan process is assigned in the execution. Therefore,
the linearization point can not be statically determined. Instead, it can be in either UpScan or








are modal operators which read as always and eventually respectively.
2end
Theorem 7.2.2 characterizes linearizability of the implementation through a refinement relation and
thus establishes our approach to verifying linearizability. Different versions of this result appeared
in distributed computing literature, for example, in Lynch’s book [148], Theorems 13.3-13.5.
Theorem 7.2.2 All traces of Lim are linearizable iff Lim ⊒T Lsp .
Proof (sketch). Sufficient condition: For any trace σ ∈ traces(Lim ), because Lim ⊒T Lsp , σ
is also a trace of Lsp . Let ρ be the execution history of Lsp that generates the trace σ. We define
the sequential permutation π of σ as the reordering of operations in σ in the same order as the
linearization actions lin(op)i ’s of all operations op and all processes pi in ρ. If op1 <σ op2, the
linearization action of op1 must be ordered before the linearization action of op2 in ρ, and thus
op1 <pi op2. It is also easy to verify that π is a legal sequential history of object o, since the
linearization action of every operation in ρ is the only action in the operation that affects the object
state based on its sequential specification, and the order of operations in π respects the order of
linearization actions in ρ.
Necessary condition: Let σ be a trace of Lim . By assumption σ is linearizable. We need to show
that σ is also a trace of Lsp . Since σ is linearizable, there is a sequential permutation π of σ such that
π respects both the sequential specification of object o and the run-time ordering of the operations in
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σ. We construct an execution history ρ of Lsp from σ and π as follows. Starting from the first event
of σ, for any event e in σ, (a) if it is an invocation event, append it to ρ; (b) if it is a response event
res(op, resp)i , locate the operation op in π, and for each unprocessed operation op′ by a process j
before op in π, process op′ by appending a linearization action lin(op′)j to ρ, following the order
of π; finally append lin(op)i and res(op, resp)i to ρ. It is not difficult to show that the execution
history ρ constructed this way is indeed a history of Lsp . Moreover, obviously the trace of ρ is σ.
Therefore, σ is also a trace of Lsp . 2
The above theorem shows that to verify linearizability of an implementation, it is necessary and
sufficient to show that the implementation LTS is a refinement of the specification LTS as we defined
above. This provides the theoretical foundation of our verification of linearizability. Notice that
the verification by refinement given above does not require identifying low-level actions in the
implementation as linearization points, which is a difficult (and sometimes even impossible) task.
In fact, the verification can be automatically carried out without any special knowledge about the
implementation beyond knowing the implementation code.
In some cases, one may be able to identify certain events in an implementation as linearization
points. We call these linearization events. For example, three linearization events have been iden-
tified in the stack algorithm [13]. In these cases, we can make these events visible and hide other
events (including the invocation and response events) and verify refinement relation only for these
events. More specifically, we obtain a specification LTS L′sp by the following two modifications to
Lsp : (a) for each linearization action lin(op)i , we change it to lin(op, resp)i so that the response
resp computed by this linearization action is included; and (b) all linearization actions are visible
while all inv(op)i and res(op, resp)i are invisible. Let L′im be an implementation LTS such that its
linearization events are visible and all other events are invisible, and its linearization events are also
specified as lin(op, resp)i .
Theorem 7.2.3 Let L′sp and L′im be the specification and implementation LTSs such that lineariza-
tion events are specified as lin(op, resp)i and are the only visible events. If L′im ⊒T L′sp , then
the implementation is linearizable. Conversely, if the implementation is linearizable, and it can be
shown that no other actions in the implementation can be linearization actions, then L′im ⊒T L′sp .
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The proof of this theorem is straight forwards, hence ignored. With this theorem, the verification of
linearizability could be more efficient based on only linearization events. However, one important
remark is that, as stated in the theorem, to make refinement a necessary condition of linearizabil-
ity in this case, one has to show that no other actions in the implementation can be linearization
points. In other words, the determined linearization points have to be complete. Otherwise, even
if the verification finds a counterexample for the refinement relation, we cannot conclude that the
implementation is not linearizable since we may have failed in determining all possible linearization
events. Examples of implementations modeled using linearization points can be found in [196].
7.2.2 Verification of Linearizability
With the results from Theorem 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, we can use the refinement checking algorithm pre-
sented in Section 6 to verify linearizability of an implementation of concurrent objects. Several
improvements that are specialized to linearizability verification are suggested in the following.
Partial order reduction (POR) in the refinement checking works without knowledge of linearization
points. Nonetheless, having the knowledge would allow us to take full advantage of POR. Because
linearization points are the only places where data consistency must be checked, we may amend
the above algorithm to perform data consistency check at the linearization points. As a result,
encoding relevant data as part of the event is not necessary and the model contains fewer events,
which translates to fewer traces. Furthermore, because only the linearization points need to be
synchronized, we may hide all other visible events to τ -transitions that are subject to POR.
Besides partial order reduction, our approach is compatible with other state space reduction tech-
niques or abstract interpretation techniques. Distributed algorithms and protocols are usually de-
signed for a large number of similar processes. They are therefore subject to symmetric reduc-
tion [83]. For instance, different writers (i.e., WriterA(i)) in Example 7.2.1 are symmetric and
therefore, it is sound (subject to property-specific conditions) to only explore one writer and con-
clude the same for all other writers. If the processes are identical, then it is subject to process counter
abstraction 5.4. For example, in the concurrent stack algorithm, the processes invoking push and
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pop are symmetric and therefore, we only keep track of the number of processes, instead of the
exact processes. In this way, we may prove the property for arbitrary number of processes.
7.3 Experiments of Linearizability Checking
Our method has been applied to a number of concurrent algorithms, including register—the K-
valued register algorithm2 in Example 7.2.1, stack—a concurrent stack algorithm [210], queue—a
concurrent non-blocking queue algorithm in Figure 3 of [154], buggy queue—an incorrect queue
algorithm [186], and mailbox and SNZI—the first algorithms for the mailbox problem [19] and
scalable Non-Zero indicators [78], respectively. We remark that the mailbox problem and SNZI
are complicated algorithms that are not formally verified before. Both algorithms use sophisticated
data structures and control structures, so the linearization points are difficulty to determine. The
verification details of the two algorithms can be found in [196] and [225] respectively.
Table 7.1 summarizes part of our experiments, where ‘-’ means out of memory or more than 4
hours, and ‘(points)’ means that linearization points are given. The number of states and running
time increase rapidly with data size and the number of processes, e.g., 3 processes for register,
stack, queue, and SNZI vs. 2 processes. The results conform to theoretical results [12]: model
checking linearizability is in EXPSPACE for both time and space. When linearization points are
known, the complexity is still EXPSPACE, but the state space reduces significantly since the state
spaces of implementation and specification are smaller. We show that the speedup of knowing
linearization points is in the order of O(2k ·2n ·(k2n−kn)), where k is the size of the shared object
and n is the number of processes [196]. Use of partial order reduction effectively reduces the
search space and running time in most cases, including stack and queue, and especially mailbox
and SNZI because their algorithms have multiple internal transitions. For register, the state space is
reduced but running time increases because of computational overhead. For buggy queue [186], the
counterexamples (discovered firstly in [60]) are produced quickly after exploring only part of the
state space.
2We extend this example with 2 readers and 1 writer. The correctness is verified using PAT.
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Algorithm #Proc. Linearizable Time(sec) #States Time(sec) #States
w/o POR w/o POR with POR with POR
4-valued register 2 true 6.14 50893 5.72 43977
5-valued register 2 true 44.9 349333 60.4 307155
6-valued register 2 true 297 2062437 789 1838177
3-valued register with 3 true 294 479859 393 361255
2 readers and 1 writer
stack of size 12 2 true 138 540769 65.9 395345
stack of size 14 2 true 411 763401 99.4 599077
stack of size 2 3 true - - 4321 4767519
stack of size 12 (points) 2 true 0.62 9677 0.82 9677
stack of size 14 (points) 2 true 0.82 12963 1.11 12963
stack of size 2 (points) 3 true 1.14 10385 1.56 10385
stack of size 2 (points) 4 true 37.6 219471 49.4 219471
queue of size 6 2 true 134 432511 86.2 343446
queue of size 8 2 true 256 104582 218 938542
buggy queue of size 10 2 false 10.9 32126 6.87 32126
buggy queue of size 20 2 false 52.73 105326 41.1 105326
mailbox of 3 operations 2 true 71.6 272608 27.8 120166
mailbox of 4 operations 2 true 2904 9928706 954 3696700
SNZI of size 2 2 true 1298 712857 322 341845
SNZI of size 3 3 true - - 6214 8451568
Table 7.1: Experiment results on a PC with 2.83 GHz Intel Q9550 CPU and 2 GB memory
Vechev and Yahav [215] also provided automated verification. Their approach needs to find a lin-
earizable sequence for each history, whose worst-case time is exponential in the length of the history,
as it may have to try all possible permutations of the history. As a result, the number of operations
they can check is only 2 or 3. In contrast, our approach handles all possible interleaving of opera-
tions given sizes of the shared objects. Because of partial order reduction and other optimizations,
our approach is more scalable than theirs. For instance, we can verify stacks of size 14, which
means any number of stack operations that contain up to 14 consecutive push operations.
Note that experiments in Section 6.3 suggest that PAT is faster than FDR for systems without vari-
7.4. WEB SERVICE AND CONFORMANCE CHECKING 141
ables. Modeling variables using processes and lack of partial order reduction will make FDR even
slower. Therefore we skip comparison with FDR on these examples.
7.4 Web Service and Conformance Checking
The Web Services paradigm promises to enable rich, dynamic, and flexible interoperability of highly
heterogeneous and distributed Web-based platforms. In recent years, many Web Service composi-
tion languages have been proposed. There are two different viewpoints in the area of Web Service
composition. Web Service choreography describes collaboration protocols of cooperating Web Ser-
vice participants from a global point of view. An example is WS-CDL (Web Service Choreography
Description Language [48]). Web Service orchestration refers to Web Service descriptions which
take a local point of view, which describes collaborations of the Web Services in predefined patterns
based on local decision about their interactions with one another at the message/execution level.
A representative is WS-BPEL (Web Service Business Process Execution Language [121]), which
models business processes by specifying the work flows of carrying out business transactions.
Informally, a choreography may be viewed as a contract among multiple corporations, i.e., a spec-
ification of requirements (which may not be executable). An orchestration is the composition of
concrete services provided by each corporation who realizes the contract. The distinction between
choreography and orchestration resembles the well studied distinction between sequence diagrams
(which describes inter-object system interactions, taking a global view) and state machines (which
may be used to describe intra-object state transitions, taking a local view).
In this chapter, we focus on the conformance checking problem between a choreography or an
orchestration, i.e., whether they are consistent with each other. Solving either problem is however
highly non-trivial. For instance, because Web Services are designed for potentially large number
of users3 (who may invoke the services simultaneously), verifying Web Services based on model
checking techniques must cope with state space explosion due to concurrent service invocations.
3In reality, the number is bounded by the thread pool size of the underlying operating system. See discussion in [93].
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The solution for the consistency checking is to show conformance relationship (i.e., existence of
a weak simulation relationship) between the choreography and the orchestration. The algorithm is
based on the refinement checking algorithm in Section 6, further extended with data support and
specialized optimizations for Web Services.
7.5 Web Service Modeling
In this section, we present modeling languages which are expressive enough to capture all core
features of Web Service choreography and orchestration. There are two reasons for introducing
intermediate modeling languages for Web Services. First, heavy languages like WS-CDL or WS-
BPEL are designed for machine consumption and therefore are lengthy and complicated in structure.
Moreover, there are mismatches between WS-CDL and WS-BPEL. For instance, WS-CDL allows
channel passing whereas WS-BPEL does not. The intermediate languages focus on the interactive
behavioral aspect. The languages are developed based on previous works of formal models for WS-
CDL and WS-BPEL [48, 172, 169]. They cover all main features like synchronous/asynchronous
message passing, channel passing, process forking, parallel composition, shared variables, etc. Sec-
ond, based on the intermediate languages and their semantic models (namely, labeled transition
systems), our verification and synthesis approaches is not bound to one particular Web Service lan-
guage. For instance, newly proposed orchestration languages like Orc [156] can be easily supported.
This is important because Web Service languages evolves rapidly. Being based on intermediate lan-
guages gives us opportunity to quickly cope with new syntaxes or features (e.g., by tuning the
preprocessing component).
7.5.1 Choreography: Syntax and Semantics
The following is the core syntax for building models of Web Service choreography4 , e.g., in WS-
CDL. Additional language features like variables, arrays and assertions are illustrated using exam-
4The ASCII version of the syntax can be found in PAT user manual.
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ples in later sections. Let I (short of interaction), J be terms of choreography. Let A,B range
over Web service roles; ch range over communication channels; svr range over a set of pre-setup
service invocation channels (refer to discussion later); c˜h denote a sequence of channels; x range
over variables; b be a predicate over only the variables and exp be an expression.
I ::= Stop – inaction
| Skip – termination
| svr(A,B , c˜h)→ I – service invocation
| ch(A,B , exp)→ I – channel communication
| x := exp; I – assignment
| if b I else J – conditional
| I 2 J – choice
| I ||| J – service interleaving
| I; J – sequential
We assume that each role is associated with a set of local variables and there are no globally shared
variables among roles. This is a reasonable assumption as each role (which is a service) may be
realized in a remote computing device. Informally, svr(A,B , c˜h), where svr is pre-defined service
invocation channel, states that role A invokes a service provided by role B through channel svr . A
service invocation channel is one which is registered with a service repository so that the service
is subject for invocation. c˜h is a sequence of session channels which are created for this service
invocation only. Notice that because the same service shall be available all the time, service channel
svr is reserved for service invocation only. ch(A,B , exp) where ch is a session channel states that
role A sends the message exp to role B through channel ch.
x := exp assigns the value of exp to the variable x . Without loss of generality, we always require
that the variables constituting exp and x must be associated with the same role5. If b evaluates
to true, if b I else J behaves as I , otherwise J . Given a variable x (a condition b), we write
role(x ) (role(b)) to denote the associated role. I 2 J is an unconditional choice (i.e., choice of
two unguarded working units in WS-CDL) between I and J , depending on whichever executes
first. I ||| J denotes two interactions running in parallel. Notice that there are no message commu-
nications between I and J . Two choreographes executing in a sequential order is written as I; J .
We remark that recursion is supported by referencing a choreography name.
5This is a well-formedness rule which can be checked easily.
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1. BuySell() = B2S (Buyer ,Seller , {Bch})→ Session();
2. Session() = Bch(Buyer ,Seller ,QuoteRequest)→ Bch(Seller ,Buyer ,QuoteResponse.x ) →
3. if (x ≤ 1000){
4. Bch(Buyer ,Seller ,QuoteAccept) → Bch(Seller ,Buyer ,OrderConfirmation) →
5. S2H (Seller ,Shipper , {Bch,Sch}) →
6. (Sch(Shipper ,Seller ,DeliveryDetails.y) → Stop
7. ||| Bch(Shipper ,Buyer ,DeliveryDetails.y) → Stop)
8. }else{
9. Bch(Buyer ,Seller ,QuoteReject) → Session()
10. 2 Bch(Buyer ,Seller ,Terminate) → Stop
11. };
Figure 7.1: A sample choreography
The syntax above is expressive enough to capture the core Web service choreography features6.
For instance, channel passing is supported as we are allowed to transfer a sequence of channels
on service invocation. Figure 7.1 presents a sample choreography, which illustrates how to use this
language to model Web Services. The choreography coordinates three roles (i.e., Buyer , Seller and
Shipper ) to complete a business transaction. At line 1, the Buyer communicates with the Seller
through service channel B2S to invoke its service. Channel Bch which is sent along the service
invocation is to be used as a session channel for the session only. In the Session , the Buyer firstly
sends a message QuoteRequest to the Seller through channel Bch. At line 2, the Seller responds
with some quotation value x , which is a variable. Notice that in choreography, the value of x may
be left unspecified at this point. At line 5, the Seller sends a message through the service channel
S2H to invoke a shipping service. Notice that the channel Bch is passed onto the Shipper so that
the shipper may contact the Buyer directly. At line 6 and 7, the Shipper sends delivery details to
the Buyer and Seller through the respective channels. The rest is self-explanatory.
Given a choreography model, a system configuration is a 2-tuple (I,V ), where I is a choreography
and V is a mapping from the variables to their values, i.e., from data variables to their valuations
or from channel variables to channel instances. A transition is expressed in the form of (I,V ) e→
6Higher order processes, which can be used to model Java applet, are excluded. They can be easily integrated into the
framework.
7.5. WEB SERVICE MODELING 145
(I ′,V ′). The transition rules are presented in Figure 7.2. Rule inv1 captures service invocation,
where event svr !c˜h occurs. Afterwards, rule inv2 becomes applicable so that the service invoking
request is ready to be received. At the same time, a copy of the choreography is forked. This
is because a service may be invoked multiple times, possibly simultaneously, by different service
users and all service invocations must conform to the choreography. In fact, in the standard practice
of Web Services, a service is embodied by a shared channel in the form of URLs or URIs through
which many users can throw their requests at any time. For instance, different processes acting as
Buyers may invoke the service provided by the Seller . All Buyers must follow the communication
sequence. Furthermore, in order to match the reality (and make things more interesting), we assume
that both service invocation and channel communication are asynchronous in this work. As a result,
service invocation (or channel communication) is divided into two events, i.e, the event of issuing
a service invocation (or channel output) and the event of receiving a service invocation (or channel
input). This is captured by rules inv1, inv2, ch1 and ch2. For simplicity, we assume that a function
eval returns the value of an expression exp given the valuation of variables V . Rule assign updates
variable valuations. Rule ref captures referencing, i.e., if I is defined to be J , they have the same
behavior. The rules for other constructs resembles those for CSP# in Section 3.1, hence ignored.
Given a choreography I , we build a labeled transition system (LTS) LI = (S , init ,→) in the
same way as in Section 3.1.2 based on the operational semantic rules. We skip the details here. In
order to verify properties about the choreography, we use model checking techniques to explore all
traces of the transition system. One complication is that the choreography’s behavior may depend
on environmental input which is only known during runtime with the execution of an orchestration.
For instance, the price quote provided by the Seller is unknown given only the choreography in
Figure 7.1. We discuss this issue in Section 7.6.
7.5.2 Orchestration: Syntax and Semantics
A Web Service orchestration O is composed of multiple roles, each of which is specified as an
individual process. A slightly different syntax is used to build orchestration models. The reason is
that orchestration takes a local view and therefore all primitive actions are associated with a single
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[ inv1 ]
(svr(A,B , c˜h)→ I,V )
svr !c˜h
→ (svr?(B , c˜h)→ I ||| svr(A,B , c˜h)→ I,V )
[ inv2 ]




(ch(A,B , exp) → I,V )
ch!v
→ (ch?(B , v) → I,V )
[ ch2 ]
(ch?(B , v) → I,V )
ch?v
→ (I,V )
eval(exp,V ) = v
[ assign ]
(x := exp; I,V )
τ
→ (I,V ′ ⊕ x 7→ v)
where X is the special event of termination
Figure 7.2: Choreography structural operational semantics
role. Let P (short of process) and Q be the processes, which describe behaviors of a role. Assume
that P plays the role A in the orchestration, written as P@A.
P ::= Stop | Skip – primitives
| inv !c˜h → P – service invoking
| inv?x˜ → P – service being invoked
| ch!exp → P – channel output
| ch?x → P – channel input
| x := exp; P – assignment
| if b P else Q – conditional branching
| P 2 Q – orchestration choice
| P ||| Q – interleaving
| P ; Q – sequential
Process inv !c˜h → P invokes a service through service channel inv and then behaves as specified
by P . Or a service can be invoked by inv?x˜ → P where x˜ is a sequence of channel variables
which store the received channels. A process may send (receive) a message through a channel ch
by ch!exp → P (ch?x → P ). To match the reality, we always assume that the communication
channels between different processes are asynchronous (and with a fixed buffer size) in this work.
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Let c be a channel; C be a channel valuation function; notempty(c,C ) be true iff the buffer is not
empty; notfull(c,C ) be true iff the buffer is not full; top(c,C ) be the top element in the buffer.
For simplicity, let C ⊕ (c, x ) be C ⊕ c 7→ C (c) a 〈x 〉 (where a is sequence concatenation), i.e.,
adding the element to the respective channel. Similarly, let C ⊖ c be the resultant channel valuation
function with the top element in c removed.
notfull(inv ,C )
[ invoking ]
(inv !c˜h → P ,VA,C )
inv !c˜h
→ (P ||| (inv !c˜h → P),VA,C ⊕ (inv , c˜h))
notempty(inv ,C )
[ invoked ]
(inv?x˜ → P ,VA,C )
inv?top(inv ,C )
→ (P ,VA ⊕ x˜ 7→ top(inv ,C ),C ⊖ inv)
notfull(ch,C )
[ output ]
(ch!exp → P ,VA,C )
ch!exp
→ (P ,VA,C ⊕ (ch, exp))
notempty(ch,C )
[ input ]
(ch?x → P ,VA,C )
ch?top(ch,C )
→ (P ,VA ⊕ x 7→ top(ch,C ),C ⊖ ch)
Figure 7.3: Orchestration structural operational semantics
The rest are similar to those of choreography.
Similarly, we define the operational semantics. Let VA be the valuation of the variables associated
with the roleA. LetC be a valuation function of the channels, which maps a channel to the sequence
of items in the buffer. C is a set of tuples of the form c 7→ m˜sg . A configuration of the process is
a 3-tuple (P ,VA,C ). Part of the firing rules for local steps of a process are presented in Figure 7.3
and the rest are skipped for the their similarity with the constructs in CSP# (refer to Section 3.1.2).
We remark that as in choreography, service invocation in orchestration forks a new copy of the
service (see rule inv in Figure 7.3) and thus allows potentially many concurrent service invocations.
In reality, however, the number of overlapping service invocations is bounded by the maximum
number of threads the underlying operating system allows [93]. In next section, we discuss how to
capture this constraint and at the same time perform efficient verification. Because an orchestration
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Role Buyer {
var counter = 0;
Main() = B2S !{Bch} → Session();
Session() = Bch!QuoteRequest → counter++; Bch?QuoteResonse.x →
if (x ≤ 1000){
Bch!QuoteAccept → Bch?OrderConfirmation
→ Bch?DeliveryDetails.y → Stop
}
else if (counter > 3){Bch!QuoteReject → Session()} else {Stop};
}
Role Seller {
var x = 1200;
Main() = B2S?{ch} → Session();
Session() = ch?QuoteRequest → ch!QuoteResonse.x → (ch?QuoteAccept →
ch!OrderConfirmation → S2H !{ch,Sch} → Sch?DeliveryDetails.y →
Stop 2 ch?QuoteReject → Session());
}
Role Shipper {
var detail = “01/11/2009”;
Main() = S2H ?{ch1, ch2} →
(ch1!DeliveryDetails.detail → Stop ||| ch2!DeliveryDetails.detail → Stop);
}
Figure 7.4: A simple orchestration
is the cooperation of multiple roles/processes, the behaviors of the processes must be composed in
order to obtain the global behavior. Given two processes, e.g., P and Q , playing different roles, e.g.,
A and B , the composition is written as P@A ‖ Q@B . Figure 7.5 shows the respective semantic
rules, i.e., a global step is constituted of a local step by either P or Q .
Following the rules, given an orchestration with multiple roles, each of which is specified as a pro-
cess defined above, we may build a LTS. The executions of the orchestration equal to the executions
the LTS. Similarly, we define traces of an orchestration as τ -filtered traces of the LTS. Given an
orchestration O, let traces(LO) be the set of finite executions. Figure 7.4 presents an orchestration
which implements the choreography in Figure 7.1. Each role is implemented as a separate compo-
nent. Each component contains variable declarations (optional) and process definitions. We assume
that the process Main defines the computational logic of the role after initialization. We remark that
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the orchestration generally contains more details than the choreography, e.g., the variable counter
in Buyer constraints the number of attempts the buyer would try before giving up.
7.6 Web Service Conformance Verification
In this section, we define conformance between a choreography and an orchestration based on trace
refinement and present an approach to verify it by showing refinement relationships. The verification
is performed under the constraints of bounded (many) service invocations.
As discussed above, both choreography and orchestration can be translated into LTSs. An orches-
tration O is valid if and only if it is weakly equivalent to the choreography I , i.e., traces(LO) =
traces(LI ). This can be verified by showing that the orchestration weakly simulates the choreog-
raphy and vice versa. By the assumption that the ranges of the variables are finite and the number
of concurrent service invocations are bounded, the LTS has finite number of states. As a result, we
can use the refinement checking algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 to check trace refinement. Given
a choreography and an orchestration, the algorithm works by constructing the synchronous product
of the two LTSs and then performing a reachability analysis. For instance, in order to verify that
the orchestration conforms to the choreography, the algorithm searches for a pair of states, one of
the choreography and the other of the orchestration, such that the state of the orchestration can per-
form more (visible) events than that of the choreography. If such a state is found, then we find a
counterexample. Otherwise, we establish the refinement relationship.
A main challenge for verifying practical Web Services by model checking is state space explosion.
There are multiple causes of state space explosion. Two of them are 1) the numerous different
interleaving of processes executing concurrently in service orchestration and 2) the large number7
of concurrent service invocations. In the following, we discuss two optimization techniques which
have been adopted to cope with the above causes.
Firstly, the algorithm is improved with partial order reduction, to reduce the number of possible
7An operating system would like dozens or even thousands of concurrent threads.
7.6. WEB SERVICE CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION 150
interleaving (particularly for orchestration). Events performed by single service role (e.g., local
variable updates in service choreography or orchestration) are often independent with the rest of the
system and hence are subject to reduction. For instance, the action of updating variable counter in
Figure 7.4 results in an invisible event, which is independent of actions performed by other roles like
Seller or Shipper . During model checking, if this action is enabled (together with actions performed
by other roles), we only expand the system graph using this action and postpone the rest8. By this
way, we build a smaller LTS and therefore checks deadlock-freeness, safety and liveness more
efficiently. For refinement checking, we apply this reduction in two ways. One is to apply partial
order reduction separately to invisible events of either the choreography or the orchestration. Notice
that this reduction is trace preserving and therefore is sound for refinement checking. The other one
is to apply reduction to visible events of the choreography and the orchestration at the same time.
Secondly, by a simple argument, it can be shown that the following algebraic laws are true; where
I , J and K are choreographes.
I ||| J = J ||| I
(I ||| J ) ||| K = I ||| (J ||| K)
Naturally, different invocations of the same Web Service are similar or even identical. By the above
laws, the interleaving of multiple choreographes can be sorted (in certain fixed ordering) without
changing the system behaviors. Therefore, if the choreography is in the form of I ||| · · · ||| I |||
· · ·, it is equivalent whether the first I makes a transition or the second does. For verification of
deadlock-freeness, safety or liveness properties, it is thus sound to pick one of the transitions and
ignore the others. In general, this reduction could reduce the number of states up to the factor
of N ! where N is the number of identical components. This reduction is inspired by research on
model checking parameterized systems [115] and [79]. Furthermore, the process counter abstraction
presented in Section 5.4 can also be applied here.
There are a number of other algebraic laws which may help to reduce the number of states (e.g.,
I 2 J = J 2 I). Nonetheless, it is a balance between the computational overhead (for the
additional checking) and gain in state reduction. In our implementation (refer to Section 10.3.3),
8This reduction is subject to other constraints, e.g., the resultant state must not be on the search stack.
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(P ,VA,C )
e
→ (P ′,V ′A,C
′)
(P@A ‖ Q@B ,VA ∪ VB ,C )
e
→ (P ′@A ‖ Q@B ,V ′A ∪ VB ,C ′)
(Q ,VB ,C )
e
→ (Q ′,V ′B ,C
′)
(P@A ‖ Q@B ,VA ∪ VB ,C )
e
→ (P@A ‖ Q ′@B ,V ′A ∪ VB ,C ′)
Figure 7.5: Process composition rules
a set of specially chosen algebraic laws are used to detect equivalence of system configurations,
including the symmetry and associativity laws of |||, ‖ and 2, etc.
Choreography may contain free variables (for environment inputs), which must be instantiated dur-
ing execution time. This is achieved by synchronizing the valuations of the choreography and
orchestration whenever a free variable is used. For instance, when checking conformance between
the orchestration in Figure 7.4 and the choreography in Figure 7.1, after the Seller sends out the
message QuoteResponse.1200 (where x is 1200), the variable x in the choreography is instanti-
ated to 1200. Similarly, the session channel names of the service invocations in the choreography
must be instantiated to the actual channel names of service invoking in the orchestration. For in-
stance, channel Bch in Figure 7.1 is instantiated to bch after the synchronization step between
B2S (Buyer ,Seller , {Bch}) in Figure 7.1 and B2S !{bch} in Figure 7.4.
7.7 Experiments of Conformance Checking
We have conducted experiments on multiple case studies, including ones from www.oracle.com and
from [48, 172]. We are currently applying PAT to several large WS-CDL and WS-BPEL models.
We thus demonstrate the scalability of our verification approach, using two models. One is the
online store example presented in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.4. Instead of one buyer and one service
invocation, we amend the model so that multiple users are allowed to use the services multiple times.
The other is the service for travel arrangement. Its WS-BPEL model and WS-CDL specification are
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Figure 7.6: Experiments for conformance verification
available at http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~pat/cdl/. A number of clients invoke the business process,
specifying the name of the employee, the destination, the departure date, and the return date. The
BPEL process checks the employee travel status (through a Web Service). Then it checks the prices
for the flight ticket with multiple airlines (through Web Services). Finally, the BPEL process selects
the lowest price and returns the travel plan to each client.
Figure 7.6 shows PAT’s efficiency using the two examples, obtained on a PC with Intel Q9500 CPU
at 2.83GHz and 4GB RAM. In the online store example, we allow buyers to invoke the service
repeatedly. As a result, the orchestration is deadlock-free. In the travel arrangement example, one
client invokes the service only once. Because the number of concurrent service invocations is bound
by the maximum number of threads allowed, the system reaches a deadlock state after exhausting
all threads. This is consistent with the finding in [93]. We verify that the orchestration conforms to
the choreography using the refinement checking algorithm, as shown in Figure 7.6. In both cases,
the number of states and the verification time increase rapidly. Yet, PAT is able to confirm that the
orchestration conforms to the choreography with a few buyers/clients using the service concurrently.
In a nutshell, PAT explores 107 states in a reasonable amount of time, which suggests that PAT is
comparable to FDR in terms of efficiency9.
9LTSA-WS or WS-Engineer takes a different approach and therefore we skip the performance comparison here.
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7.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented two applications of refinement checking.
First, we showed that linearizability can be expressed using a refinement relation, hence can be
verified using refinement checking algorithm. Several case studies show that our approach is capa-
ble of verifying practical algorithms and identifying bugs in faulty implementations. Several future
directions are possible. Algorithms that accept an infinite number of threads or unbound data struc-
tures make model checking impossible. Symmetric properties among threads can reduce infinite
number of threads to a small number. Shape analysis or integration with thereat prover can also be
incorporated into the model checking to handle unbounded data size.
Second, we present model-based methods for fully automatic analysis of Web Service compositions,
in particular, linking two different views of Web Services. Our methods build on the strength of
advanced model checking techniques. In particular, we verify whether designs of Web Services
from two different views are consistent or not, by on-the-fly refinement checking with specialized
optimizations.
In terms of modeling of linearizability, our approach is based on the trace refinement of LTSs, which
is similar to [12]. The non-atomic refinement defined in [65] separates the data explicitly as state-
based formalism Object-Z. This modeling requires to have the knowledge of linearization points,
and also prevents automatic verification techniques such as model checking to be used. Lineariz-
ability checking is a much studied research area, since it is a central property for the correctness of
concurrent algorithms. Herlihy and Wing [107] present a methodology for verifying linearizability
by defining a function that maps every state of an concurrent object to the set of all possible abstract
values representing it. Vafeiadis et. al. [212] use rely-guarantee reasoning to verify linearizabil-
ity for a family of implementations for linked lists. Neither of them requires statically determined
linearization points, but they are manual. Verification using theorem provers (e.g., PVS) is another
approach [69, 59]. In these works, algorithms are proved to be linearizable by using simulation
between input/output automata modeling the behavior of an abstract set and the implementation.
However, theorem prover based approach is not automatic. Conversion to IO automata and use of
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PVS require strong expertise. Wang and Stoller [218] present a static analysis that verifies lineariz-
ability for an unbounded number of threads. Their approach detects certain coding patterns, which
are known to be atomic regardless of the environment. This solution is not complete (i.e., not ap-
plicable to all algorithms). Amit et al. [13] presented a shape difference abstraction that tracks the
difference between two heaps. This approach works well if the concrete heap and the abstract heap
have almost identical shapes. Recently, Manevich et al. [153] and Berdine et al. [31] extended it to
handle larger number and unbounded number of threads, respectively. Vafeiadis [211] further im-
proved this solution to allow linearization points in different threads. The main limitation of these
approaches is that users need to provide linearization points, which are unknown for some algo-
rithms. In [215], Vechev and Yahav provided two methods for linearizability checking. The first
method is a fully automatic, but inefficient as discussed in Section 7.3. The second method requires
algorithm-specific user annotations for linearization points, which is not generic.
Web Service conformance checking is related to research on verifying Web Services, particularly,
the line of work by Foster et al presented in [94, 95, 93, 91]. They proposed to apply model-based
verification for Web Services. Their approach is to build Finite State Processes (FSP) model from
Web services and then apply verification techniques based on FSP to verify Web Services. For in-
stance, conformance between choreography and orchestration is verified by showing a bi-simulation
relationship between the respective FSP models. In particular, they identified the model of resource
constraint in Web Service verification [93] and proposed to perform verification under resource
constraints. In addition, they developed a tool named LTSA-WS [95] (and later WS-Engineer [92]).
Our work can also be categorized as model-based verification, and is similar to theirs. Our approach
complements their works in a number of aspects. Firstly, our model is based on a modeling lan-
guage which is specially designed for Web service composition with features like channel passing,
shared variables/arrays, service invocation with service replication, etc. Secondly, our verification
algorithms employ specialized optimizations for Web Services verification, e.g., model reduction
based on algebraic properties of the models, partial order reduction for orchestration with multiple
local computational steps, etc. These optimizations allow us to handle large state space and poten-
tially large Web Services. Our work is remotely related to formal modeling and verification of Web
Services [73, 157, 169, 123]. Our languages are inspired from the languages proposed in [48, 172].
Chapter 8
Bounded Model Checking of
Compositional Processes
Model checking techniques presented in previous chapters rely on exhaustive search through ex-
plicit representations of the state space and suffers from the state space explosion problem. To
overcome this problem, verification techniques like SAT-based bounded model checking [54] have
been proved to be successful in verifying a variety of system models.
Applying bounded model checking to compositional process algebras is, however, not a trivial task.
One challenge is that the number of system states for process algebra models is not statically known,
whereas exploring the full state space is computationally expensive. This chapter presents a compo-
sitional encoding of hierarchical processes as SAT problems and then applies state-of-the-art SAT
solvers for bounded model checking. The encoding avoids exploring the full state space for complex
systems so as to deal with state space explosion. The bounded model checking technique is used to
validate system models against event-based temporal properties. The experiment results show that
this approach can handle large systems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 discusses some background of
bounded model checking. Section 8.2 presents how to encode the semantics of compositional pro-
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cesses as Boolean formulae at the same time avoiding state space explosion. Section 8.3 introduces
the encoding of the LTL properties and the verification problem. Section 8.4 presents the experi-
mental results. Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.
8.1 Background
The original proposal of model checking relies on exhaustive search through explicit representations
of reachable system states [58], which is known as explicit model checking. It suffers from the state
space explosion problem. Later, symbolic model checking was proposed to overcome this problem
by enumerating states symbolically (typically based on the notion of BDDs [42, 44]).
However, human intervention may be required to fine-tune the variable ordering so as to reduce the
size of BDDs. In recent years, bounded model checking [54] have been proposed to complement
explicit model checking and symbolic model checking with great success. The idea is to encode
finite state machines (as well as the properties to be verified) as a Boolean formula that is satisfiable
if and only if the underlying state machine can realize a finite sequence of transitions that reaches
states of interest, and then apply state-of-the-art SAT solvers [2] to produce counterexamples (if
any) efficiently. If such a path segment cannot be found at a given length k , the search is continued
for larger k . With the rapid development of SAT solvers, we believe bounded model checking is
promising for formal verification.
Previous works on model checking have been historically centered around state machines. Model
checking techniques have only been applied to event-based formalisms to a limited extent. To our
best knowledge, bounded model checking has not yet been applied to event-based languages like
CSP [108] or CCS [155]. One of the reasons is that unlike in circuit verification [53] (where en-
coding the transition relation is rather straightforward), encoding the semantics of compositional
processes using Boolean formulae is nontrivial. The number of system states for process algebra
models is not statically known and exploring the full state space is computationally expensive. This
chapter presents a compositional encoding of hierarchical processes as SAT problems. State-of-the-
art SAT solvers are then applied for bounded model checking. The encoding avoids exploring the
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full state space for complex systems so as to avoid state space explosion. Based on the idea, we
have implemented bounded model checking in PAT. The advantages of applying bounded model
checking instead of symbolic model checking include that SAT tools usually need far less hand ma-
nipulation than BDDs. The experiment results show that our toolkit has a competitive performance
for verifying systems with large number of states.
In this chapter, we only consider a subset of CSP# with no variables and channels (i.e., essentially
the original CSP language). Because the newly added features in CSP#, e.g., variables, channels,
etc., increase the complexity of the encoding process, which makes the bound model checking
ineffective. This is also the reason that we do not pursue this direction further. With the rapid
development of SAT solver, we believe this bottleneck can be resolved.
8.2 Encoding of Processes
This section is dedicated to a discussion on how to encode a given process P in CSP# as Boolean
formulae for bounded model checking. We start with encoding simple processes by explicitly build-
ing their labeled transition system LP and then discuss how to encode processes for which building
LP is not feasible. Note that variables and channels are ignored in this chapter. Hence system
configurations have only the process component. We remark that the encoding technique is not
restricted to CSP#.
8.2.1 Encoding Simple Processes
A process P can be encoded by firstly constructing LP and then encoding LP . Given a LTS, a
property to verify and a bound k , we need to translate the LTS and the negation of the property
into a propositional formula which is satisfiable if and only if there is a trace of length k which
violates the property (i.e., a counterexample). Thus, we need to find an efficient encoding of states,
events, and the transition relation. Given L = (S , init ,→), we need ⌈log2#S⌉ Boolean variables
to encode the states. Let −→xs i = 〈xs1i , xs2i , · · ·〉 be a finite sequence of Boolean variables used to
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encode the states reached after i − 1 steps. The encoding of a state is a Boolean formula π over −→xs i
such that π(−→xs i ) = 1 if and only if the valuation of the variables uniquely identifies the state. Or
equivalently, a state is associated with a unique binary number and each Boolean variable represents
one bit of the number. Similarly, we use ⌈log2#αL⌉ Boolean variables to encode the alphabet of
L. Let −→xe i be the variables used to encode the events. A transition is encoded as a Boolean formula
of the following form,
π(−→xs i) ∧ π(−→xe i) ∧ π(−→xs i+1)
where −→xs i+1 is a set of fresh variables used to encode the post-state. Let Π denote the encod-
ing function which maps a state or event to a Boolean formula given a set of Boolean variables.
Π(P1,−→xs i ) ∧ Π(e,−→xe i) ∧ Π(P2,−→xs i+1) where (P1, e,P2) ∈→ is the Boolean coding of the tran-
sition in the above form. Informally, this formula guarantees that if the transition is to be taken,
the pre/post-state and event must be P1/P2 and e respectively. The transition relation → is encoded




{Π(P1,−→xs i ) ∧ Π(e,−→xe i) ∧ Π(P2,−→xs i+1) | (P1, e,P2) ∈→}
Given a bound k for bounded model checking, the encoded transition relation must be applied k -
times. Every time a fresh set of variables must be used to encode the engaged event as well as the
target state. Thus, we need (k + 1) × ⌈log2#S⌉+ k × ⌈log2#Σ⌉ Boolean variables to represent
state s1 . . sk+1 and e1 . . ek where s1 = init .
Definition 24 An encoding of a LTS is 4-tuple E = (I,Ti ,−→xs i ,−→xe i) where I = Π(init ,−→xs1) is the
encoded initial state, Ti is the encoded transition relation as defined above, −→xs i are the variables
used to encode the source state of Ti and −→xe i are the variables used to encode the labeling events of
transitions of Ti .
Given a LTS L and its encoding E , we say E is sound if and only if E and L are trace-equivalent,
i.e., every trace allowed by L must be allowed by E and vice versa. The above encoding of a LTS
is sound as we can show that the encoded transition relation conforms to → and the encoded initial
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condition conforms to init . Given an encoding of the system E , a property φ to verify and a bound
k , the propositional formula constructed is of the following form,
[[E , φ]]k =̂ I ∧
∧k
i=1 Ti ∧ [[¬φ]]k
where [[¬φ]]k is the encoded negation of the given property (with regards to k ). We leave it to
Section 8.3 for detailed discussion. A satisfiability solution to the above formula gives a counterex-
ample of the property, which satisfies the initial condition and the transition relation up to k -steps
and violates the property.
In the following,we use EP to denote the encoding of P . Explicitly constructing LP = (SP , initP ,
→P ) is however not always desirable for several reasons. Firstly, SP (and therefore →P ) may not
be finite. For instance, processes like P =̂ b → Skip 2 (a → P ; c → Skip) or P =̂ a → (P |||
P) allow unbounded recursion or replication and, thus, may result in infinite reachable process
expressions. Our experiences, however, show that processes of the above forms are rather rare in
practice. Without loss of generality, we assume that SP is always finite. Optimally, the number
of Boolean variables needed to encode SP is ⌈log2#SP⌉. However, determining the exact size of
SP requires traversing through all reachable states, which is often undesirable due to state space
explosion. For instance, assume #SQ = n , the interleaving of m copies of Q (say P ) has nm
states. One remedy is to encode the LQ (if its size is manageable) and then compose EQ to generate
EP so as to avoid constructing LP .
8.2.2 Composing Encodings
A rich set of operators can be used to compose processes as illustrated in Section 3.1. Among all
operators, the indexed parallel composition or indexed interleaving (which we refer to as indexed
concurrency) causes state space explosion. Given P which contains indexed concurrency, instead
of building LP we shall deduce EP from the encoding of its sub-components. In the following, we
show how to compose the encoding of sub-components for various composition. In order to draw
connections between transitions of different processes running in parallel, a global event-to-Boolean
encoding is established beforehand. In the following, let Π(e,−→xe) be the formula encoding e using
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variables −→xe . Given −→xs i = 〈xs1i , xs2i , · · · , xsni 〉 where i ∈ {1, 2} as two sequences of Boolean
variables of the same length, we write −→xs1 ⇔ −→xs2 to mean xs11 ⇔ xs12 ∧ xs21 ⇔ xs22 ∧ · · · ∧
xsn1 ⇔ xs
n
2 . To further abuse notations, we write −→xs1 ∪ −→xs2 to denote the sequence of variables
which contains both variables in −→xs1 and −→xs2 and is sorted according to the unique variables ID.
Definition 25 Let P = |||
n
j=1








i ). The encoding of P is
(IP ,T Pi ,
−→xsPi ,
























Note that the variables used to encode each Pj are disjoint. The encoded initial condition of P is
the conjunction of the encoded initial conditions of each sub-component. Intuitively, this says that
when the composition is initialized, all sub-components must be at its initial state. The predicate
−→xsPmi ⇔
−→xsPmi+1 means that Pm remains in the same state. The encoded transition relation is the
disjunction of a set of clauses, each of which states that a transition of Pj may be taken and the states
of other sub-components are unchanged. Thus, any transition of a sub-component can be taken
without affecting other sub-components. Indexed parallel composition is handled similarly. The
complication is that the alphabet of a sub-component may actually contain more events than those
constitute the process expression. The following definition shows that by manipulating the encoded
transition relations of the sub-components, the encoded transition relation of the composition shall
be exactly the conjunction of the encoded transition relations of the sub-components.
Definition 26 Let P = ‖n
j=1








i ). The encoding of P is (IP ,T Pi ,
−→xsPi ,





















{Π(e,−→xei ) ∧ −→xs i ⇔ −→xs i+1 | e 6∈ αPj ∧ e ∈ αP ∪ {τ}})
The transition relation T Pji is extended with clauses to allow events not in αPi but in αP (including
τ ) to occur freely without changing the status of this sub-component. Because the encoded transi-
tion relation of each sub-component is conjuncted and we use the same set of variables to encode
the events, an event can be engaged if and only if every sub-component participates in it. This con-
struction guarantees that the encoded transition relation of the composition allows only runs which
conform to the semantics. It avoids constructing LP by paying the price of extra transitions.
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Example 8.2.1 The following specifies the classic dining philosophers problem [108],
Phil(i) = think .i → get .i .(i + 1)%N → get .i .i
→ eat .i → put .i .(i + 1)%N → put .i .i → Phil(i);
Fork(i) = get .i .i → put .i .i → Fork(i) 2
get .((i − 1)%N ).i → put .((i − 1)%N ).i → Fork(i);




whereN is the number of philosophers, get .i .j (put .i .j ) is the action of the i -th philosopher picking
up (putting down) the j -th fork. Assuming N = 5 and x1, x2, x3 are used to encode the events, the
event encoding is shown in the following table (and the rest are ignored for brevity).
Event Encoding Event Encoding
think .0 ¬ x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ ¬ x3 put .0.1 x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ ¬ x3
get .0.1 ¬ x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ x3 put .0.0 x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ x3
get .0.0 ¬ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ ¬ x3 get .4.0 x1 ∧ x2 ∧ ¬ x3
eat .0 ¬ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 put .4.0 x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3






∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ ¬ x3 ∧ x4 ⇔ x7 ∧ x5 ⇔ x8 ∧ x6 ⇔ x9)
∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ⇔ x7 ∧ x5 ⇔ x8 ∧ x6 ⇔ x9))
∨ (¬ x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ ¬ x3 ∧ x10 ⇔ x12 ∧ x11 ⇔ x13)
∨ (¬ x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x10 ⇔ x12 ∧ x11 ⇔ x13))
∨ (¬ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x10 ⇔ x12 ∧ x11 ⇔ x13))
∨ (x1 ∧ ¬ x2 ∧ ¬ x3 ∧ x10 ⇔ x12 ∧ x11 ⇔ x13))
where x4, x5, x6 (x7, x8, x9) are used to encode the pre-state (post-state) of Phil(0) and x10, x11 (x12,
x13) are used to encode the pre-state (post-state) of Fork(0). end
A large class of systems can be specified as an indexed parallel composition or indexed interleaving
of multiple sub-components which have relatively small number of states, e.g., PhilsN is specified
as an indexed parallel composition of philosopher and fork fairs. For such systems, we encode each
sub-component by explicitly constructing the LTS and then apply the above construction to build
the composed transition relation. Nonetheless, if a process P which contains indexed concurrency is
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further composed with other processes using operators like △,2 and ; , or amended using operators
like \, we shall be able to deduce the encoding of the composition from the encoding of P (and
others). For instance, assuming the given process is Phils(N ); Q , we must not explore all states of
Phils(N ) in order to encode the given process.
Definition 27 Let P = M 2 N . Let EM = (IM ,T Mi ,−→xsMi ,−→xeMi ) be the encoding of M . Let
EN = (IN ,T Ni ,
−→xsNi ,






−→xeNi , and T Pi = (xci ∧ T Mi ∧ xci+1) ∨ (¬ xci ∧
T Ni ∧ ¬ xci+1) where xci is a fresh control variable.
The encoded initial condition has no constraints on xc1 and thus xc1 can be either true or false
initially (which means transitions from P or Q can be taken). Once one of the choices has been
taken, xci remains the same as xc1 for all i and thus a later step must respect the choice made at the
first step. This captures the semantics of choices. Note that ⊓ is handled in the same way as 2, and
⊓ is equivalent to 2 in the trace semantics [108].
Definition 28 Let P = M △ N . Let EM = (IM ,T Mi ,−→xsMi ,−→xeMi ) be the encoding of M . Let
EN = (IN ,T Ni ,
−→xsNi ,






−→xeNi , and T Pi = (¬ xci ∧ T Mi ∧ ¬ xci+1) ∨ (T Ni ∧
xci+1) where xci is a fresh control variable.
Interrupt can be viewed as a biased choice. Note that ¬ xci is true if and only if M has not yet
been interrupted. If a transition of TM is taken, xci+1 remains false so that next transition can be
taken from TM or TN . Whenever a transition of TN is taken, xci+1 must be true, which forbids all
transitions from TM .
Definition 29 Let P = M ; N . Let EM = (IM ,T Mi ,−→xsMi ,−→xeMi ) be the encoding of M . Let
EN = (IN ,T Ni ,
−→xsNi ,






−→xeNi , and T Pi is defined as follows: where xci is a fresh
variable,
¬ xci ∧ T Mi ∧ (¬Π(X,
−→xe i) ∧ ¬ xci+1 ∨ Π(X,−→xe i) ∧ xci+1 ∧ IN ) ∨ xci ∧ T Ni
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Initially, ¬ xc1 must be true. Note that ¬ xci is true if and only if M has not yet terminated. Intu-
itively, a sequential composition can be viewed a delayed choice whereby transitions from N can
only be taken after a X transition has been taken in M . xci and IN is true once a transition of M
labeled with X has been taken. Because transitions from M are guarded with ¬ xci , no transition
from M can be taken afterwards.
Other compositional operators are handled similarly by manipulating the encoded transition rela-
tions of the sub-components and introducing control variables if necessary. For instance, if some
events of an encoded process are to be hidden (i.e., P \A), those events are renamed, i.e., the label e
of a transition is encoded as Π(τe ,−→xei) instead of Π(e,−→xei ). Note that hiding different events results
in different τ transitions. This prevents synchronization between different hidden events.
Given a process P , if P contains no indexed concurrency, we construct LP and then apply the
encoding in Section 3.1. Otherwise, each sub-component of the indexed interleaving or parallel
composition is encoded first. The encoding of P is then composed by applying the compositional
encoding. If a sub-component of the indexed interleaving or parallel (say Q ) contains indexed
concurrency as well, the same procedure is repeated so as to encode Q . Note that for processes like
P = a → P ||| · · · ||| P , this construction is not feasible (and thus we have to construct LP ).
Nonetheless, for most interesting systems in which there is no unbounded replication (or recursion),
this construction not only terminates but results in Boolean formulae of manageable size, which can
be efficiently solved by SAT-solvers.
Theorem 8.2.2 Let P be a process. EP is the encoding of P as defined above. EP is trace-
equivalent to LP .
This theorem states that our encoding is sound. It is proved by structural induction. The base case is
when a process contains no indexed concurrency, i.e., the encoding in Definition 24 is sound. Then
we prove the induction step by showing the compositional encoding preserves the equivalence. We
skipped the proof for brevity.
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8.3 LTL Properties Encoding and Verification
In this section, we focus on LTL verification using bounded model checking techniques.
Let B¬φ be the Büchi automaton constructed from a LTL property ¬φ. In the explicit model
checking approach, the product of B¬φ and P is generated (same as in SPIN). Explicit model
checking is to determine the emptiness of LP × B , i.e., explore on-the-fly whether the product
contains a loop which is composed of at least one accepting state. Finite traces are extended to
infinite ones in a standard way. In the presence of a counterexample, on-the-fly model checking
usually produces a trace leading to a bad state or a loop quickly (refer to Section 8.4). However, the
counterexample produced may be extremely long because it relies on a depth first search. Bounded
model checking may then be used to produce a shorter trace which leads to the same bad state or
loop. Though because of the Büchi automata, the generated counterexample may not be the shortest.
Nonetheless, our bounded model checker can be used as a separate model checker.











where s0 is the initial state, s1 and s2 are two accepting states and ∗ means the transition is un-
guarded. ¬ e means the transition can be labeled with any event but e . end
For bounded model checking, because LP may not be built, we encode the Büchi automaton and
then compose it with the encoding of the model (i.e., EP ). Given a guard g labeled with a transition
of B , let Π(g ,−→xeBi ,−→xsBi+1) be the encoded guard, e.g., Π(e,−→xeBi ) if g is an event e or ¬Π(e,−→xeBi )
if g is an event ¬ e or Π(g1,−→xeBi ,−→xsBi+1) ∧ Π(g2,−→xeBi ,−→xsBi+1) if g is g1 ∧ g2.
Definition 30 Let P be a process. Let EP = (IP ,T Pi ,−→xsPi ,−→xe i). Let B be a Büchi automaton





{ΠB (s,−→xsBi ) ∧ Π(g ,
−→xeBi ,
−→xsBi+1) ∧ Π
B (s ′,−→xsBi+1) | (s, g , s
′) ∈ T}
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The encoding of the product of P and B is (I,Ti ,−→xs i ,−→xei ) where I = IB ∧ IP , −→xs i = −→xsPi ∪−→xsBi
and Ti = T Pi ∧ T Bi .
Because P and B share the same alphabet as well as the variables to encode the events, transitions
of P and B are always synchronized. P violates the property if and only if the language of P×B is
not empty. Let FB (−→xsi ) =
∨
{ΠB (s,−→xsi ) | s is an accepting state of B} be the encoded accepting
states. The following theorem states the correctness of our bounded model checking.
Theorem 8.3.2 Given a process P , and a Büchi automaton B constructed from ¬φ, let EP×B =
(I,Ti ,−→xs i ,−→xe i) be the encoding of P ×B . Let k to be a bound. The following formula is satisfiable
iff there is a counterexample of size k .
[[P , φ]]k = I ∧
∧k













−→xei as well as the control variables (if any), from which we can identify a finite
run 〈s1, e1, s2, e2, · · · , sk , ek , sk+1〉. Because I must be true, s1 is an initial state. Because Ti must
be true, by Theorem 8.2.2, si
ei⇒ si+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k . Thus, the sequence of states/events
identified must be a run of P (as well as a finite prefix of a trace of φ). The constraint [[¬φ]]k states
that the finite run must contain a loop, i.e., xsk ⇔ xsi for some i , and the loop must contain at least
one accepting state, i.e., there exists some j satisfying j ≥ i ∧ j ≤ k such that sj is accepting.
Therefore, the finite run identifies an infinite trace which is allowed by P and violates φ.
8.4 Experiments
In this section, we present a number of experiments to show the feasibility of applying SAT-based
model checking to process algebras. The effectiveness of our compositional encoding is straightfor-
ward. If compositional encoding is applied, the encoding time is often negligible and the size of the
formula is comparable to that of the formula generated by constructing the LTS1.
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Figure 8.1: Performance evaluation with a 2.0 GHz Intel Core Duo CPU and 1 GB memory
For timely efficiency, we compare PAT with FDR and SPIN. We choose SPIN over others because it
is the most established explicit model checker and its input language is loosely based on CSP. Note
that partial order reduction, which partly makes SPIN very successful, has been implemented in
PAT. We choose not to compare our bounded model checker with NuSMV [53] because it focuses a
different application domain (i.e., circuit verification), in which often the transition relation is known
statically. Our bounded model checker has been evaluated with two award wining SAT solvers, i.e.,
MiniSAT and RSAT [2].
Figure 8.1 summarizes the performance using three benchmark models, i.e., the dining philoso-




eat1 · · ·
23
eatN−1), the
classic readers/writers problem and Milner’s cyclic scheduler. This model describes a protocol
for coordination of N readers and N writers accessing a shared resource. The property to ver-
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ify is reachability of an erroneous situation (i.e., wrong readers/writers coordination). Milner’s
cyclic scheduler describes a scheduler for N concurrent processes. The processes are scheduled
in cyclic fashion so that the first process is reactivated after the N -th process has been activated.
The property to verify is that a process must eventually be scheduled. Details of the models and
more experiments can be found at [1]. Since FDR supports refinement checking only, to prove a
liveness property written in LTL, a property model needs to be constructed. For example, we use
Prop = eat0 → Prop 2 eat1 → Prop . . . 2 eatN−1 to express the property mention above.
The results are obtained by showing a (failure) refinement relationship between the system model
and a process capturing the property to verify. For the dining philosopher example (the left-upper
chart), our on-the-fly explicit model checker (referred as PAT-Exp) performs best to produce a coun-
terexample. Our bounded model checker (referred as PAT-SAT) outperforms SPIN for 13 or more
philosophers. The main reason is that the LTL to Büchi automata conversion in SPIN suffers from
large LTL formulae, i.e., takes more time and produces bigger automata. All verifiers outperforms
FDR (except PAT-SAT for small number of philosophers because of the encoding overhead), which
is not feasible for more than 12 philosophers. For the readers/writers example, all verifiers except
FDR produces a counterexample efficiently. Note that for every experiment SPIN takes less than
a few seconds to build model-specific executables. For the Milner’s example, the full state space
(which is exponentially increasing without partial order reduction) must be explored because the
property to verify is true. SAT outperforms FDR for 12 or more processes. This suggests that
SAT-based model checking has the potential to handle large state space. Moreover, the current im-
plementation of PAT-SAT may be improved by orders of magnitude should we incorporate recently
development on incremental bounded model checking and more [191, 226]. Nonetheless, bounded
model checking currently is mainly for falsification (if without a proper threshold bound). The time
taken by SPIN and PAT-Exp remains constant. This should be credited to the partial order reduction.
The right-bottom chart summarizes the performance our SAT-based verifier in terms of the size of
the generated formula, the time needed for encoding and solving against the number of states of
the model. The estimated number of states increase exponentially whereas the number of Boolean
variables and the time needed increase much slower.
Note that the experimental results presented in this section on FDR can be improved significantly
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with a slightly different modeling, which is subject to FDR’s hierarchical compression [176].
8.5 Summary
In summary, we have developed a way to encode compositional system models without explicitly
exploring all reachable states. Experiment results show that our approach does verification rather
efficiently. Though presented in the framework of CSP#, our encoding of compositional processes
may be applied to other formal specification languages and notations.
In literature, there have been a number of bounded model checkers dedicated to different specifica-
tion languages. Some noticeable ones include the first bounded model checker [34], NuSMV [53]
and UCLID [43]. However, as far as the authors know, there has not yet been a bounded model
checker dedicated to process algebras, which have a compositional nature.
Chapter 9
Verification of Real-time Systems
Ensuring the correctness of computer system used in life-critical systems is crucial and challenge.
This is especially true when the correctness of a real-world system depend on quantitative tim-
ing, e.g., the pacemaker system. Specification and verification of real-time systems are important
research topics which have practical implications.
Recall that the real-time system modeling language proposed in Chapter 3 supports a rich set of
concurrent operators as well as hierarchical timed constructs. It is nontrivial to offer efficient me-
chanical verification support for this modeling language because of the infinite domains of the ra-
tional clock values. In this chapter, we develop a fully automated abstraction technique to build an
abstract finite state machine from the model. The idea is to dynamically create clocks to capture
constraints introduced by the timed process constructs. A clock may be shared for many constructs
in order to reduce the number of clocks. During system exploration, a constraint on the active clocks
is maintained and solved using Difference Bound Matrix (DBM [68]). We show that the abstraction
is finite state and is subject to model checking. Further, it weakly bi-simulates the concrete model
and, therefore, we may perform sound and complete LTL-X (i.e. LTL without the next operator)
model checking, refinement checking or even timed refinement checking upon the abstraction.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.1 presents the zone abstraction
using dynamical clocks. Section 9.2 discusses the soundness of the abstraction and its implication
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on model checking. Section 9.3 presents the verification algorithms for LTL checking, refinement
checking and timed refinement checking. Section 9.4 concludes this chapter.
9.1 Zone Abstraction
Model checking is applicable to finite state systems. Nonetheless, the number of concrete configu-
rations (and hence the concrete transition system) is infinite because of the time transitions. In the
following, we apply zone abstraction to build an abstract configuration system. Different from zone
abstraction applied to Timed Automata [68, 224], we dynamically create/delete a set of clocks to
precisely encode the timing requirements. We show that the abstract transition system is finite state
and subject to model checking.
9.1.1 Clock Activation and De-activation
A clock is a variable ranging from 0 to some bounded natural number. Given a configuration
(V ,P), a clock is necessary to measure time elapsing if, and only if, a timed process (e.g. Wait [d ],
P timeout [d ] Q , P interrupt [d ] Q , or P deadline[d ]) has been enabled. If a timed process (say
Wait [d ]) is enabled, we associate a clock (say tm) with the process to record time elapsing (writ-
ten as Wait [d ]tm ). The timing requirements can be captured using a constraint on the valuation
of the clock. During system execution, multiple clocks may be used to capture quantitative timing
constraints. A clock may become irrelevant as soon as the related process takes a transition. For
instance, if P in P timeout [d ]tm Q engages in an observable event, then the process transforms
to P ′ and clock tm becomes irrelevant. It is known that model checking of real-time systems is
exponential in the number of clocks. Therefore, it is desirable to use clocks only necessary and
discharge them as early as possible.
Definition 31 (Abstract system configuration) An abstract system configuration is a triple (V ,P ,
D), where V is a variable valuation, P is a process and D is a zone.
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A zone is the maximal set of clock valuations satisfying a set of primitive clock constraints. A
primitive constraint on a clock is of the form tm ∼ d where tm is a timer, d is a constant and ∼
is ≥, = or ≤. Since clocks are implicit, clock readings cannot be compared directly. A zone is not
empty if and only if the constraint is true. We write D [t ] to be the constraints on clock t in zone D .
Next, we show how to systematically activate and de-activate clocks using process Wait [d ] and
P timeout [d ] Q as examples. Let t be a fresh clock. Given an abstract configuration, we define
function A(P , t) to recursively determine whether a clock is necessary and associate the clock with
the relevant process constructs. A clock is necessary if and only if one (or more) timed pattern has
just been enabled. For instance,
A(Wait [d ]t ′ , t) = Wait [d ]t ′
A(Wait [d ], t) = Wait [d ]t
where Wait [d ]t ′ denotes that the timed process is associated with a clock t ′, whereas Wait [d ]
denotes that it has not been associated with a clock. The intuition is for the former case, A does
nothing and t is not used (since it is not necessary to introduce another clock); for the latter case, A
associates t the the timer process. The following shows how to apply A to process P timeout [d ] Q .
A(P timeout [d ]t ′ , t) = P timeout [d ]t ′ Q
A(P timeout [d ] Q , t) = A(P) timeout [d ]t A(Q)
If a clock t ′ has already been associated with P timeout [d ] Q , then function A simply returns the
process. Otherwise, it is associated with t and further A is applied to the sub-processes P and
Q recursively. The complete definition of function A is presented in Figure 9.1. In an abuse of
notation, given an abstract configuration c = (V ,P ,D), we write A(c) to be (V ,A(P),D ∧ t =
0) if t is used; otherwise A(c) is simply c.
A runtime clock may later be discarded when the time-related process has evolved such that the
reading of the clock is no longer relevant. For instance, the clock associated with P timeout [d ] Q
can be discarded when P engages in an observable event. It should be clear that we can identify
the set of active runtime clocks by a similar procedure. To minimize clocks, all in-active runtime
clocks, and the associated timing constraints, shall be pruned from D . We assume a function D
which performs clock de-activation in a sound and complete way.
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A(P 2 (or ‖ or |||) Q , t) = A(P , t) 2 (or ‖ or |||) A(Q , t)
A(P ; Q , t) = A(P , t); Q
A(P \X , t) = A(P , t) \X
A(P , t) = A(Q , t) – if P is defined as Q
A(Wait [d ], t) = A(Wait [d ]t )
A(P timeout [d ] Q , t) = A(P , t) timeout [d ]t A(Q , t)
A(P interrupt [d ] Q , t) = A(P , t) interrupt [d ]t A(Q , t)
A(P deadline[d ], t) = A(P , t) deadline[d ]t
Figure 9.1: Clock activation: A(P , t) is P except the above cases
9.1.2 Zone Abstraction
We define D↑ = {t + d | t ∈ D ∧ d ∈ R+}, i.e. the zone obtained by delaying arbitrary amount
of time. Notice that all clocks take the same pace. Next, we define function ι to compute the
zone which can be reached by idling from a given abstract system configuration [224], presented
in Figure 9.2. Given the current zone D , process P timeout [d ]tm Q may keep idling as long as P
may keep idling and the reading of clock tm is less or equal to d (so that timeout does not occur).
The rest are similarly defined.
In the following, we define the firing rules based on the abstract system configurations. The idea
is to eliminate time transitions altogether and use the timing constraint to ensure that the time-
related process constructs behave correctly. An abstract transition is of the form (V ,P ,D) x→֒
(V ′,P ′,D ′), where x ∈ Σ ∪ {X, τ}.
[ ade ]
(V ,Wait [d ]tm ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ,Skip,D↑ ∧ tm = d)
Process Wait(d) idles for exactly d time units and then engages in event τ and the process trans-
forms to Skip. Intuitively, it should be clear that this is ‘equivalent’ to the concrete firing rules (see
Section 3.2.2). We will define what equivalence means later in this section.
(V ,P ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
[ ato1 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ]tm Q ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ′,P ′ timeout [d ]tm Q ,D
′ ∧ tm ≤ d)
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
[ ato2 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ]tm Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′ ∧ tm ≤ d)
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ι(V ,Stop,D) = D↑
ι(V ,Skip,D) = D↑
ι(V , e → P ,D) = D↑
ι(V , [b]P ,D) = D↑
ι(V ,P 2 (or ‖ or |||) Q ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D) ∧ ι(V ,Q ,D)
ι(V ,P ; Q ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D)
ι(V ,P \X ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D)
ι(V ,Wait [d ]tm ,D) = D
↑ ∧ tm ≤ d
ι(V ,P timeout [d ]tm Q ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D) ∧ tm ≤ d
ι(V ,P interrupt [d ]tm Q ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D) ∧ tm ≤ d
ι(V ,P deadline[d ]tm ,D) = ι(V ,P ,D) ∧ tm ≤ d
ι(V ,P ,D) = ι(V ,Q ,D) – if P =̂ Q
Figure 9.2: Idling calculation
[ ato3 ]
(V ,P timeout [d ]tm Q ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ,Q , tm = d ∧ ι(V ,P ,D))
Depending on when the first event of P takes place and whether it is observable, P timeout [d ] Q
behaves differently in three ways. An observable transition of P must occur no later than d time
units since the process is enabled (rule ato1 and ato2). If the first transition is observable, then the
choice is resolved (rule ato2). If it is silent, then the it transforms to P ′ timeout [d ] Q . If P may
delay more than d time units (captured by the constraint ι(V ,P ,D)), then it times out after exactly
d time units (rule ato3). The constraint tm = d ∧ ι(V ,P ,D) means that the delay is exactly d
time units and P must be idling during the period.
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
[ ait1 ]
(V ,P interrupt [d ]tm Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′ interrupt [d ]tm Q ,D
′ ∧ tm ≤ d)
[ ait2 ]
(V ,P interrupt [d ]tm Q ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ,Q , tm = d ∧ ι(V ,P ,D))
Process P interrupt [d ] Q behaves differently in two ways. Transitions of P must take place no
later than d time units since the process is enabled (rule ait1). If P delay more than d time units
(captured by the constraint ι(V ,P ,D)), then it is interrupted after exactly d time units (rule ait2).
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′), x 6= X
[ adl ]
(V ,P deadline[d ]tm ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′ deadline[d ]tm ,D
′ ∧ tm ≤ d)





Figure 9.3: An example of abstract timed transition system
P deadline[d ] behaves exactly as P except that any transition must occur before d time units.
The rest of the firing rules is present in Appendix C. A transition is valid if, and only if, it conforms
to the firing rules and the resultant zone is not empty. Intuitively, this means that a transition must
be allowed by the untimed system and at the same time satisfy the additional timing requirement.
Definition 32 (Abstract transition system) Let S = (Var , init ,P) be a system model. The ab-
stract transition system corresponding to S is a LTS LSa = (Ca , inita , →֒) where Ca is the set of
reachable valid abstract system configurations, inita is the initial configuration (init ,P , true) and
→֒ is the smallest transition relation satisfying ∀ c, c′ : Ca , c e→֒ c′ ⇔ A(c) e→֒ D(c′).
Example 9.1.1 (A simple example) Assume a model (∅,∅,P) with no variable and P is (a →
Wait [5]; b → Stop) interrupt [3] c → Stop. The abstract transition system is shown in Figure 9.3,
where transition label τ is skipped for simplicity. Let 〈t1, t2〉 be a sequence of clocks. The following
illustrates how to construct the abstract transition system. Let s0 be (∅,P , true).
• Step 1: apply A to s0 to get
s1 = (∅, (a →Wait [5]; b → Stop) interrupt [3]t1 c → Stop, t1 = 0)
• Step 2: apply rule ait1 to s1 to get
s2 = (∅, (Wait [5]; b → Stop) interrupt [3]t1 c → Stop, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 3)
Notice that (t1 = 0)↑ equals to t1 ≥ 0.
• Step 3: apply D to s2. The result is exactly s2. We obtain the transition from state 1 to state 2.
• Step 4: apply rule ait2 to s1 to get
s3 = (∅, (c → Stop), t1 ≥ 0 ∧ t1 = 3)
Notice that ι(∅, a →Wait [5]; b → Stop, t1 = 0) is t1 ≥ 0.
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• Step 5: apply D to s3 to get s4 = (∅, (c → Stop), true). We remark that because t1 becomes
inactive, it is pruned from the constraint. This generates the transition from state 1 to state 3.
• Step 6: apply A to s2 to get
s5 = (∅, (Wait [5]t2 ; b → Stop) interrupt [3]t1 c → Stop, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 3 ∧ t2 = 0)
• Step 7: apply rule ait1 to s5, we get
s6 = (∅, (Skip; b → Stop) interrupt [3]t1 c → Stop, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 3 ∧ t2 = 5)
Notice that the timing constraint is false given that all timers take the same pace. Refer to
next section on how this is discovered systematically.
• Step 8: apply rule ait2 to s5 to get
s7 = (∅, c → Stop, t1 ≥ 0 ∧ t2 ≥ 0 ∧ t2 ≤ 5 ∧ t1 = 3)
• Step 9: apply D to s7 to get s4. Notice that both clocks are inactive and therefore pruned.
This generates the transition from state 2 to state 3.




In order to construct and verify the abstract transition system, we need efficient and sound proce-
dures to manipulate zones. For instance, we need to determine whether a zone is empty or not. The
procedure must be sound (so that invalid configurations are ruled out) and complete (so that a valid
configuration is not missed).
A zone D can be equally represented as a difference bound matrices (DBM). Let {t1, t2, · · · , tn}
be a set of n clocks. Let t0 be a dummy clock whose value is always 0. A DBM representing a
constraint on the clocks contains n+1 rows, each of which contains n+1 elements. LetD ij represent
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entry (i , j ) in the matrix. A DBM represents the constraint: ∀ i : 0 . . n, ∀ j : 0 . . n, ti − tj ≤ D ij .
The most important property of DBM is that there is a relatively efficient procedure to compute a
unique canonical form. Given a DBM in canonical form, checking whether the zone is empty or
not is as easy as looking up an entry in the matrix. DBM has been well studied [68, 29, 30]. In the
following, we introduce the relevant DBM operations/properties. We skip the discussion on rest of
the zone operations (e.g. D↑, adding a constraint, etc.) as they resemble the discussion in [30].
Calculate canonical form In theory, there are infinite different timing constraints which represent
the zone. For instance, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 3 ∧ 0 ≤ t1 − t2 ≤ 3 is equivalent to 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 3 ∧ 0 ≤ t1 − t2 ≤
3 ∧ t2 ≤ 1000. In order to systematically compare two zones, we compute their unique canonical
forms. In other words, we compute the tightest bound on each clock difference. If the clocks are
viewed as vertices in a weighted graph and the clock difference as the label on the edge connecting
two clocks, the tightest clock difference is the shortest path between the respective vertices. The
Floyd-Warshall algorithm [90] thus can be used to compute the canonical from. Given that this
algorithm is cubic in the number of clocks, it is desirable to reduce the number of clocks. Besides,
the algorithm must be invoked if necessary and ideally (if possible) the result of performing an
operation on a canonical DBM should be canonical.
Check satisfiability In order to construct the abstract transition system, it is essential to check
whether a zone is empty. Given the DBM representing a zone, it is unsatisfiable if, and only if,
there is a clock which has a negative difference from itself, i.e. tk − tk < 0 for some k so that
the constraint is false. If the DBM is in canonical form, then there exists at least one D ii which is
negative. Further, it can be shown that the DBM is false if, and only if, D00 is negative. Therefore,
we compute the canonical form whenever it is necessary to check for satisfiability.
Add clocks In our setting, clocks may be introduced during system exploration. Assume the new
clock is tk and the given DBM is canonical. The following shows how the DBM is updated with
entries for tk . For all i , D ik = D i0 and Dki = D0i as the new clock always starts with value 0. By a
simple argument, it can be shown the resultant DBM is canonical.
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t0 t1 · · · ti · · · tk−1 tk
t0 0 d
0
1 · · · d
0





0 ∗ · · · * · · · * d
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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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i
0 ∗ · · · ∗ · · · ∗ d
i
0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
tk−1 d
k−1






· · · d0
i
· · · d0
k−1 0
Prune clocks Because entries in a canonical DBM represent the tightest bound on clock differ-
ences, pruning clocks is to remove the relevant row and column in the table. It should be clear that
the remaining DBM is canonical, i.e. the bounds can not be possibly tightened with less constraints.
Notice that the number of reachable timing constraints in canonical form are finite as proved in [68].
As a result, the abstraction system is finite state and therefore subject to model checking1.
Example 9.1.2 (DBM manipulation example) The following illustrates how the DBM is trans-
formed through system exploration in Example 9.1.1.
The DBM obtained after Step 7 is indeed false, i.e. D00 is −2 after applying the Floyd-Warshall
algorithm. end
1assume that the variable domains are finite and the reachable process expressions are finite.
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9.2 Verification of Real-time Systems
In this section, we prove that our abstraction is sound and complete with respect to a number of
properties. The abstract transition system is shown to be equivalent to the concrete transition sys-
tem using a specialized bi-simulation relationship [136]. We then show that three different system
verification methods are sound.
In the concrete transition system, if a configuration (V ′,P ′) can be reached from (V ,P) by idling
only, we write (V ,P)  (V ′,P ′). By a simple argument, it can be shown that if (V ,P)  
(V ′,P ′), then V = V ′. We write (V ,P) x (V ′,P ′) if, and only if, there exists (V ,P1), (V ′,P2)
such that (V ,P) (V ,P1) and (V ,P1)
x
→ (V ′,P2) and (V ′,P2) (V ′,P ′).
Definition 33 (Time abstract bi-simulation) Let S = (Var , init ,P) be a model. Let LSc =
(Cc , initc ,→) and LSa = (Ca , inita , →֒) be the concrete and abstract transition systems. Lc and
La are time abstract bi-similar (hereafter bi-similar) if, and only if, there exists a binary relation
R : Cc → Ca such that (initc, inita) ∈ R and ∀ x : Σ ∪ {X, τ}; c = (Vc,Pc); a = (Va ,Pa ,Da)
such that (c, a) ∈ R implies,
• Vc = Va ,
• if c x c′, then for some a ′, a x→֒ a ′ and (c′, a ′) ∈ R.
• if a x→֒ a ′, then for some c′, c x c′ and (c′, a ′) ∈ R.
We say that c and a are bi-similar, written as c ∼ a, if, and only if, there exists R such that the
transition systems are bi-similar. Notice that Lc and La are bi-similar if, and only if, initc ∼ inita .
Theorem 9.2.1 Let S = (Var , init ,P) be a system model. LSc and LSa are time abstract bi-similar.
Proof: Let S = (Var , i ,P) be the model; Lc and La be the concrete and abstract transition system
respectively. By definition, it suffices to construct a binary relation which satisfies the condition.
The theorem is proved by structural induction on the all types of process expressions. The following
are the base cases.
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• Stop: R = {(i ,Stop) 7→ (i ,Stop, true)}. Trivially true.
• Skip: R = {(i ,Skip) 7→ (i ,Skip, true), (i ,Stop) 7→ (init ,Stop, true)}. Trivially true.
• Wait [d ]: R = {(i ,Wait [d ]) 7→ (i ,Wait [d ], true), (i ,Skip) 7→ (i ,Skip, true),
(i ,Stop) 7→ (i ,Stop, true)}. The transition (i ,Wait [d ]) τ (i ,Skip) of Lc corresponds
to the transition (i ,Waid [d ], true) τ→֒ (i ,Skip, true). Notice that the clock introduced by
function A would be pruned by D. The rest is trivial.
Next, we prove the induction step.
• e{prg} → P : (i , e{prg} → P) and (i , e{prg} → P , true) are bi-similar since (i , e{prg}
→ P)
e
 (prg(i),P) (by rule as1 and as2) and (i , e{prg} → P , true) e→֒ (prg(i),P , true)
(by rule aev ), and (prg(i),P) ∼ (prg(i),P , true) (by hypothesis).
• [b]P : if i  b, then [b]P behaves exactly as P (rule gu2 and rule agu), hence by hypothesis,
(i , [b]P) ∼ (i , [b]P , true). If i 6 b, then [b]P behaves exactly as Stop (rule gu1 and no
abstract firing rule), hence (i , [b]P) ∼ (i , [b]P , true).
• P 2 Q : P 2 Q behaves either as P or Q , in both cases, by hypothesis (i ,P 2 Q) ∼
(i ,P 2 Q , true).
• P ⊓ Q . Similarly as above.
• P ‖ Q : there is one-to-one correspondence on the concrete firing rules (rule pa1, pa2 and
pa3) and the abstract firing rules ((rule apa1, apa2 and apa3)). It is clear that by hypothesis
(i ,P ‖ Q) ∼ (i ,P ‖ Q , true).
• P ||| Q . Similarly as above.
• P ; Q . Similarly as above.
• P timeout [d ] Q : let the associated clock be tm. We show that each abstract transition is
possible if and only if there is a corresponding concrete transition (i ,P)  (i ′,P ′). Rule
ato1 is applicable if and only if tm ≤ d and (i ,P ,D) may perform a τ -transition. By
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hypothesis, (i ,P ,D) may perform a τ -transition if and only if (i ,P) does. By rule to2, to3
and to4, a τ of P may happen if and only if tm ≤ d . Therefore, we conclude rule ato1 is
applicable if and only if there is a corresponding concrete transition. Similarly, we argue that
rule ato2 and ato3 are applicable if and only if there is a corresponding concrete transition.
This concludes that (i ,P timeout [d ] Q) ∼ (i ,P timeout Q , true).
• P interrupt [d ] Q : Similarly as above.
• P waituntil [d ]: rule awu1 is applicable if and only if x is not X or (V ,P ,D) is capable of
performing x . By hypothesis, (V ,P) must be able to perform x . Rule awu2 is applicable if
and only if tm ≥ d , this is implied by rule wu3 and hypothesis (and vice versa). Lastly, rule
awu3 is implied by rule wu2 and wu4.
• Similarly as above.
2
By definition, it suffices to construct a binary relation which satisfies the condition. Time abstract bi-
simulation is strong enough to guarantee soundness on verification of a number of useful properties.
9.2.1 LTL-X Model Checking
In this section, we study the verification of LTL formulae (see Section 2.3.2) without the next oper-
ator (i.e. LTL-X), constituted by propositions on global variables. Notice that no clocks are allowed
in the property. The philosophy is that a critical property may often be independent of the speed
of the hardware on which the system is deployed, whereas the model of the implementation shall
incorporate known hardware limitations.
Example 9.2.2 Given the Fischer’s algorithm in Section 3.2.3, the following are some critical prop-
erties.
2
ct ≤ 1 – safety property
2
(x = i ⇒
3
cs.i) – liveness property





read as ‘always’ and ‘eventually’. The first property precisely states mutual exclu-
sion, i.e., at all time, there must not be 2 or more processes in the critical section. The second states
that if process i is attempting to access the shared resource, it must eventually do so. end
In order to reflect model checking results on the abstract transition system to the original system,
we need to establish that the abstract transition system is equivalent to the concrete one with respect
to LTL-X formulae. The idea is to show stutter equivalence between traces of the abstract system
and the concrete system. Given two traces tr1 = 〈V0,V1, · · ·〉 and tr2 = 〈V ′0,V ′1, · · ·〉, tr1 and tr2
are stutter equivalent if, and only if, tr1 and tr2 can be partitioned into blocks, so that the variable
valuation in the k -th block in tr1 is the same as those in the k -th block of tr2. Formally, tr1 is stutter
equivalent to tr2 if, and only if, there are two infinite sequences of integers 0 < i0 < i1 < · · · and





= · · · = V ′sjk+1−1
. It is known that tr1 satisfies a LTL-X property if, and only if, tr2 does.
Let φ be such a property, we write L ⊢ φ to denote that the labeled transition system L satisfies φ,
i.e. every trace of L satisfies φ.
Lemma 9.2.3 Let S = (Var , initG ,P) be a system model. For every trace of the concrete tran-
sition system Lc , there is a stutter equivalent trace of the abstract transition system La and vice
versa.
The above lemma can be proved by structural induction or implied from Theorem 9.2.1. Conse-
quently, the following theorem can be proved straightforwardly.
Theorem 9.2.4 Let S = (Var , initG ,P) be a system model. Let φ be a LTL-X formula constituted
by propositions on Var . LSc  φ if, and only if, LSa  φ.
9.2.2 Refinement Checking
In this section, we investigate an alternative verification schema for finite system executions. That
is, to verify whether the system satisfies the property by showing a refinement relationship between
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the system and a model which models the property. Chapter 6 presents a variety of refinement rela-
tionships, e.g. trace-refinement, stable failures refinement and failures/divergence refinement [108].
In order to check refinement between two (timed) models, time abstraction must be applied to both
models.
Example 9.2.5 Given the Fischer’s algorithm in Section 3.2.3, a natural question is whether ǫ and
δ are necessary or their values would make a difference. Equivalently, the former is to ask whether
(init , uProcotol) where init = {x 7→ −1, ct 7→ 0} and uProcotol defined as follows, trace-refines
the original one (init ,Procotol).
uProc(i) = [x == −1]uActive(i);
uActive(i) = update.i{x = i} →
if (x == i) {




uProtocol = uProc(0) ‖ uProc(1) ‖ uProc(2);
By showing trace refinement in both directions, we may establish trace equivalence. Or, the users
may change the value of ǫ and δ check for equivalence. end
We have defined refinement and equivalence relations between two concrete models in Definition 22
in Section 6.1. In the following, we argue that it is sound and complete to show stable failures re-
finement (i.e. assuming both models are divergence-free) between the abstraction transition systems
in order to show failures refinement between the concrete models.
Theorem 9.2.6 Let Si where i ∈ {1, 2} be two models. S1 refines S2 in stable failures semantics
iff traces(LS1a ) ⊆ traces(LS2a ) and failures(LS1a ) ⊆ failures(LS2a ).
By Theorem 9.2.1, it should be clear that our abstraction preserves failures. Intuitively, this is
because not only observable transitions but also τ -transitions are preserved by the abstraction. The
theorem can then be proved straightforwardly. We remark that it is clear the failures refinement
subsumes trace-refinement and, therefore, it too can be supported by only checking the abstract
transition systems.
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9.2.3 Timed Refinement Checking
We have looked at the refinement checking without the consideration of timed transitions. To in-
clude timed transitions, we need to include the time stamps in the traces.
We assume a global clock tG which starts (with reading 0) whenever the system starts. We equip a
system configuration (V ,P) withe a clock value t , written as (V ,P)t where t is the current reading
of tG . The changes of t in the firing rules presented in Section 3.2.2 can be calculated easily by
adding the elapsed time in the transition. Assume that ǫ ∈ R+ is a real number denoting the event
of time elapsing. Given a transition (V ,P)t → (V ′,P ′)t ′ , we have t ′ = t + ǫ in rule de1, to3, it2
and de2, and t ′ = t in rest rules.
A timed event is an event associated with a time stamp, written as x@t where t is the reading of
tG when x occurs, i.e. a timestamp. A run of a model S = (Var , initG ,P) is a finite sequence of
alternating configurations and timed events, i.e.
〈(V0,P0)t0, x1@t1, (V1,P1)t1 , x2@t2, · · · , xn@tn , (Vn ,Pn)tn 〉
such that V0 = initG , P0 = P , t0 = 0 and (Vi ,Pi )ti
xi+1
→ (Vi+1,Pi+1)ti+1 for all i . An execution
of S is a finite sequence of timed events 〈x1@t1, x2@t2, · · · , xn@tn〉 such that there exists a corre-
sponding run 〈(V0,P0)t0 , x1@t1, · · · , xn@tn , (Vn ,Pn)tn 〉. Given an execution E , let E ↾X where
X is a set of event names be the sequence generated by removing events with a name in X from
the sequence. E is divergent if and only if E can be extended with infinite τ -events and possibly
ǫ-events. E is timed divergent if and only if E can be extended with infinite ǫ-events and τ -events.
A model is (timed) divergence-free if and only it contains no (timed) divergent executions.
Example 9.2.7 The following illustrates a model which is not timed divergence-free. Assume there
are no variables and the process is defined as follows: P = Wait [5]; P . The empty execution is
timed divergent since it can be extended with the sequence 〈5, τ, 5, τ, · · ·〉. end
A sequence of observable timed events tr is a trace of S if and only if there exists an execution E
such that tr = E ↾ R+ ↾ {τ}. Let traces(S) denote the set of all traces of model S . Let I and S
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be two system models. I trace-refines S , written as I ⊒T S , if and only if traces(I) ⊆ traces(S).
A timed safety property can be proved by showing a timed trace refinement relationship from an
implementation to a hand-crafted specification which captures the property.
Example 9.2.8 Assume a model I which contains two events start and end . Further, the property
is that end must occur within 5 seconds since start occurs. In order to show the I satisfies the
property, we can show that I refines (in timed traces semantics) the following specification: S =
start → (end → S) within[5]. end
An abstract timed event is written as e@D , which denotes that e may occur at any time point in
D . An execution of LSa is a finite sequence of abstract timed events 〈e0@D0, e1@D1, · · · , en@Dn〉
such that ci
ei→a ci+1 and ci = (Vi ,Pi ,Di ) for all i and c0 = inita .
Because a clock is associated with a process construct and we assume the reachable process expres-
sions are finite, only finitely many runtime clocks are necessary at the same time. Further, because
there exists a clock ceiling for all runtime clocks, we can apply zone normalization [30] on runtime
clocks so that there are finitely many zones with respects to runtime clocks only (i.e. excluding tG
from each zone).
Theorem 9.2.9 Let S = (Var , initG ,P) be a model. 〈a1@t1, a2@t2, · · · , an@tn〉 is a trace of S
if and only if there exists a trace of LSa , 〈a1@D1, a2@D2, · · · , an@Dn〉, such that ti ∈ Di [tG ] for
all i .
In the theorem above, ti ∈ Di [tG ] means that value tG = ti is a solution of the constraint repre-
sented by Di [tG ]. The theorem states that abstraction is sound and complete with respect to timed
traces semantics. We prove this theorem using the following auxiliary theorem, which subsumes
Theorem 9.2.9. Theorem 9.2.10 states that not only observable timed event sequences but all timed
event sequences are preserved.
Theorem 9.2.10 Let S = (Var , init ,P) be a model. 〈e1@t1, e2@t2, · · · , en@tn〉 is an execution
of S if and only if there exists an execution of LSa , 〈e1@D1, e2@D2, · · · , en@Dn〉, such that ti ∈
Di [tG ] for all i ,.
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Proof: The theorem is proved by structural induction, on process expression types. The base cases
are that P is Stop or Wait [d ]. Notice that Skip = X→ Stop. The base cases are straightforward.
Assume that P is enabled at time t0, the clock associated with P is t , the current valuation is V and
the current zone isD . The following proves the induction step for the case that P isP timeout [d ]Q .
• only-if: There are three cases according to rule to1 to to4. If e1 is a τ event generated by
rule to2, we get t1 − t0 ≤ d (since rule to3 is applicable only when d is positive). By
hypothesis, let e1@D ′1 be the abstract timed event generated by rule ato1. Since t1 ∈ D ′1[tG ]
(by hypothesis) and t ≤ d (by t1 − t0 ≤ d), we conclude that t1 ∈ D1[tG ]. The same
argument applied to the case where e1 is an observable event generated by rule to1. If e1 is
a τ event generated by rule to4, then t1 − t0 = d . Let e1@D ′1 be the abstract timed event
generated by rule ato3. Since t1 ∈ D ′1[tG ] (by hypothesis) and t = d (since t1 − t0 = d), we
conclude that t1 ∈ D1[tG ]. Therefore, we prove the only-if part.
• if: There are three cases according to rule ato1 to ato3. If e1@D1 is generated by rule ato1,
D1[tG ] ⇒ t ≤ d . Let e1@D ′ be the abstract timed event generated by P . By hypothesis,
there exists e1@t1, a timed event generated by P such that t1 ∈ D ′. By rule to1 and to2, t ′1
satisfies t ′1 ≤ d , and hence t1 ∈ D1[tG ]. Similarly, we prove the other cases.
By similar argument on each and every types of process expression, we prove that the theorem
holds. Further, it is straightforward to conclude that Theorem 9.2.9 holds given the above theorem.
2
By Theorem 9.2.9, given two models I and S , it is sufficient to show that LIa trace-refines LSa in
order to verify that I trace-refines S . Nonetheless, because the reading of tG is unbounded, LSa and
LIa have infinite number of states2. In this section, we show how to overcome this problem.
Normalization To verify that LIa trace-refines LSa , we need to normalize (or equivalently deter-
minize) LSa . Unlike normalization Timed Automata (which is infeasible [10]), normalization in
2Zone normalization on tG does not work.
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this setting follows the standard subset construction. A state of the normalized transition system
(referred as normalized state) is a subset of states which are connected by τ -transitions. The in-
tuition is that given a trace only one normalized state is reached. Given an abstract configuration
ca , let τ∗(ca) is the set of abstraction configurations which can be reached from ca via 0 or more
τ -transitions in →֒.
Definition 34 Let S = (Var , initG ,P) be a model; LSa = (Ca , inita , →֒) be the abstract tran-
sition system. The normalized abstract transition system is (Cn , initn , →֒n) where Cn is a set of
normalized states, initn = τ∗(inita) and →֒n is a labeled transition relation satisfying the follow-
ing condition: P e→֒n Q if and only if Q = {ca : Ca | ∃ c1 : P , c1 e→֒ c′2 ∧ ca ∈ τ∗(c′2)}.
We define the traces based on the normalized transition system in the standard way. It can be
shown that the above normalization is timed trace preserving. We remark that normalization is not a
pre-request for our refinement checking algorithm, instead the normalized transition system is con-
structed on-the-fly. Figure 9.3 in Example 9.1.1 illustrates how the transition system is normalized
using dotted ellipses. The initial normalized state contains state 1 and 3 (since state 3 can be reached
from state 1 via a τ -transition).
A refinement checking algorithm (e.g. the one for un-timed refinement checking in the FDR refine-
ment checker [178]) works by normalizing LSa and then comparing states of LIa with the normalized
states. It reports a counterexample if and only if a state of LIa enables more than the normalized
state of S (which is reached via the same trace) does. The following defines what is enabled in the
timed setting.
Given an abstract configuration, the set of enabled events is a set of abstract timed events. That is,
enabled(c) is a set of pairs (a,D [tG ]) such that a is an observable event and D is a zone which tells
when a is enabled, i.e. there exists an abstract configuration (V ,P ,D) such that c a→֒ (V ,P ,D).
Notice that only reading of tG is interested. Multiple abstract timed events with the same event name
may be present in enabled(c). In the following, we assume that abstract timed events with the same
event are always grouped together in a set of abstract timed events, by applying the following rule:
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{· · · , e@D1[tG ], e@D2[tG ], · · ·} = {· · · , e@D1[tG ] ∪ D2[tG ], · · ·}3. Given two sets of abstract
timed events E1 and E2, E1 ⊆ E2 if and only if for all e@D in E1, there exists e@D ′ in E2 such
that D ⊆ D ′. Given a normalized state cn , we write enabled(cn ) to mean the set {x | ∃ ca :
cn . x ∈ enabled(ca)}. Similarly, we assume that abstract timed events with the same event are
grouped together.
The algorithm Let I and S be two system models. Let the corresponding abstract transition systems
be LIa = (C Ia , initIa , →֒I) and LSa = (C Sa , initSa , →֒S) respectively. Further, let (C Sn , initSn , →֒Sn )
be the normalized transition system of LSa . In an abuse of notations, given an abstraction config-
uration ca = (V ,P ,D), we write ca [t := 0] to mean (V ,P ,D ′) where D ′ = Dt :=0, i.e. the
configuration with clock t being reset.
The algorithm presented in Figure 9.4 verifies whether I refines S . The idea is to construct the
synchronous product of LIa and LSn on-the-fly whilst searching for a state-pair (i , sn ) : C Ia × C Sn
of the product such that i enables more events than sn does. The algorithm is inspired by the one
used in FDR and follows its soundness/completeness argument. In order to guarantee termination,
the reading of tG must be bounded. This is achieved by resetting tG when synchronizing I and S .
Notice that tG is never pruned during the clock de-activation.
As in standard reachability testing, two data structures are maintained, i.e. a stack named working
to store all reachable state-pairs which are yet to be explored and a set named visited to record
all visited state-pairs. At line 2, the initial state of the product is pushed into the working stack.
If there is a state-pair (i , sn) yet to explored (so that the condition at line 5 is satisfied), and if i
enables more events than sn (i.e. satisfying the condition at line 7), the algorithm returns false (and
reports a counterexample). Otherwise, we generate state-pairs from (i , sn ) and push them into stack
working . Notice that if i ′ can be reached from i by a τ -transition in LIa , then (i ′, sn ) is a state of
the product. We remark that all visible events must be engaged synchronously by LIa and LSa . That
is, if i ′ can be reached from i by a and s ′n can be reached from sn by a, then (i ′, s ′n) is a state of the
product. Further, clock tG is reset whenever a visible event is synchronously engaged (line 14 and
3DBM is not closed under union. Nonetheless, it does not matter here.
9.2. VERIFICATION OF REAL-TIME SYSTEMS 188
procedure refines(I,S)
1. Stack working := 〈〉; Set visited := ∅;
2. working .push(initIa , init
S
n );
3. while working 6= 〈〉
4. (i , sn ) := working .pop();
5. if (i , sn) 6∈ visited
6. visited := visited ∪ (i , sn);
7. if enabled(i) 6⊆ enabled(sn )
8. return false;
9. endif
10. foreach i ′ s.t. (i , τ, i ′) ∈→֒I
11. working .push(i ′, sn );
12. endfor
13. foreach a, i ′ s.t. (i , a, i ′) ∈→֒I
14. foreach s ′n s.t. s ′n = {x [tG := 0] | ∃ c : sn . (c, a, x ) ∈→֒S}







Figure 9.4: Algorithm: refines(Impl ,Spec)
15). The soundness of the algorithm is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 9.2.11 Let I and S be two models. Algorithm refines(I,S) returns true if and only if I
refines S . It terminates if both are I and S are timed divergent-free.
Proof: The theorem has two parts. The first is that the result is sound. The second is that the
algorithm terminates under some condition.
Partial correctness If we never reset TG , algorithm refine resembles the refinement checking al-
gorithm used in FDR, then the theorem follows the soundness and completeness argument pre-
sented in [176]. Next, we argue that resetting tG as in the algorithm is sound and complete
as follows. I does not refine S if and only if there exists tr = 〈a1@t1, a2@t2, · · ·〉 such that
tr ∈ traces(I) ∧ tr 6∈ traces(S). Let tr i be the prefix of tr , i.e., tr i = 〈a1@t1, · · · , ai@ti〉 . By
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a simple argument, it can be shown that I does not refine S if and only if there exists i such that
tr i a 〈ai+1@ti+1〉 is a trace of I but not S . Next, we prove the theorem using an induction on i .
• Base case: if i = 0, no resetting of tG is necessary, we conclude the theorem holds.
• Induction step: Assume that tr i ∈ traces(I) ∧ tr i ∈ traces(S) and there exists ai+1@ti+1
such that tr i a 〈ai+1@ti+1〉 is a trace of I but not S . Now, assume tG starts with −ti . There
exists ai+1@ti+1 − ti such that tr i a 〈ai+1@ti+1 − ti〉 is a trace of I but not S , where
ti+1 − ti is the reading of tG after resetting at step i . This justifies that resetting tG is sound
and complete.
Terminating By assumption, all variables have finite domains and there are only finite process
expressions, and therefore, it remains to show that the number of zones are finite. Further by as-
sumption, both I and S are timed divergent-free, this implies that through τ -transitions only, there
are only finitely many partitioned on tG ’s reading. Because we reset tG every time an observable
event is engaged, we have only finitely many zones since all run-time clocks are bounded (and have
finitely partitions since only integers are allowed as time constants). 2
Notice that in order to guarantee that the algorithm can terminate, both I and S must be timed
divergence-free. This assumption is reasonable for two reasons. Firstly, it is relatively straight-
forward to check whether a model is timed divergent-free or not. A simple approach is to apply
zone abstraction without using the global clock tG . Assume the abstract transition system is La .
The model is timed divergence-free if and only if La does not contain a loop which contains only
τ -transitions and time elapsing. Existence of such a loop can be checked using well-studied algo-
rithms like nested Depth-First-Search or Tarjan’s algorithm for strongly connected components4 .
Secondly, without explicit hiding, a model which is not timed divergence-free is often problem-
atic. Furthermore, timed divergence due to hiding of observable events can be avoided by carefully
crafting the specification model. This is illustrated in the next section using a pacemaker case study.
4The latter has been implemented in PAT.
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Model Size Property States/Transitions PAT (sec.)
Fischer 4
2
ct ≤ 1 3452/8305 0.22
Fischer 5
2
ct ≤ 1 26496/73628 2.49
Fischer 6
2
ct ≤ 1 207856/654776 27.7
Fischer 7
2
ct ≤ 1 1620194/5725100 303
Fischer 4
2
(x = i ⇒
3
cs .i) 5835/16776 0.53
Fischer 5
2
(x = i ⇒
3
cs .i) 49907/169081 5.83
Fischer 6
2
(x = i ⇒
3
cs .i) 384763/1502480 70.5
Fischer 4 Protocol refines uProtocol 7741/18616 5.22
Fischer 5 Protocol refines uProtocol 72140/201292 126.3
Fischer 6 Protocol refines uProtocol 705171/2237880 3146
Railway Control 5 deadlock-free 4551/6115 0.42
Railway Control 6 deadlock-free 27787/37482 3.07
Railway Control 7 deadlock-free 195259/263641 24.2
















Table 9.1: Experiment results of LTL and refinement checking
9.3 Experiments
The techniques presented in this chapter have been implemented in PAT. We separate the experi-
ments on LTL and refinement checking with timed refinement checking. The data are obtained with
Intel Core 2 Quad 9550 CPU at 2.83GHz and 2GB memory.
LTL and Refinement Checking
In the following, we present the experiment results on two benchmark models. Table 9.1 shows the
experiment results on the Fischer’s mutual exclusion algorithm and a railway control system [224].
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In both examples, PAT performs reasonably well. It handles 107 states/transition in a few hours,
which is comparable to existing model checkers [111, 179]. Further, a simple experiment shows
that the computational overhead of calculating clocks/DBMs is around one third of the overall time.
The data on UPPAAL [135] or RED [217] verifying the same models has been omitted from the
table. Because UPPAAL and PAT are based on a different modeling language, the results must be
taken with a grain of salt. The state graph generated from a PAT model may contain unnecessary
τ -transitions introduced by the compositional process constructs, e.g. the τ in rule ato3. In hand-
crafted UPPAAL models, however, the τ -transitions may be removed by carefully manipulating the
clock guards and grouping clock guards and events on the same transition. In such a setting, verifi-
cation of the UPPAAL is faster (by a factor related to the number of such τ -transitions). However,
our experiment show that if we manually construct a PAT model and a UPPAAL model with the
same state graph, then PAT and UPPAAL have a similar performance.
Timed Refinement Checking
The refinement checking algorithm is computationally complex, specially when the specification
model is highly non-deterministic (i.e. normalization is EXP-time). In this section, we show that
our approach is still practically useful.
Case study A pacemaker is an electronic implanted device which functions to regulate the heart beat
by electrically stimulating the heart to contract and thus to pump blood throughout the body. Quan-
titative timing is crucial to pacemaker. Common pacemakers are designed to correct bradycardia,
i.e. slow heart beats. A pacemaker mainly performs two functions, i.e. pacing and sensing. Sensing
is to monitor the heart’s natural electrical activity, helping the pacemaker to gather information on
the heart beats and react accordingly. Pacing is when a pacemaker sends electrical stimuli, i.e. tiny
electrical signals, to heart through a pacing lead, which start a heartbeat. A model of the pace-
maker is of the following form: Heart ‖ Sensing ‖ Pacing where process Heart models normal
or abnormal heart condition; process Sensing and Pacing model the two functions. A pacemaker
can operate in many different modes, according to the implanted patient’s heart problem. All three
components above may be different in different modes. For instance, the following models one of
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the simple models, namely the AAT mode.
AAT = Heart || Sensing || Pacing(LRI )
Sensing = if (SA == 1){atomic{pulseA→ senseA→ Skip}; Sensing}
else {pulseA→ Sensing};
Pacing(X ) = (atomic{senseA→ paceA{SA = 0} → Skip}
timeout [X ] (paceA{SA = 0} → Skip) within[0]); Wait [URI ];
(enableSA{SA = 1} → Pacing(LRI − URI )) within[0];
where URI and LRI are constants representing upper rate interval (i.e. the fastest a normal heart
can beat) and lower rate interval (i.e. the slowest a normal heart can beat). Process heart generates
two events pluseA (i.e. atrial does a pulse) and pluseV (i.e. ventral does a pulse), periodically for
a normal heart or within one of them missing once a while for an abnormal heart. Process Sensing
synchronizes with heart on pluseA and engages in event senseA immediately. Process atomic{P},
once started, continues to execute without interleaving until blocked. SA is flag telling whether it
is necessary to monitor atria (1 for necessary). Process Pacing synchronizes with Sensing on
event senseA and paces a heart (captured by event paceA) if a heart pace is missing (captured by
timeout). We skip the details here. Interested readers can refer to [28].
We model all 16 different modes and verify that the pacemaker satisfies multiple specification. An
essential property is that the pacemaker must restore normal heart condition, which can be modeled
by the following process.
Spec = paceA→ Started
Started = (paceA→ Started) within[URI ,LRI ]
where P within[m,n] requires that P must react within m to n time units. Intuitively, Spec means
that following one paceA, the next paceA must occur within URI to LRI time units. Because
the specification only concerns event paceA, other events must be ignored. One solution is to
hide the rest of the events using the hiding operator. For instance, we may verify that AAT \
{pulseA, senseA, enableSA} refines Spec in order to show that the pacemaker satisfies the property.
In general, hiding events may introduce timed divergent traces, which then makes the refinement
checking algorithm non-terminating5 . An alternative way is to verify AAT refines Spec ||| Dummy
5Also the maximal progress assumption on hidden events may change system behaviors.
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Model Size Property States/Transitions Result Time (s)
Pacemaker - deadlock-free 302442/2405850 true 92.1
Pacemaker - correctness 986342/2608226 true 122
Fischer 4 mutual exclusion 9941/34244 true 0.78
Fischer 5 mutual exclusion 141963/599315 true 17.2
Fischer 6 mutual exclusion 2144610/10795380 true 401
Fischer 6 bounded bypass 2429/8065 false 0.36
Fischer 7 bounded bypass 9213/34611 false 1.47
Fischer 8 bounded bypass 32785/137417 false 6.16
Fischer 9 bounded bypass 91665/425966 false 21.1
Fischer 10 bounded bypass 300129/1542020 false 79.8
Fischer 11 bounded bypass 693606/3880577 false 214
Railway Control 4 bounded waiting 918/1359 true 0.45
Railway Control 5 bounded waiting 4764/7199 true 3.21
Railway Control 6 bounded waiting 28782/43795 true 26.2
Railway Control 7 bounded waiting 201444/307071 true 238
Table 9.2: Experiment results of timed refinement checking
where process dummy is defined as follows.
Dummy = pulseA→ Dummy 2 senseA→ Dummy 2 enableSA→ Dummy
As a result, Dummy will synchronize the irrelevant observable events with AAT . By a simple
argument, it can be shown that this is sound and complete.
Table 9.2 summarizes part of our experiments on demonstrating the scalability of our method using
the pacemaker system and benchmark systems. The pacemaker contains little concurrency and
hence is verified efficiently. Using refinement relationship, we can encode a variety of different
properties [178], including mutual exclusion, bounded by-pass, etc. The experiment on Fischer’s
mutual exclusion algorithm shows that PAT finds a counterexample efficiently. It is time consuming
if a system contains multiple parallel processes and the property is true. Nonetheless, PAT handle
107 states in a few hours which is comparable to model checkers like SPIN and UPPAAL.
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9.4 Summary
In this chapter, we studied model checking of hierarchical real-time systems. Based on the real-time
modeling language proposed in Section 3.2, we developed a fully automated abstraction technique
to build an abstract finite state machine from the real-time model. We showed that the abstraction
has finite state and is subject to model checking. Further, it weakly bi-simulates the concrete model
and, therefore, we may perform sound and complete LTL-X model checking, refinement checking
and even timed refinement checking upon the abstraction.
This chapter is related to verification of real-time systems. Verification support has been devel-
oped for hierarchical specification based on process algebras (e.g. the algebra of timed processes
ATP [187, 159], CCS + real-time [223], Timed CSP [183], etc). A preliminary PVS encoding of
Timed CSP was presented in [40], which rely heavily on user interactions. In [224], a constraint
solving method was proposed to verify CCS + real time. Several model checkers have been devel-
oped with Timed Automata [10] being the core of their input languages [135, 35, 207]. The zone
abstraction is closely related to works presented in [224]. The difference is that we use implicit
clocks and support the hierarchical specification. The soundness discussion of our abstraction is
inspired by [136]. There are few verification support for Timed CSP, e.g. the theorem proving ap-
proach documented in [40, 101], the translation to UPPAAL models [70, 71] and the approach based
on constraint solving [72]. The PAT model checker is the first dedicated verification tool support for
Timed CSP models. In addition, PAT complements UPPAAL with the ability to check full LTL-X
property and check refinement relationship.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few tool support for timed refinement checking. One of the
reasons is that Timed Automata, which extended Büchi Automata with clocks [10], is designed to
capture infinite languages. The refinement checking problem is undecidable in the setting of Timed
Automata, because the language of Timed Automata is not closed under complement. Our approach
is, however, decidable because we are based on finite timed trace semantics. As a price to pay, our
method is limited to verify timed safety properties or bounded liveness properties. This is justified
by the fact that most of the verified properties are safety properties [103].
Chapter 10
Tool Implementation: Process Analysis
Toolkit
Concurrent systems exhibit complex behaviors. System simulation and verification become more
and more demanding as the complexity grows. It is highly desirable to have automatic tool support
for the system analysis. In this chapter, we present Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) [1], which is a
self-contained framework to support composing, simulating and reasoning of concurrent systems.
PAT provides user friendly interfaces for system modeling and simulation. Most importantly, PAT
implements various model checking algorithm and optimization techniques developed in the previ-
ous chapters. PAT is designed to be a general framework, which can be easily extended to support
systems with new languages syntax and verification algorithms. Currently, three modules have been
developed in PAT: Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) module, Real-time System (RTS)
module and Web Service (WS) module.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.1 provides an architecture overview
of PAT. Section 10.2 presents PAT’s system design. Section 10.3 discusses the three modules cur-
rently developed in PAT in details. Section 10.4 reviews related work and concludes.
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10.1 Overview of PAT
Critical system requirements like safety, liveness and fairness play important roles in software spec-
ification, development and testing. It is desirable to have handy tools to simulate the system be-
haviors and verify critical properties. Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) [1] was initially designed
to investigate system verification under fairness assumptions [202]. Later, we have successfully
demonstrated PAT as an analyzer for process algebras in [146]. Since then, PAT has been evolved
to be a self-contained framework to support analysis of concurrent and real-time systems.
PAT provides simple installation, wizard like guidance and users friendly interfaces. System mod-
els can be easily composed with the help of featured editing functions. The models can then be
simulated using automatic animations. Most importantly, PAT implements various model checking
techniques (proposed in the previous chapters) catering for checking deadlock-freeness, divergence-
freeness, reachability, LTL properties with fairness assumptions (see Chapter 4), refinement relation
checking (see Chapter 6) and etc. To achieve good performance, advanced techniques are imple-
mented in PAT, e.g. partial order reduction (see Section 6.2.2), process counter abstraction (see
Section 5.4), bounded model checking (see Chapter 8), parallel model checking (see Section 4.6),
etc. We have used PAT to model and verify a variety of systems, ranging from recently proposed
distributed algorithms, security protocols to real-world systems like the pacemaker system [28].
Previously unknown bugs have been discovered (see Section 5.2.3). The experiment results show
that PAT is capable of verifying systems with large number of states and complements the state-of-
the-art model checkers in some cases.
Starting from PAT 2.0, we have applied a layered design to support the analysis of the different
system/languages by implementing them as plug-in modules. Figure 10.1 shows the architecture
design of PAT. For each supported system (e.g., distributed system, real-time system, service ori-
ented computing, bio-system, security protocols and sensor network), a dedicated module is created
in PAT, which identifies the (specialized) language syntax, well-formness rules as well as (opera-
tional) formal semantics. For instance, the CSP module is developed for the analysis of concurrent
system modeled in CSP#. The operational semantics of the target language translates the behaviors
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Figure 10.1: PAT architecture
of a model into Labeled Transition Systems (LTS). LTS serves as the internal representations of the
input models, which can be automatically explored by the verification algorithms or used for simu-
lation. To perform model checking on LTSs, the number of states in the LTSs needs to be finite. For
systems with infinite behaviors (e.g., real time clocks or infinite number of processes), abstraction
techniques are needed. Examples of abstraction techniques include data abstraction, process counter
abstraction (see Section 5.4), clock zone abstraction (see Section 9.1), environment abstraction, etc.
The verification algorithms perform on-the-fly exploration of the LTSs. If any counterexample is
identified during the exploration, then it can be animated in the simulator. The advantage of this de-
sign allows the developed model checking algorithms to be shared by all modules. To create a new
module in PAT, users simply need to develop a parser for the target modeling language and language
construct classes which define their operational semantics. With the help of predefined APIs, exam-
ples and tools (e.g. automatic parser generator), developing a module for a new language becomes
relatively easy and requires less expertise1 .
1Experiences suggest that a new module can be developed in months or even weeks.
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Till now, three modules have been developed. CSP module supports modeling and verification
of general concurrent systems, especially under a variety of fairness assumptions. RTS module
provides analysis for real-time systems which are specified using hierarchical timed processes. WS
module supports modeling and verification of Web service orchestration and choreography. In the
future, we plan to develop modules supporting sensor network, UML (state chart and sequence
diagrams), security domain (security protocols) and so on.
Starting from 2007, PAT (current version 2.7) has come to a stable stage with solid testing and
various applications. More than 50 build-in examples (including all examples and case studies in
this thesis) are embedded in PAT. PAT has been used by a number of institutions as a research or
educational tool. It has attracted more than 400 downloads from 93 organizations in 23 countries
and regions. Currently, there are 1213 classes with more than 110K LOC in PAT’s source code.
We continue the development with the aim of developing an easy-to-use, powerful and efficient
analysis toolkit for multiple domains. A complete PAT history and user information can be found in
Appendix D.
10.2 System Design
PAT is implemented in C# 2.0 for the benefits of Object-Oriented design and competitive per-
formance. PAT adopts a hierarchical design. The class diagram in Figure 10.2 shows the hori-
zontal view of the system design. The system consists of two basic packages: PAT .GUI and
PAT .Common . PAT .GUI contains all graphical user interface classes. PAT .Common contains
all basic entities and associations that other language modules can use and follow. Each module is
packed into a package and implements necessary classes by following the design interfaces.
Abstract class ModuleFacadeBase in PAT .Common package defines the module interface by
adopting the Façade design pattern. It has three public methods to do the parsing, show simula-
tor window and model checker window. SimulatorGUI and ModelCheckerGUI are the graphic
user interface classes for simulation and model checking, which can be used by all modules. In
addition, the two classes can be overridden according to new display requirements. The internal
10.2. SYSTEM DESIGN 199
Figure 10.2: Class diagram of PAT
representation of system models are stored as Specification objects, which are composed by a col-
lection of Processes and Assertions. Process is the base class for all language constructs with
an abstract method MakeOneMove , which should be overridden in all sub-classes according to
operational semantics of the language constructs. For example, MakeOneMove method in Skip
class returns a Stop process and unchanged valuation together with the termination event X (by
following skip rule in Section 3.1.2). Assertion is the base class of all assertions with an abstract
method Verify , which should be overridden in the sub-classes to implement the actual verification
algorithms. In PAT .Common package, several basic model checking algorithms have been imple-
mented and can be shared by all modules. Each assertion has one Configuration that represents
the initial configuration of the LTS to be verified (refinement assertion has two initial configura-
tions for the implementation and specification respectively). Each configuration has a Process and
a Valuation of the global variables and channels, which conforms to our definition of the configura-
tion in Section 3.1.2. The LTS of a model to be checked is generated dynamically in the Assertions
by keeping on invoking the MoveOneStep method, starting from the initial configuration.
Every module needs to implement ModuleFacade interface (by inheriting ModuleFacadeBase
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Figure 10.3: Workflow of CSP module
class) in order to communicate with PAT .GUI package. The internal process constructs (e.g.
parallel composition, sequential compositions, choice process and so on) need to inherit Process
class. New assertions can also be implemented by inheriting Assertion class or its subclasses.
Parser class needs implemented in each module according to its language syntax. Configuration
and Valuation classes can be customized in each module. For instance, RTS module redefines the
two classes in order to store the DBM data structure (see Section 9.1.3) and manipulate clocks in
MoveOneStep method. Each module is compiled into a Dynamic Linked Library (DLL), which
can be loaded at run-time by the PAT .GUI package.
PAT .GUI package loads the syntax files of different modules at the initialization, which stores
the syntax color and DLL linking information. When users want to parse, simulate or verify an
input model, the linked DLL is loaded into the system dynamically and the corresponding interface
method is invoked.
In the vertical view, four components constitute to PAT, namely the editor, the parser, the simulator
and the verifiers. Figure 10.3 demonstrates the design of CSP Module. The editor is featured with
powerful text editing, syntax highlighting, multi-documents environment, etc. The parser transforms
the system models and the properties into internal representation as Processes and Assertions. The
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simulator allows users to perform various simulation tasks on the input models: complete states
generation of execution graph, automatic simulation, user interactive simulation, trace replay and
etc. The simulator is also used to visualize Büchi automata generated from the negation of LTL
assertions and counterexamples generated by the verifiers. Common verifiers are used to deal with
different properties efficiently.
10.3 PAT Modules
In this section, we introduce the three modules and their major functionalities developed so far. We
focus on the unique features for each module. The common functions like model editing, simulation,
deadlock and reachability analysis are omitted.
10.3.1 CSP Module
CSP module is designed for analyzing general concurrent systems. CSP module supports a rich
modeling language CSP# (see Section 3.1 and PAT user manual [1]). Distinguished from existing
model checkers, CSP module found its strength in two unique aspects.
Firstly, the LTL model checking algorithm in CSP module is designed to handle a variety of fair-
ness constraints efficiently. Two different approaches for verification under fairness are supported
in PAT, targeting different users. For ordinary users, one of the following options may be chosen
and applied to the whole system: weak fairness or strong local/global fairness. The model checking
algorithm works by identifying one bundle of fair executions (within a SCC) at a time and checks
whether the desirable property is satisfied. In general, however, system level fairness may some-
times be overwhelming. The worst case complexity is high and, worse, partial order reduction is
not feasible for model checking under strong local/global fairness. A typical scenario for network
protocols is that fairness constraints are associated with only messaging but not local actions. We
thus support an alternative approach, which allows users annotate individual actions with fairness.
Notice that this option is only for advanced users who know exactly which part of the system needs
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fairness constraints. Nevertheless this approach is much more flexible, i.e., different parts of the sys-
tem may have different fairness. Furthermore, it allows partial order reduction over actions which
are irrelevant to the fairness constraints, which allows us to handle much larger systems. Other
effective reduction techniques supported by CSP module including process counter abstraction (see
Section 5.4 for more details), which reduces state space dramatically by grouping similar processes
in interleaving composition. Furthermore, CSP module provides a parallel verification option (see
Section 4.6) for LTL properties to make best use of multi-core CPU.
Secondly, CSP module allows users to reason about behaviors of a system as a whole by refinement
checking. Refinement checking (see Chapter 6) is to verify whether an implementation’s behav-
iors follow the specification’s. CSP module supports six notions of refinements based on different
semantics, namely trace refinement/equivalence, stable failures refinement/equivalence, failures di-
vergence refinement/equivalence. A refinement checking algorithm (see Section 6.2) is used to
perform refinement checking on-the-fly.
10.3.2 Real-time System Module
Real-time system (RTS) module supports analysis of real-time systems. In RTS module, a system
is modeled using a hierarchical timed process with mutable data (see Section 3.2). Additional
behavioral patterns which are useful in modeling and analyzing real-time systems are introduced.
Examples are deadline (which constrains a process to terminate within some time units), timed
interrupt , etc. Instead of explicitly manipulating clock variables (as in Timed Automata), the
time related process constructs are designed to build on implicit clocks. Based on the clock zone
abstraction (see Chapter 9), RTS module is designed to support dense-time semantic model (in
contrast to discrete-time or continuous-time), i.e., all clock values are rational numbers. RTS module
supports only integer numbers, since a set of rational numbers can be converted an ‘equivalent’ set
of integer numbers by multiplying the least common multiple.
RTS module provides efficient mechanical verification support for a number of properties, deadlock-
freeness, (timed) divergence-freeness, reachablity, etc. LTL-X (i.e. LTL without next operator)
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model checking or trace refinement checking (without time transitions in the specification) are sup-
ported based on the clock abstraction techniques developed in Chapter 9.
For timed refinement checking, RTS module uses a timed trace semantics (i.e. a mapping from a
model to a set of finite timed event sequences) and a timed trace refinement relationship (i.e. a
model satisfies a specification if and only if the timed traces of the models are a subset of those
of the specification). The verification algorithm developed for timed refinement checking (see Sec-
tion 9.2.3) will verify that a system model is consistent with a specification by showing a refinement
relationship. A timed event sequence is presented as a counterexample if there is no such refinement
relationship. For the timed refinement checking, PAT requires that the implementation or specifica-
tions are not divergent, otherwise the shared clock will not be bounded.
10.3.3 Web Service Module
The Web Services paradigm promises to enable rich, dynamic, and flexible interoperability of highly
heterogeneous and distributed web-based platform. There are two different viewpoints in the area
of Web Service composition. Web Service choreography describes collaboration protocols of co-
operating Web Service participants from a global view. Web Service orchestration describes col-
laboration of the Web Services in predefined patterns based on local decision about their interaction
with one another at the message/execution level, which is a local view.
WS module is developed to offer practical solutions to for two important issues in Web Services
paradigm. First, if both the choreography and orchestration are given, it is important to guarantee
that the two views are consistent, by showing that the orchestration conforms to the choreography.
Second, given only a choreography, it is necessary to check whether it is implementable and synthe-
size a prototype implementation (if possible). In WS module, conformance is verified by showing
weak simulation relationship using an on-the-fly model checking algorithm. A scalable lightweight
approach is used to solve the synthesis problem.
Figure 10.4 shows the workflow of WS module. Given a choreography or an orchestration, a pre-
processing component is used to extract relevant information and build a simplified model in inter-
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Figure 10.4: WS module workflow
mediate languages (see Section 7.5), which are designed to capture behaviors of choreography and
orchestration. Both languages (for choreography and orchestration) have their own parsers, com-
pilers as well as formal operational semantics. Therefore, users can quickly write a Web Service
model and analyze it using our visualized simulator, verifier and synthesizer.
Given a choreography, WS module can statically analyze whether it is well-formed, for instance
whether it can be implemented in a distributed setting without introducing unexpected behaviors. If
the choreography is not implementable, WS module generates an implementable one, by injecting
extra message passing into the choreography. Otherwise, WS module may be used to automatically
generate a prototype orchestration (which may later be refined and translated to a WS-BPEL docu-
ment). If an orchestration is provided, the conformance checker allows users to verify whether the
orchestration is valid with respect to the choreography. Choreography may contain free variables
(for environment inputs), which must be instantiated during execution time. This is achieved by
synchronizing the environments (of the choreography and the orchestration) whenever a free vari-
able is used. WS module offers other verification options as well, in particular, deadlock-freeness
checking, LTL model checking, etc.
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10.4 Summary
In summary, we have developed a self-contained framework PAT for specification, simulation and
verification of concurrent and real-time systems. PAT adopts an extensible design, which allows new
languages and verification algorithms to be supported easily. Three modules have been developed to
support the analysis of different systems. Experiment results show that PAT does verification rather
efficiently.
As a temporal logic model checker, PAT is related to the model checking tools like NuSMV [53],
SPIN [111], mCRL2 [102] and so on. Compared to these tools, PAT adopts event-based modeling
language with the emphasis of fairness verification. Better usability and extensibility are the ad-
vantages of PAT. Bogor [77] is another extensible model checker developed as a plugin of Eclipse.
It allows user to extend the base language to support new language features, but can not be fully
customized with desired syntax and semantic model.
For refinement checking, PAT is related to tools on equivalence/refinement checking (or language
containment checking), e.g. FDR [176], ARC [162] and ProBE [3]. Compared with FDR, PAT per-
forms an on-the-fly verification with partial order reduction. ARC (Adelaide Refinement Checker)
is a refinement checker based on ordered binary decision diagrams (BDD). It has been shown that
ARC outperforms FDR in a few cases [162]. PAT adapts an explicit approach for model checking.
It has long been known there are pros and cons choosing an explicit approach or a BDD approach
(refer to comparisons between SPIN and NuSMV). Nonetheless, we may incorporate BDD in the
future. ProBE is a simulator developed by Formal Method Europe to interactively explore traces of
a given process. The simulator embedded in PAT has the full functionality of ProBE.
In terms of real-time verification, PAT is related to a number of automatic verification support for
Timed Automata, including UPPAAL [135], KRONOS [35], RED [217], Timed COSPAN [207],
Rabbit [33]. Different from the Timed Automata approach, PAT model checker is the first dedi-
cated verification tool support for hierarchical real-time modeling languages (like Timed CSP) by
adapting advanced verification techniques. In addition, PAT complements UPPAAL with the ability
to check full LTL-X properties and refinement relationship. To the best of our knowledge, there are
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few verification support for Timed CSP, e.g. the theorem proving approach documented in [40, 101],
the translation to UPPAAL models [70, 71] and the approach based on constraint solving [72]. Re-
garding to the timed refinement checking, there is no tool support to the best of our knowledge. One
of the reasons is that it has been proved that the refinement checking (or equivalently the language
inclusion) problem in the setting of Timed Automata [10] is undecidable. Other negative results
include that Timed Automata cannot be determinized. It has been proved [160] that language in-
clusion checking against a Timed Automaton with one clock, however, is decidable. We show that
timed refinement checking (under an assumption on τ -transitions) is decidable in our setting. The
timed systems we tackle correspond to a special subclass of Timed Automata (i.e. with one clock
only and τ -transitions, and all states are accepting). As a price to pay, direct comparison of clocks’
values are disallowed and our method is limited to verify timed safety properties (or bounded live-
ness properties). The latter is justified by the fact that most of the verified properties are safety
properties [103].
WS module is related to works on verifying Web Services. In particular, it is closely related to
LTSA-WS [95], which translates Web Service model into Finite State Processes (i.e., a simple
modeling language) and then verifies conformance by showing a bi-simulation relationship. Dif-
ferent from their approach, WS module is based on languages specially designed for Web Services




This chapter concludes the thesis. Section 11.1 summarizes the contribution of this thesis and
Section 11.2 discusses some on-going and future directions.
11.1 Summary of the Thesis
In this thesis, we focused on the verification of concurrent and real-time systems using model check-
ing approach. The main outcome is Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT), which is a self-contained frame-
work to support composing, simulating and reasoning of concurrent and real-time systems. We used
PAT to model and verify a variety of systems, ranging from recently proposed distributed algorithms,
concurrent systems to real-world applications. In the following, we summarize the contributions of
the thesis, which are all implemented in PAT.
First of all, we designed an event-based modeling language for concurrent and real-time systems.
This language integrates high-level specification languages with mutable data variables and low-
level procedural codes. Timing requirements for real-time systems are captured using behavior
patterns. With the formally defined syntax and operational semantics, the system models can be
translated into labeled transition systems, which are suitable for model checking.
207
11.1. SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 208
One of the main focuses of this thesis is LTL verification with fairness assumptions. We developed
an on-the-fly LTL model checking algorithm for fairness enhanced systems based on SCC search-
ing. This algorithm gives a unified solution that handles a variety of fairness, e.g. process-level
weak/strong fairness, event-level weak/strong fairness and strong global fairness. To achieve better
performance, the algorithm was further changed to support parallel verification in multi-core archi-
tecture with shared memory. We applied the proposed fairness model checking algorithms on a set
of self-stabilizing population protocols for ring networks, which only work under global fairness.
One previously unknown bug in a leader election protocol [118] was discovered using PAT. Pop-
ulation protocols are designed for network with large or even unbounded number of nodes, which
raises the space explosion problem. To solve this problem, a process counter abstraction technique
was developed for model checking parameterized systems under fairness. We showed that model
checking under fairness is feasible, even without the knowledge of process identifiers.
The second focus of this thesis is refinement checking. Our modeling language is an event-based
formalism, whose behaviors can be captured using event traces. Following the trace semantics in
CSP [108], we developed a trace refinement verification algorithm to verify complex properties
beyond the expressiveness power of LTL. Advanced model checking techniques, like partial order
reduction was incorporated into the proposed algorithm. To demonstrate the usefulness of refine-
ment checking, we presented two applications. First, we verified linearizability based on refinement
relations from concrete implementations to linearizable abstract specifications. We have checked
a variety of implementations of concurrent objects, including the first algorithms for the mailbox
problem [19] and scalable NonZero indicators [78]. Second, we applied the refinement checking
algorithm to automatically check consistency between Web Service choreography and Web Service
orchestration by showing conformance relationship between them.
As an attempt to handle large state space, we used bounded model checking technique [54] to
verify LTL properties using compositional encoding of hierarchical systems as SAT problems. The
encoding avoids state space explosion by exploring only the partial state space. The experiment
results showed that our approach has a competitive performance for verifying systems with large
number of states. However, this approach was limited by the performance of the SAT solver and
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hard to scale up for encoding of variables. Therefore, we did not continue in this direction.
We remark that in theory we can encode the property model as temporal logic formulae (as temporal
logic is typically more expressive than LTS) and then apply temporal-logic based model checking
to verify the property (e.g. SCC-based LTL verification). It is, however, impractical. For instance,
LTL model checking is exponential in the size of the formulae and therefore it cannot handle formu-
lae which encode non-trivial property model. In short, refinement checking allows users to verify
a different class of properties from temporal logic formulae. Comparing the three verification sup-
port, SCC-based LTL verification is more efficient than refinement checking and bounded model
checking when the LTL formula is small. Bounded model checking is good for the verification with
limited search depth or counterexamples.
Real-time systems are not subject to model checking directly because of the infinite clock values.
To support the automatic verification of real-time systems, we proposed a clock zone abstraction
technique to build an abstract finite state machine from the real-time model, which makes the model
checking feasible. In our approach, clocks are created dynamically to capture constraints introduced
by the timed process constructs, and deleted if they are not used by any process. Clocks may be
shared for many constructs so that the number of clocks used is minimum. We proved that this
abstraction has finite state and it weakly bi-simulates the concrete model, which allows us to perform
sound and complete LTL model checking or refinement checking upon the abstraction. To reason
about behaviors involving time, we formally defined a timed trace semantics and a timed trace
refinement relationship. We extended the zone abstraction technique to preserve timed event traces,
hence timed refinement checking is possible.
11.2 On-going and Future Works
We are actively developing PAT. In this section, we discuss some on-going and future works sur-
rounding the PAT development.
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11.2.1 Tool Development
Starting with modeling languages, CSP# and its real-time extension are quite expressive for mod-
eling concurrent and real-time systems. We are planning to introduce new language features, in-
cluding user defined data structures, variables of real values, higher order processes. Adding new
features is not a matter of arithmetic, each of these features requires substantial effort in both re-
search and implementation. User defined data structures can be implemented using external C#
code with proper interfaces interacting with PAT. To support real values, data abstraction is needed
to reduce the continuous domains into discrete ones. For the real-time systems, we would like to
add the syntax for explicit clocks and the notion of urgent events [62], which can considerably sim-
plify the modeling process. Another aspect related to the modeling is the model conversion from
existing languages. We are working on the automatic conversion from Promela models [111] (the
input language for SPIN) to CSP# models. This is feasible because Promela is a subset of precess
algebra, and CSP# covers most syntax of Promela. The benefit of this conversion is to attract more
users of other tools to start using PAT. Another targeting language is Petri-net [165] for its simple
structure based on labeled transition systems.
To improve the usability of PAT, we are working of two directions. First, we are providing the
advanced editing features for system modeling like refactoring functions and IntelliSense (code
auto completion). Examples of refactoring functions are “go to definition for selected variable or
process", “find usage of selected variable and process", “extract selected text as another process",
etc. IntelliSense is an auto completion technique based on the user input, which is handy when there
are more libraries. Second, graphical system input as supported by Uppaal [135] and TINA [32] is
extremely helpful for starting users. Our plan is to implement the drag-and-drop model creation in
the future.
To improve the reliability of PAT, there are two possible strategies. The first strategy is to create
more testing cases. We are using unit testing tool (e.g. NUnit) to perform unit testing and integration
testing. With the rapid increasing of the functionalities, more testing cases are needed. The second
strategy is to use verification tools like Spec# [27] and Contracts [26] to conduct both static and
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dynamic verifications on pre-conditions, post-conditions, loop invariants, assertions and so on.
11.2.2 Model Checking Techniques
To develop new model checking algorithms and related techniques has top priority in PAT. We have
identified five possible directions.
First, we plan to investigate methods to combine well-known state space reduction techniques. we
know that systems that accept an infinite number of threads or unbound data structures make model
checking impossible. Symmetric properties among threads can reduce infinite number of threads to
a small number. Data abstraction for infinite domain data variables can also be incorporated into the
model checking to handle unbounded data size. These solutions are valuable for our model checking
algorithms and refinement checking algorithms.
Second, we are interested in adopting symbolic representation techniques, like Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDD) [42]. Our bounded model checking solution is limited by the performance of SAT
solvers. Since BDD has been used to handle extremely large number of states (many orders of
magnitude larger than could be handled by the explicit-state algorithms), implementation based on
BDD may make bound model checking scalable for compositional models.
Third, we are interested in automatic detection of symmetry relations. Reductions based on symme-
try relations have been investigated during the last decade. Most of these approaches requires users
to provide the symmetry relations, which makes this technique impractical. This is the reason why
SPIN does not support symmetry reduction. Therefore, automatical discover of symmetry relations
from the model is worth investigating. One possible solution is to detect symmetry relations by
analyzing program structures statically.
Last, we plan to look in to probabilistic model checking techniques, which can help to analyze
systems which exhibit random or probabilistic behavior. Particular, the integration of probabilistic
model checking with fairness assumptions and refinement checking techniques is interesting to us.
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11.2.3 Module Development
Since PAT offers a flexible design, implementing new modules is particularly interesting. Our tar-
get domains include orchestration language, security protocol, sensor network (particular NesC
language [98]). Orc language [156] is a modeling language for distributed and concurrent program-
ming, which provides uniform access to computational services, including distributed communi-
cation and data manipulation. The only verification support for Orc language is the approach by
converting Orc models to Timed Automata, hence using UPPAAL [73] to do the verification. Direct
support of Orc language in PAT is possible, because Orc is an algebra like language extended with
clocks. CSP has been used to model and verify security protocol with great success [185, 180]. The
common approach is to convert security model into CSP, and use FDR to do the verification. Direct
supporting security modeling language will make the verification simpler and more effective. The
verification of sensor network model is done by converting NesC language into Promela, which is a
subset of CSP#. Therefore, developing a module to support NesC language is straightforward.
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Appendix A
Operational Semantics of CSP#
The following are firing rules associated with process constructs other than those discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1.2. Let e ∈ Σ, eτ ∈ Σ ∪ {τ}, x ∈ Σ ∪ {X} and ∗ ∈ Σ ∪ {τ,X}.
(V ,P)
e
→ (V ′,P ′), e ∈ X
[ hide1 ]
(V ,P \X )
τ
→ (V ′,P ′)
(V ,P)
x
→ (V ′,P ′), x 6∈ X
[ hide2 ]
(V ,P \X )
x
→ (V ′,P ′ \X )
(V ,P)
eτ→ (V ′,P ′)
[ seq1 ]
(V ,P ; Q)
eτ→ (V ′,P ′; Q)
(V ,P)
X
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ seq2 ]





→ (V ′,P ′)
[ ch1 ]
(V ,P 2 Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′)
(V ,Q)
x
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ ch2 ]
(V ,P 2 Q)
x
→ (V ′,Q ′)
(V ,P)
τ
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ ch3 ]
(V ,P 2 Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′ 2 Q)
(V ,Q)
τ
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ ch4 ]
(V ,P 2 Q)
τ
→ (V ′,P 2 Q ′)
[ non1 ]









→ (V ′,P ′)
[ int1 ]
(V ,P ||| Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ′ ||| Q)
(V ,Q)
x
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ int2 ]
(V ,P ||| Q)
x
→ (V ′,P ||| Q ′)
233
Appendix A. Operational Semantics of CSP# 234
(V ,P)
X
→ (V ′,P ′), (V ,Q)
X
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ int3 ]
(V ,P ||| Q)
X
→ (V ′,P ′ ||| Q ′)
(V ,P)
∗
→ (V ′,P ′)
[ inter1 ]
(V ,P △ Q)
∗
→ (V ′,P ′ △ Q)
(V ,Q)
e
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ inter2 ]
(V ,P △ Q)
e
→ (V ′,Q ′)
(V ,Q)
τ
→ (V ′,Q ′)
[ inter3 ]
(V ,P △ Q)
τ
→ (V ′,P △ Q ′)
Appendix B
CSP# Models of Population Protocols
1. #define N 3; #define C 3;
2. var color [N ]; var precolor [N ]; var succolor [N ];
3. Interaction(u, v) = if (color [v ] == precolor [u] ∧ color [v ] 6= succolor [u]){
4. act1.u.v{succolor [v ] = mycolor [u]} → Interaction(u, v)
5. } else if (color [v ] == succolor [u] ∧ color [v ] 6= precolor [u]){
6. act2.u.v{precolor [v ] = color [u]; } → Interaction(u, v)
7. } else {
8. act3.u.v{precolor [u] = color [v ]; succolor [v ] = color [u]}
9. → Interaction(u, v)
10. };
11. Init() = ...
12. OrientingUndirected() = Init(); ||| x : {0..N − 1}@(Interaction(x , (x + 1)%N )
13. ||| Interaction((x + 1)%N , x ));
14. #define property1 (x : {0..N − 1}@precolor [x ] 6= succolor [x ]));
15. #define property2 (...);
16. #assert OrientingUndirected() 
32
property1;
17. #assert OrientingUndirected() 
32
property2;
Figure B.1: CSP# model for orienting undirected ring protocol
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1. #define N 3;
2. var leader [N ]; var label [N ]; var probe[N ]; var phase[N ]; var bullet [N ];
3. Interact(u, v) =
4. [label [u] == label [v ] ∧ probe[u] == 1 ∧ phase[u] == 0]
5. act1.u.v{leader [u] = 1; probe[u] = 0; bullet [v ] = 0; phase[u] = 1;
6. probe[v ] = 1;} → Interact(u, v)
7. 2 [label [u] == label [v ] ∧ probe[u] == 1 ∧ phase[u] == 1 ∧ probe[v ] == 0]
8. act2.u.v{leader [u] = 1; probe[u] = 0; bullet [v ] = 0;
9. label [v ] = 1− label [v ]; phase[v ] = 0;} → Interact(u, v)
10. 2 ...
11. 2 [label [u] 6= label [v ] ∧ leader [v ] == 0 ∧ bullet [v ] == 1 ∧ probe[v ] == 0]
12. act11.u.v{bullet [u] = 1; bulllet [v ] = 0;} → Interact(u, v)
13. Init() = ...
14. LeaderElection() = Init(); (||| x : 0..N − 1@Interaction(x , (x + 1)%N ));
15. #define leaderelection (leader [0] + leader [1] + leader [2] == 1);
16. #assert LeaderElection() 
32
leaderelection;
Figure B.2: CSP# model for leader election protocol in odd rings
1. #define N 3;
2. var leader [N ]; var label [N ]; var token[N ];
3. Rule1(u, v) = [!leader [u] ∧ leader [v ] ∧ label [u] == label [v ]]
4. (rule1.u.v{token[u] = 0; token[v ] = 1; label [v ] = 1− label [u];}
5. → Rule1(u, v));
6. Rule2(u, v) = [!leader [v ] ∧ label [u] 6= label [v ]]
7. (rule2.u.v{token[u] = 0; token[v ] = 1; label [v ] = label [u];}
8. → Rule2(u, v));
9. Init() = ...
10.TokenCirculation() = Init(); (||| x : 0..N − 1@(Rule1(x , (x + 1)%N )
11. ||| (Rule2(x , (x + 1)%N ));
12. #define onetoken (token[0] + token[1] + token[2] == 1);
13. #assert TokenCirculation() 
32
onetoken;
Figure B.3: CSP# model for token circulation protocol
Appendix C
Operational Semantics of Abstract
Real-Time System
The following are abstract firing rules associated with process constructs other than those discussed







(V , [b]P ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ,P ,D↑)
[ aev ]
(V , e{prg} → P ,D)
e
→֒ (prg(V ),P ,D↑)
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
[ aex1 ]
(V ,P | Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′ ∧ ι(V ,Q ,D))
(V ,Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,Q ′,D)
[ aex2 ]
(V ,P | Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,Q ′,D ′ ∧ ι(V ,P ,D))
(V ,P ,D)
e
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′), e 6∈ αQ
[ apa1 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q ,D)
e
→֒ (V ′,P ′ ‖ Q ,D ′ ∧ ι(V ,Q ,D))
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(V ,Q ,D)
e
→֒ (V ′,Q ′,D ′), e 6∈ αP
[ apa2 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q ,D)
e
→֒ (V ′,P ‖ Q ′,D ′ ∧ ι(V ,P ,D))
(V ,P ,D)
e
→֒ (V ,P ′,D ′), (V ,Q ,D)
e
→֒ (V ,Q ′,D ′′), e ∈ αP ∩ αQ
[ apa3 ]
(V ,P ‖ Q ,D)
e
→֒ (V ,P ′ ‖ Q ′,D ′ ∧ D ′′)
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′), x 6= X
[ ase1 ]
(V ,P ; Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′; Q ,D ′ ∧ (X 6∈ init(V ,P) ∨ D))
(V ,P ,D)
X
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
(V ,P ; Q ,D)
τ
→֒ (V ,Q ,D ∧ D ′)
(V ,P ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′),Q =̂ P
(V ,Q ,D)
x
→֒ (V ′,P ′,D ′)
Appendix D
PAT History
PAT project started from July, 2007 in National University of Singapore. PAT was named Libra orig-
inally for its emphasis on the fairness model checking. Soon, it was renamed to PAT because of the
conflict with Microsoft search engine. After finishing LTL verification under fairness assumption,
we looked at the bounded model checking, which resulted a bounded model checker for CSP. How-
ever, we found that bounded model checking was difficult to apply for variables. Since we were
expending the modeling languages quickly, we decided to stop the development of the bounded
model checker. At the same time, the on-the-fly refinement checking algorithm was quickly imple-
mented in PAT by following the ideas in FDR.
In year 2008, we started to look for applications of the model checking algorithms developed. Our
first application is to apply fairness model checking on population protocols, which gave a success-
ful result with a bug discovered. The second application was to verify linearizability. After several
attempts, we found refinement checking can be applied to it directly. In ICSE 2008, we successfully
demonstrated PAT as an analysis toolkit for CSP [146]. After that we started the development of
Web Service module with an architecture redesign.
Starting from 2009, we looked at the real-time verification since there is very few tool support for
Timed CSP. RTS module was completely finished in September 2009. We also looked reduction and
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optimizations for fairness model checking, for example the multi-core support and process counter
abstraction.
Currently, PAT version 2.7.0 is public available at our web site [1]. We keep in working on the
improvements of every aspect of the system. Our aim is to develop an easy-to-user, powerful and
efficient analysis toolkit for concurrent systems.
PAT Users
As a research tool, PAT has been used by quite a number of institutions for various purposes. Till
now, there are more than 400 downloads from 93 organizations in 23 countries and regions.
PAT has also been used for teaching two courses (CS4211 Advanced Software Engineering and
CS5232 Formal Methods) in National University of Singapore. More than 300 students are using
it as an educational tool for learning process algebra and model checking. PAT’s development
involved with collaboration of Microsoft Research Asia. We worked with theory group in Microsoft
Research Asia to model checking distributed algorithms with successful results. PAT has been used
as a model checker for web service choreography verification at Peking University in China.
Maturity and Robustness
After two years’ development, PAT has come to a stable stage with solid testing. The toolkit has
developed as a self-contained application with user friendly design. The editing functions are com-
plete. The detailed debugging message will be popped up for syntax errors. A rich set of simulation
and model checking options are also provided for different requirements.
Currently the system contains 1213 classes with more than 110K LOC. We have conducted heavy
testing to guarantee the correctness. Internally, we have a complete set of unit testing for the whole
system. For the black-box testing, PAT has been used to model hundreds of systems with differ-
ent properties. Currently, there are 50 built-in examples in PAT ranging from classical concurrent
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algorithms, math puzzles, real world problems (e.g., pace maker), population protocols, security
protocols and recently published distributed algorithms (e.g., mailbox problem).
For scalability, the model checker in PAT is capable of handling tens of millions states within several
hours, which is compatible to SPIN. The simulator can display up to several hundreds of states
within the readability. The whole system has gone through syntax changes twice and once system
redesign. The Object-Oriented design is incorporated maximally, which makes the language and
properties extension easily and independently.
